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INTRODUCTION
Massimo Meccarelli
Almost a decade has passed since the outbreak of the economic crisis; 
from its original nucleus, its effects have quickly affected the social and geo-
political fields. Such wide impact and its complex implications make the crisis 
an object susceptible of multiple readings.
The basic issue examined by the studies collected in this book1 is the out-
come of the crisis for fundamental rights and social protection2; however the 
particular aim of these essays is to explore the impact of the crisis on law and 
society. We speak of ‘exploration’, since our analysis does not claim to carry 
out a comprehensive survey; rather, we want to test the depth of the problem, 
by comparing the analytical perspectives obtainable from legal and human 
sciences. The theme has a complexity that goes beyond the understanding of 
each specialist knowledge, and this complexity can better be tackled through 
a genuine multidisciplinary approach. We do not intend to propose awkward 
pairings between fields of knowledge that are so different in terms of language 
and rhetoric used and in identification and analysis of the problems; we are 
dealing with systems of knowledge that are relatively incommensurable. We 
are only interested in creating the conditions for a meaningful dialogue.
The book considers diverse topics, and there are several ways to bring to-
gether such different analyses. We give readers the freedom to set their own 
narrative itinerary; in these short introductory pages we want only to draw 
attention to the three convergence paths, which give structure to the volume.
The first part of the volume, the crisis as a social object, is the one in which 
1  This volume begun to take shape in a Workshop organized on 10th and 11th Decem-
ber 2015 at the University of Macerata, as part of the research project IPC - Perceptions of 
(In)security and Forms of Legal Protection in Times of Crises. 
We would like to thank Prof. Manuel Martinez Neira for including this publication in 
the series Legal History of the Figuerola Institute - Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. 
Many thanks also to Francesca Martello for the editing of the manuscript. 
2  It is the same basic issue investigated in the previous volume produced within the 
research project IPC: Meccarelli Massimo (a cura di) (2016), Diversità e discorso giuridico. 
Temi per un dialogo interdisciplinare su diritti e giustizia in tempo di transizione, 
Madrid, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, (e-book version available open access: https://
e-archivo.uc3m.es/handle/10016/23792). 
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the crisis is most directly observed in terms of its attributing force. The time 
of crisis is, in fact, a conjuncture, but it has adscriptive importance in relation 
to the problem we want to understand. In other words, it represents, not only 
an historical phase in which we can consider legal and social issues, but also 
the temporal circumstances that determine and configure these issues.
The essays in this section, therefore, seek to identify some attributive ef-
fects of the crisis. Silvana Colella, reading fictions of finance in contemporary 
British novels, observes the representations of the economic crisis through 
the «prism of literature» to consider what kind of «cultural work» this fiction 
performs. Francesco Costamagna analyses the legal aspects of the European 
response to the crisis, to evaluate the «impact on the fabric of the European 
integration process» and especially on some of its grounding elements such 
as the «protection of fundamental rights», the «integration through law mod-
el» and the function of the Supreme Court of Justice, which, in such a system, 
is called upon to set the limit of the intangibility of rights against the range 
of options of the political decision. Eliana Augusti inquires about the crisis 
of the conceptual path of «loyalty and belonging» at the basis of the configu-
rations of legal and political orders; in particular, Augusti describes the tra-
jectory of the dyad State-Nation, which, for a large part of the contemporary 
Age, has, amidst a complex dialectical tangle, undoubtedly played a major 
role in giving foundation to social cohesion in the legal discourse. Carla Can-
ullo’s essay closes the section, philosophically assuming the “viewpoint of the 
crisis as such”; Canullo considers and describes the crisis as a social object, 
«thing and perception» at the same time, constiting of an objective and sub-
jective dimension, that makes it - and this confirms the adscriptive nature of 
the crisis – part of the process of «building a new social reality».
In the second part of the book the essays converge on a particular issue: 
The problem of democracy, which is becoming an increasingly central ques-
tion now, as the changes imposed by the crisis have begun to settle down. It is 
the problem of recovering and renewing the democratic processes underlying 
civil coexistence in the context of Europe, which has built its model of legal 
protection and legal order on such dynamics. Again, the multidisciplinary 
prism multiplies the analytical view-points.
Louise Owen analyses an artistic-literary reflection on the crisis, which in-
vites us to focus on the problem (but also on the possibility) of the «collective 
social body as demos»; in the recent adaptations of Aeschylus’ trilogy The Or-
esteia, examined in the essay, the theatrical space has been transformed into 
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a «space of community, of political expression». The problem of the dem-
os is also at the centre of Roberta Calvano’s essay; her analysis of the legal 
mechanisms triggered in response to the economic crisis shows a «decision-
making process increasingly secluded from public debate» and a substantial 
depletion of the political representation systems. In other words, the crisis 
reopens an ancient problem connected with a more general wearing down 
of the democratic process of participation in the production of political deci-
sions. The phenomenon, in fact, also affects the formation of public opinion 
and the exercise of direct democracy. Lucia Barbone and Erik Longo survey 
this kind of problem, studying data on the relationship between immigration 
regimes and welfare state – an «issue that is first and foremost political and 
only marginally legal». In their analysis they highlight «the lack of accurate 
data as a basis for the public debate» in the recent decision process on Brexit. 
The philosophical weighting of the problem in Jean-Philippe Pierron’s es-
say confirms the picture. In times of crisis, decision-making processes of a 
predictive nature (based on diagnosis produced by scientific knowledge and 
expertise) tend to prevail over those of an anticipatory nature (deriving from 
the exercise of «political will»). The specific issue is to re-appropriate a «vol-
untarist concept of decision» with which the social and political body can 
return to build a «perspective» between «ethical imagination and anticipa-
tion». In this post-traditional society, however, it is not so much a question 
of returning to past analyses on the issue of freedom, but (and this is not an 
easy task) much more one of «discovering new forms of choice».
The third part of the book, the interdisciplinary challenge, focuses on 
some methodological and epistemological implications of our problem for 
legal and human sciences. Understanding the crisis, its manifestations, its 
effects, imagining solutions to the problems posed by the crisis, all call for a 
willingness to question disciplinary methods, and enable dialogue between 
different forms of knowledge. This issue is explored in the book from three 
different perspectives. 
The first, in Flavia Stara’s essay, focuses on the relationship between episte-
mological-cognitive and ethical dimensions, such as the relationship between 
logos and praxis. Starting with an intercultural approach to the problems and 
challenges of the contemporary world, Stara shows how the «theoretical and 
epistemological intercultural instance», in order to translate into ethical and 
political proposals, questions humanistic, social and legal knowledge, defying 
«any specific subject paradigm of knowledge and competence». The second 
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approach is that of checking the autonomy of a scientific discipline. Paolo 
Palchetti reflects on the features that international law is required to assume 
at the present stage. The problem in question is how to update the scientific 
method of international lawyers, from the traditional «rule-based approach» 
aiming to «describe what the law is» to an approach open to «non-normative 
and extra-legal elements»; it is a matter of attributing to this legal science 
also an explanatory (the «why of the law») and prescriptive («what the law 
should be») capacity. The third approach (Meccarelli) considers the relation-
ship between a specific legal problem and its pre-legal premises. The study of 
rights in times of crisis, in fact, urges to include in the legal discourse a mo-
ment of cognitive diagnosis of the social; it is a hermeneutic moment that the 
traditional method of implementing legal sciences does not allow, and that 
implies openness to interdisciplinary dialogue.
The three approaches converge in considering the opportunities that dia-
logue between disciplines and areas of knowledge – especially in the form of 
a multi-disciplinary debate – offers for dealing with such problems. It is in 
particular a matter of experiencing a methodological practice in which each 
discipline has the opportunity to give its own analytical contribution. By com-
plementing the other disciplines and, at the same time, enriching its own base 
of epistemic references, each area of knowledge – as well as each scientific 
discipline – will be able to grasp novel reasons for its own autonomy. This 
book is intended as an attempt at this methodological practice.
The Crisis as a soCial objeCT

NARRATING THE CRISIS: FICTIONS OF FINANCE
IN CONTEMPORARY BRITISH NOVELS
Silvana Colella
Fiction must stick to facts, and the truer the facts the better 
the fiction – so we are told.
[Virginia Wool, A Room of One’s Own, 1929]
The name of the game is not whether your novel honours re-
ality; it’s all about what you can get away with.
[Lionel Shriver, «Fiction and Identity Politics», 2016]
1. Introduction
Throughout the history of capitalist modernization, the cycles of bubbles 
and crashes, the grandiose ambitions of visionary speculators, and the dis-
tress caused by crises have been refracted in the figurative prism of literature. 
From Daniel Defoe’s satirical personification of Lady Credit – a capricious, 
inconstant and effeminate presence waiting to be “mastered” – to twenty-first 
century anxious refigurations of algorithms as impersonal and all-powerful 
financial villains, writers have used the medium of fiction to reframe the 
“facts” of finance and reassess its myths.1 Nineteenth-century novelists paid 
special attention to financial speculation as an increasingly democratic phe-
nomenon, attracting investors from all walks of life. Even though the majority 
of the population could hardly afford to buy stocks and shares, novelists were 
drawn to investigating the dangerous allure of speculative schemes, alerting 
readers to the risks they entailed. More explicitly than other fictional modes, 
«realism is invested in an economically situated conception of history».2 In 
their realist novels, Dickens, Trollope, Thackeray, George Eliot and other 
Victorian authors created memorable figures of speculators, eloquently de-
1  On Defoe’s understanding of public credit see Sherman (1996). In his history of 
financial crises, Kindleberger mentions several examples of literary responses to manias 
and panics, see Kindleberger (2005). On the contemporary vogue for financial thrillers see 
De Boever (2015), pp. 24-38. 
2  Shonkwiler and La Berge (2014), p. 17.
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nounced financial malfeasance, imagined poignant scenes of bankruptcy, and 
explored the impact of financialization on the everyday life of their charac-
ters, casting a sharp critical eye on what was then a new economic order, even 
as they appreciated some of its features.3 
Small wonder that when the 2008 financial meltdown shook the world, 
some commentators reached for Victorian novels – Little Dorrit (1857) and 
The Way We Live Now (1874) in particular.4 Although the financialized world 
we inhabit is markedly different from the one Dickens and Trollope knew, the 
feelings of dismay and outrage articulated in their fiction find a distinct echo 
in today’s concerns. We may not concur with their moralistic perspective, but 
the indignation conveyed by Dickens and Trollope’s satires against the ex-
cesses of finance is arguably a sentiment contemporary readers can find con-
genial. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the critique of financial spec-
ulation these authors so forcefully vented in their fiction is now hegemonic. 
The animosity against Wall Street and the City of London, the contempt for 
big speculators and corporate managers «who profit from risky decisions but 
are protected from failure by “golden parachutes”», as Žižek observes, is now 
shared at both ends of the political spectrum, by conservative Republicans as 
well as left-wing radicals.5 The crisis has sharpened the perception that the 
financial sector is increasingly detached from the “real economy” and that 
the interests of Wall Street and Main Street are divergent. Though this is not 
really the case, economists would argue, there is a widespread sense that the 
barons of finance have gone too far, governments have been too weak, and the 
99% have had to bear the brunt. As Mervyn King, the then Governor of the 
Bank of England, told the Treasury Select Committee in 2011 «The price of 
the financial crisis is being born by people who absolutely did not cause it».6 
We are still smarting under the consequences of the credit crunch. Žižek 
predicted in 2009 that the «primary immediate effect» of the crisis would be 
«the rise of racist populism, further wars, increased poverty in the poorest 
Third World countries, and greater divisions between the rich and the poor 
within all societies».7 His predictions were not wide of the mark. Today, al-
most ten years after the event, populism, racism and terrorism are on the rise, 
3  See Wagner ( 2010); O’Gorman (2017) and Poovey (2009).
4  See Preston (2012); Adler (2014); Packer (2013).
5  Žižek (2009), p. 12.
6  See Inman (2011).
7  Žižek (2009), p. 17.
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and the gap between the rich and the poor, «the Included» and «the Exclud-
ed»,8 is widening. The idealization of the free market, in conjunction with 
democracy and choice (the neoliberal doxa) has come under attack both be-
fore and after the recent financial storm. However, as Žižek and Mark Fisher 
contend, the feeling that there is no real alternative to capitalism is pervasive. 
Fisher has termed this ideological formation «capitalist realism»; he defines 
it as «the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political 
and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to imagine a 
coherent alternative to it».9 The crisis has revealed prodigious flaws in the 
machinery of financial capitalism, generating much criticism leveled at both 
the irrational exuberance of financial markets and at the staggering bailout 
packages devised to restore confidence in them. Yet «ideological naturaliza-
tion», Zizek claims, «has reached an unprecedented level: rare are those who 
dare even to dream utopian dreams about possible alternatives».10 Capitalist 
realism, or «pragmatic realism» in Žižek’s definition, seems to be the order 
of the day.
Realism, of course, is both an ideology and a representational mode. It is 
therefore apposite to ask: how is the crisis narrated in contemporary realist 
novels? Has the credit crunch fostered utopian dreams or pragmatic realism? 
How do novelists deal with the facts and fictions of finance? The sample of 
novels that I shall examine in this essay is limited. I have selected only texts 
by British authors written after the crisis and focusing specifically on the 
financial world centered in the City of London: Sebastian Faulks’s A Week 
in December (2009), John Lanchester’s Capital (2012), Justin Cartwright’s 
Other People’s Money (2011), and Gavin Extence’s The Empathy Problem 
(2016). All these novelists show a marked preference for the classic realist 
mode, variously adapted to the contemporary stories they tell. This essay 
aims to elucidate what kind of financial narratives they articulate, how they 
construct the experience of crisis and how their stories relate to the ideology 
of capitalist realism. I shall discuss each novel separately, focusing on what 
realist fiction does best – the invention of characters and plots that test the 
limits of what we believe.
8  Žižek (2009), p. 91.
9  Fisher (2009), p. 2.
10  Žižek (2009), p. 77.
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2. «The fantastic circuitry of finance»: A Week in December
Sebastian Faulks’s novel is set in London at the end of 2007. It is structured 
as a multi-plot narrative with each storyline centred on a different character. 
The cast of characters includes an embittered literary critic, Tranter, who 
takes special pleasure in bashing fellow writers; a hedge fund manager, John 
Veals, who is devising a trade of such scope and magnitude that it threatens 
to bring down global markets; a radicalized young Muslim, Hassan, planning 
an imminent terrorist attack; Jenni Fortune, a Tube driver, passionate about 
reading, who spends most of her free time in the virtual world of a popular 
online game; and the wife of an ambitious MP who is organizing a dinner 
party that will, eventually, bring together most of the characters whose stories 
readers have been following throughout the narrative. As this brief overview 
shows, the financial plot is one of the many strands the novel pursues, but it 
is central to the representation of contemporary London. 
There is a sense of impending threat hanging over the story, determined 
both by the actions of the newly radicalized Jihadist, and by the risky mach-
inations and unscrupulous scheming of the financier who, with the aid of his 
acolytes, manipulates the market to his own advantage. Neither the terrorist 
attack, nor the global financial collapse becomes actual events in the narrative. 
Faulks concentrates on the troubled times preceding major detonations. He is 
particularly interested in detailing how John Veals concocts his plan, what in-
struments and strategies he uses to short sell a well-established bank, and how 
speculators and hedge fund managers go about their daily business, courting 
risk and skillfully navigating the shadowy border between the legal and the 
unethical. Noticeable is the degree of didacticism that Faulks’s realism has to 
bear when it comes to articulating the mysteries of finance (for the lay reader). 
Here is one prime example of Faulks’s informative and pedagogical aesthetic:
The simple, but perhaps too simple, thing to do was to short sell the stock. This meant 
first borrowing a vast number of ARB shares from an insurance company or some other 
registered owner who specialised in lending stocks; then selling it at whatever the market 
would offer; and, finally, repurchasing it at a much cheaper price when the market had 
collapsed and returning it to its owner. The profit was in the difference between the price 
at which they’d sold and the lower one at which they had rebought. […] The second obvious 
thing to do was to buy “put” options on ARB stock. These gave them the right to sell the 
stock at a pre-agreed or “strike” price […].11
11  Faulks (2009), p. 64.
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In this case, the narrator is doing the explaining; in other scenes, specific 
information is conveyed through dialogues between financial professionals.12 
The novel contains useful clarifications about credit default swaps, subprime 
mortgages, and other infamous tools of the financial arsenal. This factual an-
choring of the text has a pronounced documentary effect that renders the 
financial plot a curious hybrid: while the pedagogical aesthetic aims to coun-
teract the notorious abstractions and mysteries of financial operations with a 
solid dose of particulars and concrete explanations, the satirical perspective 
Faulks adopts confers upon the character of the financier the abstract quality 
of the typical. «The real problem with Veals», as one reviewer put it, «is that 
he never lifts off the page».13 Obsessed with secrecy (he does not do emails), 
motivated only by profit («the only aspect of human life that interested Veals 
was money»), unperturbed by ethical issues («the distinction between “legal” 
and “ethical” was of no concern to him»), indifferent to his wife (he «found 
the dividend of carnal pleasure a brief and poor return for the hours of tedi-
um he’d invested»),14 Veals comes across as a modern, cynical rendition of 
many stock-market villains of nineteenth-century fiction, held individually 
responsible for the wrongs of an entire system. He has never read a novel, 
does not go to the cinema, detests holidays and art galleries, and has «no so-
cial life outside the office».15 Hardly human, this financier serves one import-
ant textual function: through his perspective readers are encouraged to see 
the distortions of finance as the result of unfettered individual greed. Faulks 
is also alert to the broader context. His representation of the financial sphere 
includes descriptions of how easy it is for clever traders to exploit loopholes 
in the legislation, and to devise ever new, sophisticated instruments in order 
to dupe regulators. But the focus on one obsessed individual, accumulating 
millions with one epic trade, reduces the systemic to the subjective, encour-
aging a sweeping condemnation of the stereotype of the financier, driven by 
instrumental rationality and swayed by an anxious identification with money. 
For all his precision in mapping out the febrile activities of financial actors 
in the months leading up to the crisis, Faulks then falls back on a generic, 
12  As the reviewer for the New York Times notices, Faulks indulges in «business 
school lectures», see Cowles (2010).
13  Cartwright (2009); for the Financial Times, likewise, Veals is a «cardboard mon-
ster», see Hill (2009). 
14  Faulks (2009), pp. 269, 69, 235.
15  Faulks (2009), p. 269.
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abstract form of critique that pits the blame on greed and on the «functional 
autism» of the likes of Veals.16 The novel’s final words appropriately sum up 
Veals’s sense of absolute mastery upon realizing that his company, High Level 
Capital, has accrued a capital gain of £12 billion:
But I have mastered this world, thought John Veals, passing his hand over his newly 
shaved chin. To me there is no mystery, no nuance, no complication; I am a man alive to 
the spirit of his time, the one who hears the whispers on the wind.
A rare surge of feeling, of something like vindication, came from the pit of his belly 
and spread out till it sang in his veins. As he stood with his hands in his pockets, staring 
out over the sleeping city, over its darkened wheels and spires and domes, Veals laughed.17
The triumphant laughter of this self-appointed master of the universe is 
arguably meant to solicit public outcry against the lords or barons of finance 
and their spiteful callousness. But whether it does or not is a moot point: the 
novel ultimately tends to reaffirm a reassuring vision of reality, despite much 
social satire. Just as Veals gets away with his machinations, so too other char-
acters get rewarded with comedic or romantic endings. Hassan does not carry 
out his terrorist plot, choosing love over fundamentalism; Jenni Fortune too 
is rewarded with real romance, a more nourishing substitute for the immer-
sive virtual reality game she used to play; and even the embittered literary 
critic (turned novelist) obtains a degree of financial security that might pla-
cate his ferocious pen. In a novel that sets out to portray contemporary Lon-
don under the double threat of terrorism and financial collapse, such endings 
appear consolatory, suggesting a desire for normality and private solutions 
that tempers down the asperities of social criticism. «The fantastic circuitry 
of finance»18 gets a fair bashing in this text, but the laughter of the triumphant 
financial villain is a reminder that not much has changed or will change.
3. «Where do we go from here?»: Capital
«There is a general sense of needing to understand what has happened», 
writes Lanchester in Whoops! Why everyone owes everyone and no one can 
pay (2010), «it is difficult to accept the reality that in a downturn this sharp, 
16  Faulks (2009), p. 103.
17  Faulks (2009), p. 390.
18  Faulks (2009), p. 103.
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in face of an economic crisis so systemic, we are no longer in control of crucial 
aspects of our lives».19 The feeling of not being in control, arguably shared by 
many, has motivated Lanchester to write two books of popular economics – 
Whoops! and How to Speak Money: what the money people say – an what 
they really mean (2014) – which aim to bridge the knowledge gap between 
«the people who understand money and economics and the rest of us», and 
to dispel the exoteric aura of financial jargon.20 While Whoops! is a witty ac-
count of the crisis that elucidates for «the rest of us» complex financial mat-
ters, How to Speak Money provides the uninitiated with a handy economic 
lexicon, flanked by a long introduction and an afterword in which the author 
addresses the vexed issue of «where do we go from here?».21 His stance is one 
of mild optimism, grounded on the belief that gradual change is possible, giv-
en the right set of “tools”: «Some readers may be disappointed that I am not 
advocating more explicit alternatives to capitalism», Lanchester concludes, 
«I might well advocate one if I could see one that seemed to be working».22 
His pragmatic realism is unmistakable.
How does Capital imagine change? The novel begins in December 2007 
and ends after the collapse of Lehman Brothers one year later. Like Faulks, 
Lanchester opts for a panoramic, condition-of-England novel, reminiscent of 
nineteenth-century social realism, in which the financial plot is one of several 
storylines centred on a diversified set of characters: Roger Yount, the invest-
ment banker, and his deputy, Mark; Quentina, an illegal immigrant from Zim-
babwe, working as traffic warden; The Kamals, a family of British-Pakistani 
shopkeepers; Zbiengnew, a Polish construction worker; Matya, an Hungarian 
nanny; a successful artist, Smitty, whose identity is unknown to the public, 
and a host of other, less prominent figures. Some of these characters reside in 
Pepys Road, others simply work there: this fictional street (in south London) 
provides the unifying focal point where the various strands of the narrative 
intersect. Reviewers have pointed out the similarities between Capital and 
its Victorian antecedents mostly to highlight the deficiencies of contempo-
rary attempts to reproduce the broad social scope of Dickens’s, Trollope’s or 
Balzac’s novels. As Theo Tait wrote in The Guardian: «the recent fashion for 
neo-Victorian condition-of-England novels in the vein of Little Dorrit or The 
19  Lanchester (2010), p. xv.
20  Lanchester (2014), p. xi.
21  Lanchester (2014), p. 269.
22  Lanchester (2014), p. 276.
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Way We Live Now – featuring a range of emblematic intersecting lives and 
at least one City villain – looks unlikely to produce any great works of art. 
These books seem basically programmatic and unoriginal, fatally in hock to 
the news agenda».23 
For Lanchester, the news agenda included the banking crisis that he had so 
thoroughly explored in Whoops! His focus in the novel is on two generations 
of financial actors: senior investment bankers, like Roger and his German 
boss Lothar, who struggle to come to grips with sophisticated financial instru-
ments, and a new generation of mathematically gifted «boys» who are able to 
understand and exploit the predictive power of algorithms. Roger Yount, the 
narrator observes, «would have fitted seamlessly in the old City of London 
[…] where everything depended on who you were and whom you knew, and 
how well you blended in».24 When the novel begins, the old City of gentle-
manly capitalism has already been replaced by the new City of financial en-
gineering, run by smart young traders with a penchant for «immensely com-
plicated mathematical formulae».25 Roger’s deputy, Mark, is one such wizard. 
In a telling scene at the onset of the story, Roger and Lothar are unable to 
make much sense of Mark’s number crunching while he is briefing them on 
the foreign exchange trades they are supposed to be supervising. A certain 
air of bonhomie envelops the senior bankers, loyal to slightly antiquated rit-
uals, concerned about their inability to keep up with the fast pace of change 
in the financial world, but also solidly attached to their self-interest. Roger’s 
thoughts, when he first appears in the novel, revolve around his annual bo-
nus, which he has reasons to believe will reach a million pounds. However, 
since the bank has suffered major losses in the wake of the subprime crisis, 
Roger’s bonus turns out to be a more modest affair of £30.000. The trajec-
tory of his story is then set as one of gradual decline and partial redemption. 
Unlike Veals, Roger is no financial villain; his main preoccupation is not how 
to manipulate the market and get away with it, but how to communicate with 
his wife, deal with his children, manage the family’s unrestricted patterns of 
consumption and, towards the end of the novel, imagine a different future 
after his dismissal from the bank. 
The character who embodies financial masculinity at its most ambitious 
and villainous is Mark, the junior upstart scheming to outwit his boss. Fu-
23  Tait (2012).
24  Lanchester (2012), p. 15.
25  Lanchester (2012), p. 24.
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elled by a burning desire to escape middle-class, «suburban mediocrity»26 by 
accessing the fast track of social mobility that a job in the City provides, Mark 
develops a grandiose plan to prove his worth:
The plan was simple. Trade, not on his own account – he was no thief, thank you very 
much! – but on the bank’s, until he had made, say, £50 million. Serious money. An amount 
which didn’t risk the bank but which was irrefutable evidence of his talents. Then, fess 
up. Tell them what he had done and let them draw the obvious conclusion: that he was 
a risk-taker with a proven talent for delivering spectacular returns, and there were fifty 
million reasons for giving him what he wanted – which, in the short term anyway, was 
Roger’s job.27
The implementation of this scheme entails taking extremely risky posi-
tions, making big bets on foreign currencies, by logging on to colleagues’ ac-
counts without their knowledge. His unauthorized trading, conducted under 
his boss’s nose, does not last long. Charged with fraud, Mark exits the scene 
of the novel as a criminal, bringing down with him not only Roger, dismissed 
for «gross negligence», but the good reputation of the bank.28 
What is interesting in this subplot is that the narrative of fraud, a staple of 
financial novels as La Berge has argued,29 is presented as a story of illegitimate 
ambitions, a tale of denied social mobility, reminiscent of nineteenth-centu-
ry plots in which the lower-middle-class upstart (like Mark in this text) is 
punished for daring to ask for more. Having internalized the ideology of the 
City as a democratic space where each individual has a real chance of re-fash-
ioning his destiny («the City is one of the few places where you are allowed 
to be extraordinary»),30 Mark believes that he can escape from the «stifling» 
world his parents inhabit by performing «extraordinary» feats of financial 
shrewdness.31 But in the conservative agenda of this novel, Mark’s desire for 
change, presented in chapter 35 as a class-related issue, finds no legitimate 
outlet. The moral of his story is twofold: on the one hand, a warning against 
the temptations of financial felony, on the other, a more insidious condemna-
tion of social mobility, cast in a negative mould and equated with the desire 
26  Lanchester (2012), p. 192.
27  Lanchester (2012), p. 447.
28  Lanchester (2012), p. 467.
29  See La Berge (2015).
30  Lanchester (2012), p. 192.
31  Lanchester (2012), p. 193.
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to usurp the privileges and prerogatives of the upper classes. The financial 
villain, in Capital, is no grand baron or overlord, no master of the universe 
like Veals imagines himself to be in the last chapter of A Week in December. 
Rather, Mark is described as a puny individual, nourishing excessive ambi-
tions that the narrative conveniently curbs, thus reaffirming a conservative 
vision of social stability in which cross-class transitions are ruled out. 
The novel’s structure further confirms the compartmentalization of so-
cial space; each character is placed in a specific sphere or class that delimits 
the borders of their separate stories. Social immobility, however, does not 
go entirely uncontested in the novel. Mark’s bungled attempt to flee from 
mediocrity is one example. Another is provided in the novel’s detective sub-
plot, which hinges on the mystery of postcards, bearing the caption «We 
Want What You Have», secretly delivered to the inhabitants of Pepys Road. 
«We want what you have» is the slogan of social envy, rooted in the ille-
gitimate desire to appropriate the life-style and social status of those who 
earn a sufficiently high income to afford residence in a posh area. Not sur-
prisingly, the perpetrator of such bizarre scheme is another small individ-
ual (the assistant of a famous and very rich artist), who occupies a position 
structurally similar to that of Mark and nurses an analogous desire to step 
up in the social ladder. In this case too, the moral of the story is insidious-
ly conservative: the criminals in the novel are the puny characters whose 
dissatisfaction with their lot can only be channeled via illegal activities. In 
Lanchester’s social imaginary, dissatisfaction leads to crime, not change. 
This stance could be considered realistic: as the divide between the rich and 
the poor, those who “have” and those who “want”, continues to widen, so-
cial mobility is bound to appear as a far-fetched utopia. On the other hand, 
however, to criminalize those who “want” means to foreclose the possibility 
of change, even on a small scale.
It is symptomatic that the word “change”, repeated as a mantra by Roger, 
is the novel’s last word: «I can change, I can change, I promise I can change 
change change».32 The banker who has lost his job, but owns a multimil-
lion-pound house whose sale will ensure a steady level of comfort for his fam-
ily at least in the short run, is entitled to imagine a change for the better. This 
change is predictably presented as a moral choice between excess (which he 
can no longer afford) and the refined moderation of a life spent in the coun-
tryside, possibly running a small business and getting back in touch with the 
32  Lanchester (2012), p. 577.
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“real economy”: «He was done with the city and with the City […] done with 
earning twenty or thirty times the average family’s annual income for doing 
things with money rather than people or things […] It was time to do or make 
something».33 Downward social mobility for the rich is presented as an op-
portunity to rethink the core values according to which they lead their life: 
ethical, responsible capitalism and more moderate patterns of consumption 
are imaginable changes. Upward social mobility, on the other hand, even in 
the democratic environment of the City, is unimaginable except in the shape 
of fraud or petty crime. The capitalist realist lesson this novel teaches is rath-
er chilling. Capitalism may reinvent itself as “creative”, “cultural” or “ethical”, 
especially in the aftermath of the 2008 credit crunch. But imagining how this 
turn may foster social equality and more opportunities for a greater num-
ber of people remains impossible, at least in the ideological agenda of this 
novel. It is but fair to add, at this point, that Lanchester does include moder-
ately successful immigrant workers, like the Polish builder and the Hungar-
ian nanny, in the social space of the novel and imagines for them a future of 
slow accumulation of capital, honestly earned, and much deserved love. It 
would appear that London’s openness towards immigrants has the potential 
to change lives for the better. But reading this novel in the light of the Brexit 
referendum, one is licensed to wonder whether this idyllic vision will have 
any traction in the future.
4. «And now they believe their own myths»: Other People’s Money
Justin Cartwright’s Other People’s Money does not aspire to be a state-of-
the-nation novel, though it retains a focus on the financial world, rocked by 
the «turmoil and madness» of the 2008 meltdown.34 The crisis has affected, 
in minor or major ways, all the main characters in the novel – from the in-
vestment banker, Julian, who has bought toxic assets and is now facing con-
siderable losses, to the junior reporter, Melissa, who has to go freelance since 
the advertising revenues of the local newspaper for which she writes are in 
steep decline, and to the playwright, actor manager, Gaelic scholar Artair Mc-
Leod, whose grant has been suspended. As Artair complains in one moment 
of exasperation: «the spivs in London and Wall Street and Frankfurt have lost 
33  Lanchester (2012), p. 573.
34  Cartwright (2011), p. 42.
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hundreds of billions pissing into the wind and now I can’t even get my grant. 
Yes, I’m down. Are you surprised?»35 
This is not, however, a novel about the precarious, impoverished condi-
tion of young graduates like Melissa or about the struggle for survival of pro-
vincial theatres, starved for lack of funding. Rather, the centre of attention 
is the figure of the disaffected or reluctant investment banker, Julian Treve-
lyan-Tubal, who longs for a simpler form of life and is determined to escape 
from the «rotten» world of finance and banking. Not an easy task to accom-
plish, since the bank of which he is chairman – a family-owned business, 
founded by his forefather in 1671, and renowned in the City for its impecca-
ble reputation of solidity – is suffering severe losses due to ill-advised invest-
ment choices, which include, of course, «the sub primes and collateralized 
debt instruments they bought and the hedge funds they financed».36 When 
the novel begins, we are told that Tubal & Co. «is now stuck with $800m. 
of utterly useless and finely diced mortgages in territories they have never 
visited».37 Dazzled by the prospect of quick profits, the traders and «hed-
gies» have taken enormous risks, while the senior management has failed to 
understand what kinds of bets they were placing. The financial plot revolves 
around Julian’s subtle maneuvers, some of them bordering on the illegal, 
to cover up the extent of the bank’s liabilities prior to selling Tubal & Co. to 
American tycoon Cy Manheim.
Unlike Veals and Roger Yount, Cartwright’s investment banker, Julian, is 
a financier with a troubled conscience. He perceives the world he is immersed 
in from a critical, ironic distance: he is in it but not really of it. Most emphat-
ically, Julian professes not to believe in the self-serving myths or social fic-
tions that «the cultural circuit of capital»38 reproduces to justify its existence. 
In the novel, his thoughts and observations carry a considerable ideological 
burden, as they represent an internal front of opposition to the financial in-
dustry in which Julian is nonetheless a major player: 
This rotten, crumbling industry resting on greed and half-truths; this pretense that 
Tubal’s itself is somehow special, that the people who work in banking are particularly 
35  Cartwright (2011), p. 63.
36  Cartwright (2011), p. 15.
37  Cartwright (2011), p. 15.
38  See Thrift (2001), p. 415. Thrift defines what he calls «the cultural circuit of capi-
tal» as a «machine for producing and disseminating novels to business élites» and dates 
its emergence in the mid 1990s. On the social fictions of finance see Heiven (2014).
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talented, that the government is principled, that the old country still possesses ancient 
wisdom and deeply bedded human standards.
It’s all a sham: the ludicrous royal family in their castles and palaces, the Army 
pounding away hopelessly at mud houses in recalcitrant villages far away, the wretched 
government with its desperate determination to save its skin by issuing more and more 
ineptly populist statements of intent and benchmarks and guidelines and tables and un-
enforceable laws. And worst of all, we, the bankers, believing we could produce money 
out of thin air. Instead we lost nearly $600m.39 
Italicized in the text, Julian’s words openly express his abhorrence not only 
of the arrogant financial sector but also, more broadly, of the ineptitude of a 
«wretched government» and a ruling class in thrall to the business ontology. 
Yet, as the novel shows quite shrewdly, it is precisely this oppositional stance, 
this critical conscience that allows Julian to perform his duties successfully as 
he negotiates the sale of the bank. In the process of finessing the deal, he tests 
the boundaries of the legal more than once, proving quite adept at practicing 
what he condemns. In one final ironic twist, Julian, the reluctant banker, comes 
to resemble his father, who firmly endorsed the myths of finance, the more he 
seeks to position himself as a critical contrarian: «you sound», observes one 
of his colleagues towards the end of the novel, «more like your old dad every-
day. He saw the workings of democracy as pure opportunism».40 Žižek’s under-
standing of «contemporary cynicism» may be helpful to explain the ideolog-
ical mechanism this novel captures in the representation of the disillusioned 
banker. Contemporary cynicism, Žižek writes, represents «an exact inversion 
of Marx’s formula: today, we only imagine that we do not “really believe” in 
our ideology – in spite of this imaginary distance, we continue to practice it».41 
Whether cynical or simply self-deluded, Julian’s resistance to finance defines 
his uneasy subjectivity and motivates him to conduct his trades with redou-
bled zeal.42 By exploring both sides of the equation (brooding internal defiance 
equals successful external performance), the novel provides a somber assess-
ment of the efficaciousness of resistance. Julian does succeed in selling the fam-
ily bank, extricating himself from the onerous task of being an active player in 
39  Cartwright (2011), pp. 102-103.
40  Cartwright (2011), p. 246.
41  Žižek (2009), p. 3.
42  «So long as we believe (in our hearts) that capitalismi is bad», observes Mark 
Fisher, «we are free to continue to participate in capitalist exchange», see Fisher (2009), 
p. 13. Cartwright’s novel exposes the workings of this ideology.
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a «rotten, crumbling industry resting on greed and half-truths»; but the novel 
clearly shows that the rotten industry of finance, far from crumbling, is stronger 
than ever and that disaffected, ironic players contribute to its resilience. 
Cartwright also considers other forms of resistance to financial power be-
sides Julian’s self-doubts. The subplot centered on Melissa and the intrepid 
left-wing editor of the newspaper, the Cornish Globe and Mail, for which she 
writes brings to the fore the role of the press in uncovering and denouncing fi-
nancial malfeasance. In possession of secret documents, leaked by a disgrun-
tled former employee of Tubal & Co., Melissa and her boss try to mount a me-
dia campaign with the intention of exposing «a massive fraud» that will bring 
down «a family so grand that they believe they are untouchable» (210).43 Pre-
dictably, their scheme fails, easily quashed by the American financial mogul 
Cy who buys out the newspaper group, silencing the Globe and Mail for good. 
Public opposition is rendered null, and the threat of exposure contained, by 
the sheer persuasive force of big money. The press can be bought.
Can art be bought too? In the novel, art is presented as the sphere of 
non-alienation where human creativity continues to flourish despite the se-
vere impact of the crisis. Artair McLeod, writer and theatre manager, stands 
at the opposite pole from Julian: while the latter is wrecked by doubts about 
his role and professes to loathe the financial sector, the former has an un-
wavering faith in art and «genuinely believes that art is something real, and 
necessary, something that should be privileged over any other human activi-
ty».44 Cartwright contrasts the squalid environment where Artair lives (a di-
lapidated boathouse facing a sea of mud) with the loftiness of his ideals: «the 
transformative power of art», Artair muses, «is everything. His life has been a 
string of triumphs and disappointments but he has always been sustained by 
the certainty that life is for living according to your highest aspirations. Life is 
for burning up. And a life lived in the pursuit of art is the only one worth liv-
ing».45 If the financial world produces either troubled subjectivities (Julian) 
or the arrogant pursuit of risk and profit (Cy), the art world seems to exist 
in a reality of its own, hinging on a set of alternative values that sustain its 
votaries even in times of crisis. Of course, this distinction exists in the novel 
only to be disputed. As readers discover early on in the story, Artair’s annual 
income is provided by a generous donation of the Tubals family trust, willing 
43  Cartwright (2011), p. 210.
44  Cartwright (2011), p. 66.
45  Cartwright (2011), p. 120.
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to support the artist not for the excellence of his vision, but in exchange for 
the promise never to contact his former wife, Fleur, now part of their family. 
There is a lot that money can buy. While the novel never implies that with 
this purchase Artair’s creativity becomes enslaved to finance, and his ideals 
hollow and illusory, Cartwright portrays Artair’s grand project («a five-hour 
play on the life and novels of Flann O’Brian»)46 in an amused satirical tone 
as a creation that is unlikely to have any impact or to make much difference. 
Art and finance go their separate ways: the artist whose acquiescence with the 
Tubals’s diktats is easily bought poses no real threat to their power, and the 
products of his imagination, likewise, seem destined to be sublimely irrele-
vant; the financial industry, on the other hand, will continue to play its games, 
«in thrall to fables»,47 as Julian believes, but wielding real power nonetheless.
None of the novelists I have discussed so far imagine the sphere of literary 
or artistic production as a possible site of resistance: Faulks’s literary critic 
and novelist, Tranter, is notable for his rabid reviews, lingering adolescent 
narcissism and revengeful feelings, but this anger is aimed at his peers and 
takes no notice of the wider world; Lanchester’s Smitty, «a conceptual art-
ist who specializes in provocative temporary site-specific works»48 has made 
enough money selling his anonymous, anti-bourgeois art to rich bourgeois 
collectors that he can sit comfortably on his success, playing a minor role in 
the narrative; gently deflated by a disenchanted narrator, Artair’s idealism 
hardly qualifies as militant in Cartwright’s novel. Yet, these authors have all 
welcomed the challenge to write about the increasing reach of financialisa-
tion, the credit crunch crisis, the irresponsible behavior of traders and hedge 
fund managers, and to do so in a critical way, whether through satire or re-
lying on the power of fictional narratives to stir doubts and solicit questions. 
That their fictions reserve to writers and artists only the space of the ineffec-
tual (and the narcissistic) is a wry commentary on how difficult it is, in the 
present juncture, to imagine a re-politicized realm of art, literature and cul-
ture more broadly in which contestation and opposition are not written out. 
The capitalist realism of these novels may be «resigned» or «plutocratic» but 
it is also alert to the limits of its own vision.49
46  Cartwright (2011), p. 20.
47 Cartwright (2011), p. 80.
48  Lanchester (2012), p. 86.
49  For an interesting discussion of the «plutocratic imagination» and the «resigned» 
realism of contemporary American novelists see William (2016). See also Walonen (2016).
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5. Creative destruction: The Empathy Problem
Form the Occupy Movement to the Movements of the Squares, examples 
of public resistance to finance and financialization have not exactly been lack-
ing, nor have they failed to expose blatant contradictions. “We are the 99%” 
– the slogan of the Occupy Movement – effectively captures the stark imbal-
ances in the global distribution of wealth that the crisis has further aggravat-
ed. Gavin Extence’s The Empathy Problem takes due notice of these recent 
outbursts of collective dissent. The story takes place in the months when the 
City of London became the stage for a prolonged Occupy demonstration. In 
the second chapter, the presence of vociferous demonstrators – «armed to 
the teeth with banners and tents and tarpaulins»50 – causes the «irritation» 
of Gabriel (hedge fund manager), delayed in a traffic jam while trying to reach 
his office: «Gabriel wasn’t paid 3.4 million a year», we are informed, «to roll 
into the office whenever he felt like it».51 With assets of about four billion 
pounds, Gabriel’s company, Mason Wallace Capital Management, has gained 
colossal sums of money by betting on the collapse of the Greek economy. This 
is the City that has triumphantly survived the crash, rising from the ashes 
more defiant and unstoppable than ever. Gabriel is the very epitome of this 
triumph: thirty-two years old and incredibly handsome, he boasts of making 
more money in six months than any of the demonstrators «would earn in a 
lifetime».52 For him humanity is divided into two categories, people who are 
«useful» and people who are «irrelevant»53 – the irrelevant ones are the 99%. 
He belongs to the highly selected circle of the useful, the rich and the beauti-
ful, firmly ensconced in their own surreal world of gilded isolation. 
The “empathy problem” of the novel’s title would appear to be how to 
make such a brazen, callous exemplar of financial masculinity a believable 
character according to the standards of realism. Some misfortune must in-
tervene to test his humanity, and it does. Gabriel is affected by an incurable 
brain tumor; his days are numbered. Rather than a tragedy, however, the 
novel is a comedy that treads lightly on the topic of impending death. Much of 
the novel’s dark humour derives from the contrast between Gabriel’s old self 
50  Extence (2016a), chapter 2. Since I have consulted the Kindle edition of this novel, 
I will reference quotations indicating chapter not page numbers. 
51  Extence (2016a), chapter 2.
52  Extence (2016a), chapter 3.
53  Extence (2016a), chapter 3.
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(overconfident, conceited, incapable of empathy) and the new personality he 
is forced to inhabit when the tumor alters his brain chemistry, leaving him ex-
posed to the power of raw emotions: «It was as if an outer layer of himself had 
been peeled back, leaving something too sensitive to touch».54 Distressed by 
what the surgeon terms «emotional lability» and Gabriel promptly decodes 
as «emotional liability»,55 he experiences frequent bouts of crying, a height-
ened sensitivity to the world around him and to classical music, as well as an 
irrepressible curiosity about the demonstrators camping outside his office. 
He listens to their speeches, applauds when prompted, and eventually starts 
interacting with them as fellow human beings deserving of attention.
The novel, in other words, is a fable of individual redemption: the finan-
cial villain, like Scrooge in Dickens’s Christmas Carol (1843), undergoes an 
inner transformation that rehabilitates his soul. The transition from egoistic 
self-interest to sympathy for the sufferings of others is effected in Dickens’s 
novel through the intervention of supernatural forces (ghosts). In Extence’s 
text the same transition is contingent upon a fatal illness. In both cases, it is 
circumstances beyond one’s control that trigger change. The Empathy Prob-
lem, unlike Dickens’s ghost story, however, retains an analytic focus on the 
reality that Gabriel knows best (finance), complicated by his double vision: 
on the one hand, he still believes in the truths that circulate in his sphere 
(City people work hard, earn every penny, or million, they make; “crisis” is 
best understood as “cycle”, and so forth), on the other, by interacting with the 
“irrelevant” people in the Camp, he comes to see those truths as highly ques-
tionable. A supporter of the Occupy Movement, Extence gives much space in 
the novel to their political philosophy.56 But since the third-person narration 
is focalized on the main character and the story reads as if told by Gabriel’s 
ghost,57 what the protesters say comes laced with gentle ironies, enveloped in 
a thin veil of incredulity. For example, in a rare moment of self-reflexivity, the 
narrator mocks the very ideal of empathy that this novel otherwise endors-
es: Mat (one of the demonstrators) «seemed to believe that tea and empathy 
were the panacea for all the world’s social and economic ills. If a problem 
54  Extence (2016a), chapter 28.
55  Extence (2016a), chapter 17.
56  In a recent interview, Extence explicitly declares his pro-Occupy position, see Ex-
tence (2016b).
57  See Bradley (2016a), Bradly observes that Extence has given us «a wonderful nar-
rator whose use of psychic distance is enough to have you feel that this was in fact the ghost 
of Gabriel Vaughn telling us his tale».
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seemed intractable, you hadn’t thrown enough tea and empathy at it».58 Em-
pathy may not be a panacea for global dramas, but in this novel it certain-
ly functions as a temporary, private solution to the angst Gabriel feels. In 
line with the fabulistic thrust of the narrative, Gabriel is rewarded with true 
love, once he becomes capable of true feelings. Romance and empathy teach 
him that the life he used to have is not worth living: «his luxury apartment, 
his creature comforts, even his Ferrari – none of this seemed important any 
more» (ch. 57).59 Even work has lost its luster: «nothing I do is for the benefit 
of the wider community», Gabriel tells his father, «my job is to make money 
regardless […] I care about share prices, not economic health».60 Illness, love 
and empathy have produced a complete metamorphosis.
If all this sounds clichéd and predictable, it is because the novel falls into 
the grooves of a narrative pattern well tried and tested. Like all moral fables, 
this story does not bank on surprises and unexpected plot twists. Rather, it 
relies on the certitude that “good” will triumph over “evil”. We know that 
the hero will be able to turn his life around, as Gabriel does, the moment he 
realizes his mistakes, because we recognize the pattern underneath the sur-
face of the story. What is perhaps more baffling is why a young author, with 
declared sympathies for the Occupy protesters and their politics, would opt 
for the most apolitical form of fiction in order to tell his crisis story. One pos-
sible answer is distrust in realism as a “capitalist” mode: for all its clichés and 
predictability, The Empathy Problem simply refuses to accept that dreaming 
utopian dreams of change is impossible. By pushing the boundaries of verisi-
militude, stripping realism of most of its subtleties and ambiguities, turning 
pragmatism on its head, this novel goes on dreaming. How else to interpret 
the very improbable plot of creative destruction and wealth redistribution 
that finally turns Gabriel into a modern Robin Hood? 
This plot is based on a simple (and simplified) idea of justice. The new 
Gabriel, who cares for more than just share prices, uses all his skills to loose 
money instead of making it. In his final month at work he manages to loose 
eight hundred and fifty million dollars, ensuring the collapse of the hedge 
fund. At the same time, he transfers a sizable chunk of the wealth he has ac-
cumulated to the secretaries and administrative stuff employed by the fund, 
offering them a clean start on condition that they «quit [their] job and find 
58  Extence (2016a), chapter 46.
59  Extence (2016a), chapter 57.
60  Extence (2016a), chapter 78.
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something worthwhile to do instead».61 «Why did you do it?» asks Caitlin 
(Gabriel’s girlfriend), «Because it felt right, because I thought it might be nice 
to see a financial collapse where the rich suffered rather than the poor».62 
It cannot get any simpler than that: a return to basics, this is the novel’s ul-
timate philosophy. Emotions and feelings that smooth the rough edges of 
instrumental rationality; excessive assets, unethically amassed, pulverized 
in a cathartic potlatch; wealth redistributed to the deserving. Like the angel 
whose name he bears, Gabriel brings glad tidings. 
If this is the type of vision that a political-minded author is able or willing 
to offer, empathy really is a problem and not just for fiction. But then again, 
why should we expect fiction to provide plausible answers to complex prob-
lems that have no simple solution? The Empathy Problem plays quite loosely 
with realistic expectations, opting for dreams instead of facts. The story is 
not entirely unrealistic, grounded as it is on a fair dose of historical facts (the 
crisis, the Occupy Movement), but its deep structure is reassuringly familiar 
and simplified, harking back to fables and popular myths that are the stuff of 
dreams. «Sometimes you just need to imagine a better world», Gabriel con-
cludes, «Better than the one you had».63
6. Conclusion
Considering the novels here under scrutiny, one could argue that the fi-
nancial crisis has inspired moderation in fiction, a kind of self-imposed aus-
terity on the part of novelists who have chosen a safe investment (realism), 
avoiding more hazardous speculations in new forms. They have also capi-
talized on a venerable literary tradition that still attracts the interest of the 
reading public. Some critics claims that these and other novels of the crisis 
«have so far proved wholly inadequate to their subject matter, attempting 
to impose the venerable fictional traditions of realism, personalisation, and 
moralisation onto a crisis that was in many ways unreal, impersonal, and 
amoral».64 Though there is some truth in this allegation, especially as regards 
the tendency to personalise the crisis, it is arduous to imagine what the “ide-
61  Extence (2016a), chapter 92.
62  Extence (2016a), chapter 99.
63  Extence (2016a), chapter 99.
64  Crosthwaite (2012).
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al” crisis novel would have to look like. The novels Crosthwaite identifies as 
more adequate alternatives – Amalgamemnon (1984) by science fiction au-
thor Christine Brooke-Rose and the cyberpunk experiment in “theory-fiction” 
by Nick Land, Meltdown (1994) – were written years before the crisis. Much 
as we may admire their ability to capture systemic failures, predict the im-
pending downfall of the economic system, and experiment with avant-gar-
de narrative techniques, it is debatable whether apocalyptic visions are more 
“adequate” than realist ones, or just appear so after the apocalypse. 
The novels examined in this essay eschew radicalism, whether ideological 
or literary. Arguably, they were not written to shake up the sleepy political 
conscience of readers. The cultural work they perform is more descriptive 
than predictive. In this respect, they are truly post-crisis novels – commit-
ted to refiguring normalization and readjustment within the fictional space 
of the text. These novels engage the capitalist realist perspective mostly by 
imagining a return to order while narrating the crisis. But in so doing they 
also betray an anxious sense that this return is faulty and uncertain: the end-
ings of the various stories narrated (not just the financial plots) are blatantly 
strained – generous doses of romance in A Week in December, an unrealistic 
redistribution of wealth in The Empathy Problem, and a promise of change 
that changes nothing in Capital. Such reassurances, by their very artificiality, 
testify to the opposite: the way we live now is anything but reassuring. They 
also suggest that an integral part of the experience of the crisis is the desire 
for a reliable narrative frame.
The safe investment of novelists working within the formal confines of re-
alism can only go so far. Perhaps the speculative finance of today might best 
be explored in more speculative types of fiction – utopias and dystopias, New 
Weird fiction, fantasy, science fiction, and other non-mimetic genres with 
a focus on futurity – as Crosthwaite and de Boever suggest.65 A movement 
in this direction can already be detected. Lionel Shriver, for instance, well-
known for her starkly realist fiction, has turned to the now popular genre of 
dystopia to imagine a future world (not far from ours) in which the value of 
the dollar collapses, the United States loses its superpower status, the bancor 
(the international monetary unit theorised by Keynes) becomes the new re-
serve currency and the equilibria of global governance shift dramatically in 
favour of a Russian-Chinese consortium, while American citizens experience 
65  See Crosthwaite (2012) and De Boever (2013). 
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the nightmare of sudden and utter impoverishment and lack of freedom.66 
Undoubtedly, the novel gives us pause for thought: what if this imaginary 
future is not counterfactual? Are we heading in that direction? Yet, like all 
dystopias, The Mandibles too solicits a degree of nostalgia – nostalgia for the 
present, the current moment, before things started going horribly wrong. In 
this respect, speculative fiction may end up confirming the value of what is, 
just as much as realist novels incline to do. However, both types of narratives 
ultimately share a desire to question naturalized assumptions, to probe the 
limits of the fictions (myths, ideologies, narratives) we live by, and to make 
us see the history of the present from a skewed angle, whether speculative or 
mimetic. No negligible task, as every writer knows.
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SOCIAL RIGHTS IN CRISIS:
ANY ROLE FOR THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EU?
Francesco Costamagna1
1. Introduction: the reform of the European economic governance in re-
sponse to the crisis 
The European response to the crisis revolved around two main axis2: fi-
nancial assistance for Member States in difficulty and the creation of new 
mechanisms that may yield stronger economic coordination and tighter con-
trol on Member States economic choices.3
Since 2008, eight European States have obtained financial assistance that 
has been provided through a variety of instruments. Early cases, involving 
non-euro States, such as Hungary, Latvia and Romania, received assistance 
on the basis of Article 143 TFEU, which envisages the possibility to grant 
“mutual assistance” to non-Eurozone States facing difficulties as regard its 
balance of payments. Vice versa, in the first Greek bailout package approved 
in May 2010 there was no EU mechanism available and, thus, resources had 
to be provided through bilateral loans by Eurozone States and by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) under a stand-by arrangement. 
After this experience, the EU rushed to fill the gap, creating two new bailout 
mechanisms: the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The former was established 
1  I wish to express my gratitude to Paolo Pachetti and Massimo Meccarelli, conveners 
of the seminar “Perceptions of (in)security and forms of legal protection in times of crisis”, 
held in Macerata on the 11th December 2015, and to the participants. Furthermore, a spe-
cial thanks goes to Annamaria Viterbo, Andrea Spagnolo and Alberto Miglio for the time 
spent discussing about these issues and, in particular, the Ledra case. All errors remain 
mine. This chapter has been written in the context of the REScEU project (Reconciling 
Economic and Social Europe, www.resceu.eu), funded by the European Research Council 
(grant no. 340534).
2  A third axis consists of measures aiming at creating a safer financial sector in the 
EU. These measures involved stronger prudential requirements for banks, improved de-
positor protection and rules for managing failing banks. They set the foundations for the 
creation of a European Banking Union. See Kern (2015).
3  See generally, Viterbo and Cisotta (2012); Ruffert (2011).
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by Regulation No. 407/20104 and it had the capacity to borrow up to a total of 
60 million euros. The latter, endowed with more financial resources5, has been 
created by an international agreement and operates as a private company es-
tablished in Luxembourg. Most of the resources used to provide financial assis-
tance to Ireland and Portugal came from these sources. Conversely, the second 
adjustment program for Greece was entirely financed by the ESFS.
The need to reduce the risk of contagion through the establishment of a 
credible firewall pushed Member States to create a permanent mechanism to 
provide financial assistance to Euro-Area Members experiencing or threat-
ened by financing difficulties. The European Stability Mechanism6 was es-
tablished on 27 September 2012 with a maximum lending capacity of 500 
million euros. The ESM intervened to provide assistance to Cyprus, together 
with a loan by Russia, and to Spain for the bailout of the financial sector. Fur-
thermore, the ESM is also involved in the third financial assistance package 
for Greece, approved in August 2015.
Each bailout was premised upon the respect by the beneficiary State of a 
set of policy conditions to be agreed with EU institutions, acting on behalf 
of the donors. Conditionality is a typical tool used by international financial 
institutions that serves different purposes. First, it aims to reduce moral 
hazard and to ensure that resources are used to solve the beneficiary State’s 
problems.7 Moreover, conditionality is meant to protect the whole Eurozone 
against possible negative spill overs (the so-called ‘contagion effect’), safe-
guarding its long-term financial stability by making sure, inter alia, that the 
beneficiary State will be in the position to payback its loan. Tying financial 
support to the adoption of austerity measures also purports to send a reas-
suring message to financial markets, by showing concerned States’ resolve 
in trying to address the root causes of the problem. Lastly, conditionality 
serves deterrent purposes, since, as pointedly observed by Schepel, “States 
will have to be deterred from pursuing unsound budgetary policies by the 
prospect of having to live through the same amount of pain and misery in-
flicted on States assisted by the ESM”.8
4  Council Regulation (EU) No. 407/2010 of 11 May 2010, establishing a European 
financial stabilization mechanism, [2010] OJ L 118/1.
5  It had the capacity to borrow up to a total of 440 million euros.
6  The Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism (‘ESM Treaty’) was 
signed in March 2012. 
7  Ioannidis (2016).
8  Schepel (2017), p. 88.
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The Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) are key actors in 
this context, being them part, together with the IMF, of the so-called Troika 
since the first economic adjustment programme for Greece. After these in-
formal beginnings, their role has been recognized and codified in legal acts. 
For instance, Article 13(3) ESM Treaty establishes that, once it has decided to 
grant financial assistance, the Board of Governors “shall entrust the European 
Commission – in liaison with the ECB and, wherever possible, together with 
the IMF – with the task of negotiating, with the ESM Member concerned, 
a memorandum of understanding (a “MoU”) detailing the conditionality at-
tached to the financial assistance facility”.9 
The second axis of the European response to the crisis consists of the re-
inforcement of budgetary discipline by Member States and the creation of a 
new mechanism for stronger economic policy coordination. 
This has been achieved through a combination of EU legislative measures 
and international law treaties. As for the former, in November 2011 the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council adopted the so-called ‘Six-Pack’, a bundle 
of five Regulations and one Directive that strengthened both the preventive 
and corrective arms of the Stability and Growth Pact and introduced the Mac-
ro-Economic Imbalance Procedure.10 One of the Regulation of this package11 
codified the European Semester, a policy coordination framework that brings 
under a single procedural umbrella both soft and hard coordination and sur-
9  The provision has been copied and pasted in Article 7 Regulation (EU) No. 472/2013 
of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member 
States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect 
to their financial stability, [2013] OJ L140/1.
10  Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011 of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, [2011] OJ L306/12; 
Regulation (EU) No. 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the ex-
cessive deficit procedure [2011] OJ L306/33; Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of 16 Novem-
ber 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the Euro area [2011] 
OJ L306/1; Council Directive No. 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for 
budgetary frameworks of the Member States, [2011] OJ L304/41; Regulation (EU) No. 
1176/2011 of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic im-
balances [2011] OJ L306/25 and Regulation (EU) No. 1174/2011 of the Council of 16 No-
vember 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances 
in the Euro area, [2011] OJ L306/8.
11  Regulation (EU) No. 1175/2011, above n. 8.
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veillance mechanism.12 In May 2013 the EU legislator adopted two further 
measures – the ‘two-pack’- aimed at strengthening economic and budgetary 
surveillance over Euro-States in difficulty and at monitoring budgetary plans 
of all Euro-States.13
In March 2012, 25 out of 27 EU Member States signed the Treaty on Stability 
Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union,14 known 
as the ‘Fiscal Compact’, in order to send out unequivocal signs of their commit-
ment toward budgetary probity. Indeed, the TSCG sets out, inter alia, stringent 
targets in terms of structural deficits, so to make sure that Contracting Parties’ 
budgetary position is balanced or in surplus.15 Moreover, Article 3(2) TSCG re-
quires Contracting Parties to bring these rules into effect in their national legal 
orders “through provisions of binding force and permanent character”.
These measures had a profound impact on the fabric of the European 
integration process, engendering systemic16 conflicts with some of its foun-
dational elements.17 This paper looks at the capacity of the system to deal 
with these conflicts in order to avoid that they may shake its foundations and 
further weaken the legitimacy of the integration process. In particular, the 
paper focuses on the role that the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(‘the Court’) has been able and/or willing, to play when anti-crisis measures 
encroach upon fundamental social rights and, more in general, the balance 
between the social and the economic dimensions within the EU legal order. 
The first part looks at the departure from the rule of law in the context of bail-
out programmes devised to assist Member States that have been hard hit by 
the crisis. The second part looks at the impact of anti-crisis measures on so-
12  See generally Hallerberg, Marzinotto, Wolff (2012).
13  Regulation No. 472/2013 of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and 
budgetary surveillance of Member States in the Euro area experiencing or threatened 
with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, [2013] OJ L140/1 and 
Regulation (EU) No. 473/2013 of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and 
assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States in the Euro area [2013] OJ L140/11.
14  The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Mon-
etary Union was signed in March 2012 by representatives of all EU Member States, but the 
UK and Czech Republic. It entered into force on 1 January 2013. For an analysis of its legal 
form and content, as well as its contradictory relationship with EU law, see Craig (2012).
15  Article 3 TSCG. 
16  On this notion see Von Bogdandy, Ioannidis (2014).
17  Menéndez (2013), pp. 511-519.
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cial rights, examining some of the defining features of the conditions attached 
to financial assistance packages. The third and fourth parts turn to the Court, 
critically analysing its role in the new European economic governance and its 
capacity to preserve some of the foundational elements of the EU legal order. 
2. The crisis, the EU and the demise of the Rule of Law
Focusing on the financial assistance axis, Kilpatrick convincingly argued 
that “EU sovereign debt conditionality in ‘debtor states’ significantly troubles 
the Rule of Law”.18 To this end, she pointed to a number of key features of 
bailout instruments that threatens one of the cornerstone of the European 
integration process. 
Bailout programs are often governed by a mixture of acts of uncertain legal 
nature, especially due to Member States’ recourse to intergovernmental mech-
anisms, such as the European Stability Mechanism, that operate outside the 
scope of EU law. The departure from the Rule of Law is even more evident in 
those cases where EU institutions and, in particular, the ECB resorted to in-
formal tools, such as secret letters, to put pressure on some Member States in 
order to force them into socially painful structural adjustment programs.19 This 
is what happened, for instance, with Italy that, in August 2011, received a let-
ter20 from the then-President of the ECB and the then-Governor of the Italian 
Central Bank detailing a list of measures that it had to take and even the legal 
instruments it had to use. The adoption of these reforms were considered as a 
condition to benefit from the purchase of sovereign debt paper on the second-
ary market in the context of the Securities Market Programme, although the 
letter did not make this link explicit. The same line of action has also been fol-
lowed with Spain and, although using other forms of pressure, with Ireland,21 
18  Kilpatrick (2015b), p. 325. See also Munari (2015).
19  See generally Viterbo (2016).
20  See Economia e Finanza - Corriere della Sera, http://www.corriere.it/economia/11_
settembre_29/trichet_draghi_inglese_304a5f1e-ea59-11e0-ae06-4da866778017.shtm-
l?refresh_ce-cp, luglio 2017. 
21  In this case, the ECB played a key role to force the State to enter in a structural 
adjustment programme to be negotiated with the Troika. In a letter of 15 October 2010, 
Trichet reminded to then Irish Minister of Finance the ECB Governing Council’s powers 
and discretionality in applying collateral rules and in setting limits to ELA, In a subse-
quent letter of 19 November 2010, Trichet was even clearer on this point, by stating that 
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Cyprus22 and Greece.23
According to Joerges and Weimer, the reform of the EU economic archi-
tecture had an even deeper impact, perverting Europe’s economic constitu-
tion and its legal structure.24 In particular, it marks the definitive shift away 
from the ‘integration through law’ model toward a form of executive manage-
rialism, which they see as the heir of the new governance model. The main ca-
sualties of this move are “the virtues of ‘old’ traditional law based upon ideas 
of representative democracy, command and control, rights protection and 
justiciability, and the stabilization of expectations via formal legal norms”.25 
Although diverging on several aspects, these perspectives concur on the 
fact that the departure from the rule of law has been a choice and not an acci-
dent. As it often happens in situations that are perceived as having an excep-
tional character,26 the respect for rules has been perceived as a constraint that 
could hamper and, thus, make less effective the response to the crisis. There-
fore, the characterization of the crisis as an emergency situation allowed de-
cision-makers to adopt exceptional measures to cope with it and getting rid 
of the constraints imposed by an allegedly ineffective legal framework. In this 
“[i]t is the position of the Governing Council that it is only if we receive in writing a com-
mitment from the Irish Government vis-à-vis the Eurosystem on the four following points 
that we can authorise further provision of ELA to Irish financial institutions: 1) The Irish 
government shall send a request for financial support to the Eurogroup; 2) The request 
shall include the commitment to undertake decisive actions in the areas of fiscal consolida-
tion structural reforms and financial sector restructuring, in agreement with the European 
Commission, the IMF and the ECB […]”. Unsurprisingly the Irish Government bowed in, 
formally asking for financial assistance on the 20 November 2010.
22  In a Decision of 21 March, the ECB Governing Council made clear that it would have 
rejected a request of Emergency Liquidity Assistance by Cyprus’ National Central Bank un-
less “an EU/IMF programme is in place that would ensure the solvency of the concerned 
banks”. Also in this case, the pressure put by the ECB was enough to convince the State.
23  On 28 June and 6 July 2015, the ECB Governing Council twice decided to reject the 
request by the Greek National Central Bank to raise the Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 
forcing Greek authorities to impose a bank holiday and capital control. These decisions did 
not refer at all to the breakdown of the negotiations between Greece and EU institutions 
on the Third Assistance Package. However, it is telling that the very day in which the Tsip-
ras Government secured a Parliamentary vote on the measures that it pledged to obtain 
assistance from the EU, the ECB raised the ELA by 900 millions euros.
24  Joerges, Weimer (2012), p. 20.
25  Joerges, Weimer (2012) p. 15. See also Menéndez (2017).
26  The war on terror represents a good example in this regard.
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context, effectiveness has become the main, if not the only, feature that an-
ti-crisis measures must possess, even at the expenses of legality. 
The new framework gives to EU institutions an unprecedented capacity to 
take part and influence decisions adopted by national authorities in domains 
reserved to Member States, as it reaches across the entire spectrum of the 
their economic and social policies. This is particularly evident with regard 
to States under financial assistance: structural adjustment programs give to 
EU institutions the capacity to exercise policy formulation, supervision and 
guidance on key social issues, such as the provision of social services or the 
regulation of the labour market.27 
Referring to the case of implicit conditionality, Sacchi described the situa-
tion as an “extreme case of vertical […] integration in the policy arena, which 
goes well beyond what is generally meant by Europeanization, and cannot be 
captured through multilevel governance heuristic”. In his view, this transfor-
mation is better described as “a fusion ‘of responsibilities for the use of state 
instruments’”28. In the same vein, the strengthening of economic policy co-
ordination and surveillance mechanisms has potentially heightened the level 
of involvement of EU institutions into domestic policymaking. Chalmers, in 
particular, described the regimes aiming at securing balanced budgets, avoid-
ing excessive deficits and avoiding or correcting macroeconomic imbalances 
as a process of co-government that “goes to the structure and rationale of a 
State fiscal and welfare systems”.29 
This development puts severe constrains on political bargaining processes 
that should take place at national level.30 Indeed, in many cases national in-
stitutions – especially those of States under financial assistance – cannot but 
follow the line decided at supranational level, with little, if any, discretion.
3. The Impact of Anti-Crisis Measures on Social Rights 
Reduction of social expenditure, modernization of social protection sys-
tems and reform of the labour market are ever-present ingredients in the rec-
ipes proposed in the menu of the EU anti-crisis strategy. These objectives are 
27  Costamagna (2012).
28  Sacchi (2015), p. 89.
29  See also Chalmers (2012). 
30  Floris de Witte (2013).
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strongly reminiscent of those traditionally pursued by IMF-sponsored struc-
tural adjustment programmes back in the ‘80s and ‘90s, even though the IMF 
itself is now reconsidering the wisdom of this approach.31 Some commenta-
tors have aptly dubbed such a paradoxical situation as the “European rescue 
of the Washington Consensus”.32 
Especially from 2010 onward, the priority of austerity-driven rescue pack-
ages was reducing sovereign debts, by invariably imposing draconian cuts to 
social expenditure. The attention toward this issue may be explained by refer-
ring to its relative weight in European States’ budgets, as social expenditure 
account for roughly 30% of the total. At the same time, this strategy seems 
to be fully in line with one of the dominant narratives of the crisis, according 
to which the latter had been mainly generated by the profligacy of Southern 
States and the excessive generosity of their welfare systems.33 This is very 
much evident in the case of States forced to enter into a structural adjustment 
programme in order to get financial assistance from the EU or from EU-re-
lated mechanisms. For instance, Greece and Hungary were forced to reduce 
their social expenditure by respectively 17% and 11% in the period 2007-
201334. Moreover, it is worth observing that the First Economic Adjustment 
Programme for Greece envisaged cuts in health care expenditure amounting 
to more than 2 billion euro by 2015 and cuts in social benefits amounting to 
more than 5 billion euro by the same year to be achieved through, inter alia, 
a reduction of the monetary transfers to certain categories of vulnerable per-
sons. In the third package approved in August 2015, Greek authorities com-
mitted to target savings of around 0.25% of GDP in 2015 and around 1% of 
GDP by 2016 to improve the long-term sustainability of the pension system. 
A second component of the austerity-driven strategy is the promotion of 
internal devaluation, so to enable the ‘beneficiary’ State to regain external 
competiveness. In a context where currency devaluation is no longer an op-
tion35, the objective has been mostly pursued by reducing wages and other la-
bour costs, making individual and collective dismissals easier, forcing Mem-
ber States to revise (or even dismantle) the wage–setting system, by giving 
31  Lütz (2015). 
32  Lütz, Kranke (2010).
33  Tsoukala (2013).
34  OECD (2014).
35  Internal devaluation policies have been considered as “functional equivalents” to 
exchange rate flexibility. See generally Armigeon, Baccaro (2012).
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precedence to individual over collective bargaining. This stems from the (be-
lated) recognition that fiscal consolidation is not enough to promote growth 
and that there is the need to pursue it by mainly looking at the supply side.
Over the years, there have been some attempts to pay greater attention 
to the social implications of financial assistance programmes. Article 7 of 
Regulation (EU) 473/2013, on the strengthening of economic and budgetary 
surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened 
with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, represents a 
good example in this regard. The provision establishes that, when a Member 
State requests financial assistance, the draft macroeconomic adjustment pro-
gramme has to take “into account the practice and institutions for wage for-
mation and the national reform programme of the Member State concerned”, 
as well as to “fully observe Article 152 TFEU and Article 28 of the Charter”. 
Likewise, the August 2015 Memorandum for Greece seems, at least on pa-
per, more ‘socially-conscious’ that its predecessors. In particular, it explicitly 
recognizes the need for greater social justice, urging the Greek Government 
to “roll out a basic social safety net in the form of a Guaranteed Minimum 
Income”36 and praising the adoption of some measures aimed at supporting 
the most vulnerable part of the population.37 
Although certainly welcome, these attempts to work out a more balanced 
approach seem far too limited, especially if compared with the magnitude 
of the problem. Indeed, austerity measures contributed much to make the 
economic crisis evolve into a full-scale social crisis, having a severe negative 
impact on the enjoyment on a wide range of social rights, in particular with 
regard to certain groups, such as children, women, young and pensioners. 
The impact of austerity measures on social rights has been the objective of 
several studies. Notably, in January 2015 the European Parliament published 
a detailed comparative analysis regarding the impact on fundamental rights 
of austerity measures imposed in response to the crisis by seven EU Member 
States: Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal38. The anal-
ysis focused on a number of rights protected by the EU Charter of Fundamental 
36  Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission acting on 
behalf of the European Stability Mechanism and the Hellenic Republic and the Bank of 
Greece, 19 August 2015, p. 4. 
37  However, this praise sounds at bit paradoxical, as the adoption of these measures 
had been severely criticized by the donors at the time when they had been adopted.
38  European Parliament (2015).
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Rights and by the European Social Charter, such as education, healthcare, work, 
pension, access to justice, freedom of expression and assembly, housing, prop-
erty and some rights at work. The findings of the study paint a bleak picture. 
For instance, with regard to the right to education, it found that reduction 
in the number of schools, in the number of teachers and of administrative and 
other school-related costs “include a danger to the overall quality of education 
and children’s success at school; an increase in unemployed workers in educa-
tion; reduced availability of services [and] deterioration of general conditions 
in classrooms”. All these consequences being more intense for “[c]hildren with 
disabilities, Roma, Travellers’ children, as well as children of migrants”.39 Fur-
thermore, the study found that the massive reforms of the healthcare systems 
adopted in certain countries, such as Greece and Cyprus, primarily aimed at 
reducing costs through restricting access to healthcare, introducing or in-
creasing participation fees, reducing salaries and freezing the employment of 
staff took an equally heavy toll on the enjoyment of the right to health. In par-
ticular these measures reduced access to healthcare, increased waiting times 
for treatments and unmet medical needs, as well as decreased preventive and 
protecting care. Also in this case, these effects were more acutely felt by the 
most vulnerable, such as poor and homeless people, older people, people with 
disabilities and their families, women, and undocumented migrants.40 The 
analysis comes to similarly troublesome conclusions also with regard to oth-
er rights, such as work-related ones and, in particular, the right to collective 
bargaining; the right to social security, as social benefits have been cut and 
access has been severely restricted in many States; and the right to housing, as 
foreclosures and evictions escalated in countries such as Spain.41 
4. The Court of Justice and the Safeguard of Social Rights in Crisis 
4.1. The crisis, the reform of the European economic governance and the 
Court
At least on paper, the reform of the European economic governance 
strengthened the position of the Court. 
39  European Parliament (2015), p. 12.
40  European Parliament (2015), p. 13.
41  European Parliament (2015), pp. 13-16.
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On the one hand, new legal instruments, even if adopted outside the EU 
legal order, conferred further competences to the Court. This is the case of 
Article 37(3) ESM Treaty that gives to the Court the power to hear any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or the application of the Treaty. Furthermore, 
Article 8 TSCG empowers each Contracting Party to bring a claim before the 
Court when it considers that another Party failed to fully transpose, into its 
national legal order, the balanced budget rule, as provided for by Article 3(2) 
TSCG.42 
On the other hand, some commentators pointed out that the Court, togeth-
er with some national supreme judicial bodies, has been very much involved in 
the fiscal domain, to a degree that is far higher than in the past and elsewhere. 
They considered that this has led to a level of judicial interference that is ex-
cessive, as decisions in this domain are better left with the political branches. 
They maintained that the main reason behind such an unprecedented judicial 
intervention in the fiscal domain is the recourse to international law instru-
ments, which are more amenable to judicial review than EU ones.43 
However, the image of a stronger and pro-active Court can be hardly rec-
onciled with the peripheral role that it has played with regard to the pro-
tection of social rights and, more generally, the safeguard of non-economic 
interests and values vis-à-vis the strengthening of the EMU.44 This contrasts 
starkly with the key role that the Court played in the construction of the EU 
legal architecture underpinning the European integration process, through 
the introduction of new principles - such as that concerning the protection of 
fundamental rights - that have contributed much to shape the European inte-
gration process as a whole. Indeed, as aptly observed by Poiares Maduro, the 
CJEU “promoted the use of law as […] a ‘mask for politics’ in European inte-
gration”, supplementing the work of the legislative process and compensating 
for the lack of consensus among Member States on key issues.45 To this end, 
the CJEU did make full use of the interpretative discretion left by EU rules, 
stretching them to the limit and, in many instances, even beyond. 
Conversely, in the cases concerning austerity measures the CJEU has 
keenly accepted the limits posed by EU law to its capacity to review the legal-
42  See generally Porchia (2013).
43  Fabbrini (2014).
44  The Court is not alone in holding this position: see Hinarejos (2016).
45  Poiares Maduro (1998), pp. 17-19.
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ity of such measures. Most of these solutions are defensible,46 resting upon 
a flawless, even though quite formalistic, reading of the relevant provisions. 
Nonetheless, the overall approach contrasts with the far more proactive at-
titude that it had adopted in the past, showing that the CJEU was not just 
unable to play a part, but, at least to a large extent, also unwilling to do so. 
4.2. The systematic rejection of annulment actions brought by private ap-
plicants
The first line of relevant cases concerns the claims brought to the CJEU 
by private applicants seeking the annulment of acts addressed to a Member 
State in the context of a financial assistance programme.
A fitting example in this regard is the Ledra case,47 concerning the ESM 
intervention to assist Cyprus in the management of the difficulties faced by 
two of its biggest banks and, consequently, to avoid contagion. ESM financial 
assistance, which lasted from 2013 to 2016, was granted on the back of a mac-
ro-economic adjustment programme set by a MoU to be negotiated between 
the Troika and the Cypriot authorities. Negotiations started in 2012 and end-
ed in April 2013, when the MoU was signed by the Commission, on behalf of 
the ESM, the Central Bank of Cyprus and the Minister of Finance of Cyprus. 
In the meanwhile, the Cypriot authorities put the two largest Cypriot banks 
into resolution and provided for the recapitalisation of one of them, at the 
expenses of uninsured depositors, shareholders and bondholders. Some of 
them, after having seen a substantial decrease in the value of their deposits, 
turned to the EU General Court seeking the annulment of the parts of the 
MoU providing for the restructuring of the banks. In this case, the General 
Court48 swiftly rejected the claim, pointing to the fact that the MoU had been 
adopted by the Republic of Cyprus and the ESM and, thus, not being an act of 
an EU institution, body, office or agency, its legality cannot be review under 
Article 263 TFEU. 
The CJEU came to the same conclusion also in cases where the challenge 
46  Munari (2015), p. 49.
47  Judgment of 20 September 2016, Ledra Advertising at al., Joined cases C-8/15 to 
C-10/15 P, EU:C:2016:701.
48  Order of 10 November 2014, Ledra Advertising Ltd, T-289/13, EU:T:2014:981, 
paras. 56-63.
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was directed toward EU acts. In the ADEDY case,49 for instance, a public sec-
tor trade union sought the annulment of two Council decisions addressed 
to Greece aiming at reinforcing and deepening fiscal surveillance, as well as 
pushing through measures for the reduction of an excessive deficit. Appli-
cants argued that, inter alia, the two acts violated the principle of conferral, 
enshrined in Article 5(2) TEU. The General Court dismissed the action, as 
it considered that the applicants had no standing to bring it. Indeed, Article 
263(4) TFUE provides that natural or legal persons can institute an annul-
ment proceeding only in those cases where the act, if not addressed to them, is 
“of direct and individual concern to them”. The General Court focused exclu-
sively on the requirement of direct concern and, having found that it had not 
been fulfilled and having considered that the two conditions are cumulative, 
it declared the action inadmissible without having to take into consideration 
the other one. In particular, it observed that the acts not only were addressed 
to Greece, but were also very general in content, leaving much discretionary 
space to Greek authorities as to the selection of the concrete measures to be 
adopted in order to reduce the deficit. Therefore, applicants were not in the 
position to claim that the EU decisions were of direct concern to them. 
This conclusion is in line with a well-settled case law and it did not come as 
a surprise. The same goes also with a final remark made by the Court, dismiss-
ing the incompatibility between the inadmissibility decision and the right to 
effective judicial protection. Following, also in this case, a usual path,50 the 
Court pointed out that the remedy provided for under Article 263(4) TFUE is 
not to be considered in isolation, as it represents just one of the possibilities 
available to private parties to challenge the validity of EU acts having a gener-
al character. Indeed, private parties can bring their claim in front of national 
courts and, then, ask them to make a reference to the CJEU for a preliminary 
49  Order of 27 November 2011, Anotati Dioikisi Enoseon Dimosion Ypallilon (AD-
EDY), Spyridon Papaspyros and Ilias Iliopoulos v Council of the European Union, T-15 
/11, EU:T:2012:627.
50  However this line of reasoning has been much contested also within the CJEU, as 
the strict interpretation of the conditions for admissibility of action brought by private ap-
plicants were considered to be incompatible with the right to an effective judicial remedy: 
see Judgment of 3 May 2002, Jego-Quéré, T-177/01, EU:T:2002:112. The judgment was 
subsequently set aside by the Court, which considered that the then Court of First Instance 
erred in law, as it failed to duly consider that “the Treaty has established a complete system 
of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure review of the legality of acts of the 
institutions” (Judgment of 1 April 2004, Jego-Quéré, C-263/02, EU:C:2004:210). 
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ruling on the validity of the contested acts. As confirmed in ADEDY, the an-
nulment procedure and the preliminary reference one establish “a complete 
system of legal remedies and procedures designed to enable the European 
Union Courts to review the legality of acts of the institutions”
4.3. A truly “complete system of legal remedies”? Austerity measures out-
side the reach of the Charter
The application of the ‘complete system’ doctrine does not seems to offer 
many reasons for hope with regard to the capacity of the Court to play a more 
active role for the protection of rights threatened by austerity measures. In-
deed, the CJEU has rejected most of the requests for preliminary rulings sub-
mitted by national courts, showing, in particular, much reluctance to apply 
the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights (‘the Charter’) in cases concerning 
anti-crisis measures. 
In this regard, the case that set the tone was Pringle,51 one of the few de-
cided by the Court sitting in plenary session. The case originated from a re-
ferral by the Irish High Court, which had been asked to ascertain whether, 
by ratifying the ESM Treaty, Ireland would have undertaken obligations in 
contravention with several provisions of EU law and, in particular, with the 
norms on the protection of fundamental rights, as contained in the Charter. 
The Court answered in the negative, observing that in the case at hand the 
Charter does not find application. According to Article 51 of the Charter, its 
provisions are addressed to Member States only when they are implementing 
EU law and, according to the Court, this condition was not fulfilled in the case 
at stake. Indeed, “Member States are not implementing Union law […] when 
they establish a stability mechanism such as the ESM where […] the EU and 
FEU Treaties do not confer any specific competence on the Union to establish 
such a mechanism”.52 Regrettably, the Court did not conclusively address the 
other issue on the table, i.e. whether the Charter applies when EU institu-
tions, such as the Commission and the European Central Bank, act outside 
the EU legal framework, as it happens, for instance, when they participate 
to the definitions of the conditions attached to ESM-sponsored assistance 
packages. In this regard, it is worth considering that, in her conclusions on 
the case, Advocate General Kokott made clear that the Commission “as such 
51  Judgment of 27 November 2012, Pringle, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:756. 
52  Pringle above note 50, para. 180. 
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is bound by the full extent of European Union law, including the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights”.53 
The CJEU adopted an equally restrictive stance with regard to the appli-
cability of the Charter in cases directly concerning the legality of austerity 
measures. A good example in this regard is the Order adopted by the Court 
in Sindicato dos Bancarios do Norte and Others.54 The case concerned the 
Portuguese bailout and, in particular, a number of measures aimed, as clari-
fied in the Implementing Decision 2011/344/EU,55 at “strengthening labour 
market functioning by limiting severance payments and making working 
time arrangements more flexible” by the end of 2011, as provided for by the 
Memorandum of Understanding. The Portuguese Government honoured its 
commitments with the Budget Law for 2011, which imposed, inter alia, cuts 
to public sector wages and suspended the payment of bonuses. Public sectors 
trade unions challenged these measures in front of the employment tribu-
nal of Porto that, in turn, referred a number of preliminary questions to the 
Court. In particular, it asked whether the right to fair and just working con-
ditions, as enshrined in Article 31 of the Charter, prevented the reduction of 
workers’ salary, when there is no modification of the collective agreement. 
Moreover, the Portuguese tribunal also asked whether the same provision 
is to be interpreted as imposing a remuneration that allows the worker to 
maintain a satisfactory standard of living. Lastly, it asked whether salary cuts, 
insofar as they are not the only available measure to ensure the sustainability 
of public finances, contravene Article 31 of the Charter, as they put at risk the 
standard of living of the affected workers. The Court refused to hear any of 
these questions, claiming that it had no jurisdiction to take cognisance of the 
requests. Indeed, it confirmed that the Charter does not find application in 
this case, since, when Portugal adopted the contested measures, it was not 
implementing EU law.
The strict interpretation of the conditions regulating the applicability of 
the Charter seems compatible with the black letter of Article 51 of the Charter, 
which establishes that the Charter applies to member States “only when they 
53  View of 26 October 2012, Pringle, C-370/12, EU:C:2012:675, para. 176. See Kilpat-
rick (2015a), pp. 405-406.
54  Order of 7 March 2013, Sindicato dos Bancarios do Norte and Others, C-128/12, 
EU:C:2013:149.
55  Council Implementing Decision no. 2011/344/EU of 30 May 2011 on granting 
Union financial assistance to Portugal [2011] OJ L159/88.
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are implementing Union law”. However, there has been instances where the 
Court opted for a much liberal reading of the provision, allowing for the appli-
cation of the Charter in cases where the State concerned was not implementing 
EU law. A case that stands out in this regard is Åkerberg Fransson, a judgment 
concerning an alleged violation of the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in 
Article 50 of the Charter.56 Mr. Fransson, having been charged for serious tax 
offences, had first been ordered to pay a hefty tax surcharge by the Swedish 
Tax Board and, then, criminally prosecuted for these very offences. From our 
perspective, the most interesting issue is that neither the Tax Board, nor the 
Prosecutor were implementing EU law when they imposed the penalties on Mr. 
Fransson or when they decided to prosecute him. This notwithstanding, the 
Court established that the Charter could find application in the case at hand, as 
it considered that the existence of a link, even though quite tenuous, between 
the offences committed by Mr Fransson and EU law would suffice to this end. 
In particular, the Court pointed to the fact that some of these breaches con-
cerned the obligation to declare VAT, which, in turn, is one of the sources of 
EU’s own resources and it regulated by EU primary and secondary norms. This 
element, according to the Court, was enough to draw the situation under the 
scope of EU law and, thus, to make the Charter applicable. This broad reading 
of the conditions governing the application of EU fundamental rights norms 
refers back to case law predating the entry into force of the Charter and it used 
by the CJEU to broaden its scope of application vis-à-vis Member States. 
Had the Court followed the same interpretive approach when faced with 
challenges directed against austerity measures, it would have come to differ-
ent conclusions as to the applicability of the Charter. Indeed, the measures 
at stake had been adopted in the context of structural adjustment programs 
negotiated with EU institutions, in accordance to procedures governed by EU 
law and to pursue objectives, such as the reduction of the excessive deficits, 
sanctioned by EU norms. In a word, they clearly have a much stronger link 
with the EU legal order than those in Åkerberg Fransson.
4.4. The ‘complete system’ doctrine avenged? Yes, but only partially
As seen above, the Court went through a long period in which it seemed 
to fully adhere to the idea that bailout measures were immune from judicial 
scrutiny at supranational level. However, there are now some tentative signs 
56  See Lazzerini (2013); Montaldo (2013), pp. 574-581.
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pointing in the opposite direction, showing a renewed commitment toward 
opening up new judicial avenues for the protection of fundamental rights in 
times of austerity. 
The most recent example in this regard is the Florescu judgment of June 
2017. The case concerned a Romanian law of 2009 that prohibited the com-
bining of a pension with an income for activities carried out in a public insti-
tution. Anyone in such position had to either ask for the suspension of the 
pension or renounce to the paid job. The law had been adopted in order to 
fulfil the obligations arising under the MoU negotiated by the Romanian Gov-
ernment with the Commission as a condition to obtain financial assistance 
from the EU. Three retired judges, teaching at the law faculty of Sibiu, chal-
lenged the measure, which, in their view, violated several of their rights, as 
enshrined in the Charter. The Court of Appeal decided to stay proceedings 
and raise a number of preliminary questions. Quite remarkably, the Court has 
already had the chance to rule on similar measures adopted by Romanian au-
thorities on the basis of the very same law. However, in 2011 and 2012 it dis-
missed two requests coming from Romanian judges, finding “an easy escape 
route”57 in poorly drafted orders for reference that failed to highlight the con-
nection between national measures and EU law. In Florescu, the Court took a 
different path, declaring its competence to rule on the compatibility between 
Romanian austerity measures and EU law provisions protecting fundamen-
tal rights. To this end, it found that the MoU is reviewable under Article 267 
TFEU, since it is mandatory and “constitutes an act of an EU institution”.58 
This is quite remarkable, being it the first time, nine years after the first fi-
nancial assistance programme was launched, in which the Court take a clear 
position on this issue. Yet, the implications of this finding need to be assessed 
against the specificities of the Romania’s assistance programme. Indeed, the 
latter was based on Article 143 TFEU, which empowers the EU to financially 
assist non-euro States facing difficulties as regards their balance of payments. 
This means that the MoU at issue finds its roots in EU law, having being ad-
opted on the basis of Article 143 TFEU and Regulation (EC) No. 332/2002.59 
In the light of the above, the Court had an easy run in finding that the Charter 
57  Barnard (2013). 
58  Judgment of 13 June 2017, Florescu, C-258/14, EU:C:2017:448, para. 35.
59  Council Regulation (EC) No. 332/2002 of 18 February 2012 establishing a facility 
providing medium-term financial assistance for Member States’ balances of payments, 
OJ L 53 of 23.202.2012, pp. 1-3.
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was applicable to the case at hand, by pointing to the fact that Romanian 
authorities were implementing EU law when adopting measures that aimed 
at realizing the objectives set forth in the MoU. In the process, the Court ex-
cluded, by correctly referring to its previous case-law, that the existence of a 
margin of discretion for national authorities in deciding what measures were 
to be adopted could in any way call into question this analysis.60 
What remains to be seen is whether Florescu is a sign of a broader change 
of attitude by the Court or if the latter will stick to its strict interpretative ap-
proach when it comes to deciding on the applicability of the Charter in cas-
es where bailout conditions are set by documents whose main legal basis lies 
outside the EU legal framework. The Court will be called upon to provide an 
answer to this question in a pending case concerning the reduction of the sal-
aries of Portuguese Court of Auditors’ judges. The reduction resulted from a 
law adopted in 2014 that scaled down the remuneration of many categories of 
public servants, so to fulfil one of the conditions contained in the structural 
adjustment programme negotiated with the Troika. In the national proceed-
ing, claimants sought the annulment of the measure, arguing that it contrasted 
with the principle of judicial independence, as enshrined in the TEU and in 
Article 47 of the Charter. The referring judge – the Supremo Tribunal Admin-
istrativo – decided to turn to the Court, asking whether these EU provisions 
have to be interpreted in the sense of precluding the adoption of measures such 
as the contested one. In his Opinion, AG Saugmandsgaard Øe61 concluded that 
the Portuguese measure “constitutes an implementation of provisions of EU 
law, within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter”.62 The conclusion seems 
to rest on the existence of a sufficiently strong linkage between the contested 
measures and the EU legal order. In particular, the AG posited, without spell-
ing it out clearly, that the reduction of salaries constituted a measure adopted 
to comply with conditions referred to also in EU legal acts, such as Council 
implementing decisions. Doubts can be legitimately raised as to whether the 
Opinion will be able to persuade the Court to revisit its position on the appli-
cability of the Charter to this type of bailout measures. Indeed, the AG was 
too swift in addressing this controversial aspect, jumping directly to the con-
clusion and failing to clearly articulate all the steps of his argumentative path.
60  Florescu above note 57, Para. 48. 
61  Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe of 18 May 2017, Associação Sindical dos Juizes 
Portugueses, C-64/16.
62  ASJP above note 60, Para. 53.
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It is worth highlighting that the Court had already opened up another ju-
dicial avenue for the protection of fundamental rights in non-EU based struc-
tural adjustment programmes. In the above-mentioned Ledra judgment, the 
Court of Justice declared the admissibility of an action for damages brought 
by a number of Cypriot investors against the Commission and the ECB for 
their role in the negotiation and conclusion of the MoU. As seen above, the 
latter document detailed a series of measures to be adopted by Cypriot au-
thorities as a condition to obtain financial assistance by the ESM. In particu-
lar, applicants claimed that the Commission and the ECB played a key role in 
devising the bail-in implemented by Cypriot authorities in a way that made 
their bank deposits’ value drop dramatically and, thus, violating their right 
to property as enshrined in Article 17 of the Charter. On this point, the Court 
overturned the decision of the General Court and distanced itself from the 
path suggested by Advocate General Wahl. 
The General Court, in an Order issued on November 2014, rejected the 
claims for compensation on several different grounds. First, it found that 
there was no act, nor course of action, that could be imputed to the Commis-
sion or the ECB, since the ESM Treaty does not confer to them any power to 
take autonomous decisions. Consequently, the acts adopted in that context 
“solely commit the ESM”63 and the Court has no jurisdiction to consider a 
claim that is based on the illegality of an act that does not originate from a EU 
institution acting within the EU. Secondly, it excluded that the Commission 
could incur responsibility for having failed to fully exercise its role as guard-
ian of the Treaties, as provided for in Article 17 TEU. In particular, it opined 
that the alleged omission did not meet one of the conditions for the admissi-
bility of the action for damages, that of the existence of a causal link between 
the behaviour of the institution and the damage. Indeed, the decree that de-
termined the severe reduction of the value of claimants’ deposits was adopted 
before the conclusion of the MoU and, consequently, the Commission could 
have done nothing to avert the losses.64 
The Advocate General’s Opinion65 was, up to a certain point, broadly in 
line with the arguments put forward by the General Court. After excluding 
that the MoU could be directly imputed to either the Commission or the ECB, 
63  Ledra above note 47, para. 45. 
64  Ledra above note 47, paras. 54-55. 
65  Opinion of 21 April 2016, Ledra Advertsing Ltd, Joined cases C-8/15 P to C-10/15 
P, EU:C:2016:701.
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he offered a distinctively restrictive reading of Pringle and, in particular, of 
the paragraph where the Court hinted at the existence of an obligation for the 
Commission to ensure the consistency of the MoU with EU law.66 Further he 
drew an unpersuasive parallel between the discretionality that the Commis-
sion enjoy in the context of the infringement procedure and the situation at 
stake, going as far as maintaining that “it cannot be argued that every time the 
Commission breaches a specific Treaty provision, or does not prevent such 
a provision being breached by another entity, that breach amounts to an in-
fringement of the general provision of Article 17 TEU”. All these elements 
led him to conclude that there was no duty for the Commission to act in case 
of incompatibility between bailout instruments and EU law and, thus, no 
responsibility could arise. For good measure, the Advocate General also ex-
cluded the applicability of the Charter when the Commission acts outside the 
EU legal framework. In his final remarks, AG Wahl admitted that aggrieved 
individuals should not look for remedies within the EU legal order, but at 
national or international level. As for the latter, he took the UN Draft Articles 
on the Responsibility of International Organizations as a “source of inspira-
tion”67 to conclude that only the ESM, and possibly Member States, can be 
held responsible for the acts adopted in the context of ESM-sponsored finan-
cial assistance programmes. 
Conversely, the Court of Justice declared the action for damages admissi-
ble, at least with regard to the Commission. The fact that the MoU falls out-
side the scope of application of EU law – the Court observed – does not bar 
applicants from bringing an action for compensation. Indeed, this element is 
relevant for the admissibility of an action for annulment, but not in the case 
at stake. The two actions are autonomous68 and their admissibility depends 
on the fulfilment of different conditions. Subsequently, the Court turned 
to address the crux of the matter, i.e. whether the Commission is bound to 
ensure the respect of EU law even when acting outside the EU legal order. 
Pringle had been quite reticent on this point, carefully avoiding to draw any 
conclusion. Ledra represents a step forward in that regard: moving from the 
66  Pringle above n. 50, Para. 164. 
67  Pringle above note 50, Para. 100. Quite remarkably, in drawing inspiration from 
this document, the Advocate General did not even feel the need to distinguish between 
international responsibility, which is the subject matter of DARIO, and non-contractual 
liability under Art. 340 TFEU.
68  See Gutman (2011), pp. 703-708.
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premise that the participation to the ESM activities cannot alter the pow-
ers conferred to the institution by the Treaties, the Court inferred that “the 
Commission retains, […] within the framework of the ESM Treaty, its role of 
guardian of the Treaties as resulting from article 17(1) TEU”. For this reason, 
it is bound to “refrain from signing a memorandum of understanding” even 
in the case “it doubts” its consistency with EU law. 
Such a conclusion rests on the assumption that the primacy of EU law 
operates not only with regard to domestic law, but also with regard to agree-
ments concluded between Member States.69 What the Court is saying, with-
out making it explicit, is that Article 17 TEU, mandating the Commission to 
act as guardian of the Treaties, prevails over Article 13(4) ESM Treaty, which 
establishes that the “Commission shall sign the MoU on behalf of the ESM” 
when the document is approved by the Board of Governors. In this regard, the 
Court is seemingly sending a strong message to EU institutions or, at least, to 
the Commission, making it clear that their freedom of action in the context 
of intergovernmental mechanism created by Member States is not unlimited. 
These judgments and opinions represent a step forward, signalling the 
Court’s renewed commitment toward the protection of fundamental rights 
in the context of structural adjustment programmes. However, the sense of 
relief may well evaporate if one considers how the cases have been decided 
on the merit. Both in Florescu and Ledra the Court found against the pri-
vate claimants, excluding that any violation of the rights had occurred. These 
conclusions are by and large convincing in the light of the factual scenarios: 
indeed, in both cases the impugned measures touched upon privileges, more 
than rights. Far more problematic is the the argumentative path followed to 
get there, especially if the Court is going follow it also in the future, when deal-
ing with other types of measures. In both these cases, the Court adopted an 
extremely deferential standard of review in applying the proportionality test, 
granting to national authorities an extremely wide margin of appreciation. 
In Ledra, the Court began with making clear that, even when acting in the 
context of the ESM Treaty, the Commission had to ensure that the MoU was 
consistent with the rights guaranteed therein and, in particular, with the right 
to property, contained in Article 17. Subsequently, it observed that, under the 
Charter, this right is not absolute, as it can be subject to restrictions. How-
69  This proposition is fully in line with the case law of the Court; see Judgment of 10 
November 1992, Exportur SA, C-3/91, EU:C:1992:420. Furthermore, it finds strong sup-
port in the literature, see Bruno de Witte (2001), pp. 244-245.
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ever, Article 52(1) Charter establishes that limitations to the exercise of any 
right are possible only in so far as they pursue an objective of general interest, 
comply with the principle of proportionality and does not impair the essence 
of the right. The Court enumerated all the conditions, but it then contented 
itself with just one of them, i.e. the fact the impugned measures pursued an 
objective of general interest. Little, if any, attention is devoted to their pro-
portionality and to their capacity to preserve the essence of the right. The im-
portance of the objective pursued by the measures – ensuring the stability of 
the banking system and of the euro area as a whole – it is enough, in the eyes 
of the Court, to conclude that they “do not constitute a disproportionate and 
intolerable interference impairing the very essence of the appellants’ right 
to property”. Without any need to consider the suitability of the measures to 
reach the stated objectives, their necessity or whether a fair balance had been 
struck with other competing objectives.70 
Likewise, in Florescu the Court found that the contested measure did not 
violate claimants’ right to property, since it “is capable of attaining the gen-
eral interest objective pursued and is necessary to attain that objective”. To 
this end, it acknowledged that national authorities enjoy a wide margin of 
appreciation “when adopting economic decisions”, being them “in the best 
position to determine the measures likely to achieve the objective pursued”.71 
Such a highly deferential approach is at the vanishing point of judicial scru-
tiny, putting the Court in the spectators’ seat while national authorities are 
free to run the show at their will. What justifies the granting of a wide margin 
is “the particular economic context” that needs to be confronted by “reduc-
ing public sector wage costs and […] reforming the pension system”.72 The 
Court seemed, thus, to share the sense of inevitability that traditionally per-
vades the adoption of austerity measures and that represents a defining trait 
of the technocratic approach prevailing in this context. In other words, this 
approach can be read as offering a stark – and troublesome – confirmation of 
the deep impact of the crisis on the EU constitutional fabric and, in particular, 
on the relationship between different objectives therein. Ensuring the finan-
70  The Court seems to have taken very seriously, even too much, the suggestion of 
some commentators who argue that, instead than putting these measures outside the 
reach of EU law, the Court should address the merit of the cases, granting a wide margin 
of discretion to decision-makers in order to preserve their autonomy of action. See Bar-
nard (2013), pp. 13-14.
71  Florescu above note 57, para. 57. 
72  Florescu above note 57, paras 56-57.
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cial stability of the euro area has seemingly become a sort of a trump card 
that just needs to be invoked in order to prevail over any other competing 
objective.73
5. Concluding remarks
The analysis shows that the Court has consistently adopted a non-inter-
ventionist stance with regard to judicial actions challenging the compatibility 
of austerity measures with key principles of EU law, such as the protection of 
fundamental rights. This finding still holds true after the Ledra and Florescu 
judgments, where the Court finally declared the amenability of bailout mea-
sures to some form of judicial control at supranational level, but it then ad-
opted an extremely deferential approach toward the choice made by national 
authorities. 
This choice can be viewed as an attempt by the Court not to interfere with 
decisions taken by political bodies – being them national or supranational 
ones – to cope with an emergency situation. This is nothing new, as there are 
many examples where courts have decided to refrain from constraining the 
capacity of the legislative or, more often, executive power to (re-)act in the 
face of an emergency.74 
However, the adoption of this approach by the Court is problematic under 
many accounts. In particular, the choice not to engage with these issues re-
veals its passive acceptance of the demise of the role that the law can play in 
the response to the crisis and the construction of a new architecture.75 This 
is all the more disturbing in the context of the European Union that, as the 
Court itself has proudly repeated several time and it has been codified in the 
Preamble of the Charter, is “based on the rule of law”. The situation is further 
compounded by the effects that the managerialist turn, and its blind adher-
ence to fiscal austerity, is having on what can be broadly defined as the ‘Eu-
ropean social model’. In this context, the Court’s unwillingness – and not just 
inability – to fully exercise its role do not certainly do any good in restoring 
the legitimacy of the European integration process. 
73  See generally Costamagna (2014), pp. 371-373.
74  This tendency has been extensively analysed with regard to the so-called fight 
against terrorism, see recently Fabbrini (2010); Cole (2003).
75  Giubboni (2015).
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RIPENSARE LA NAZIONE OTTOCENTESCA.
VECCHI E NUOVI PARADIGMI TRA STORIA, DIRITTO E GLOBALITÀ
Eliana Augusti
«[…] l’età del simultaneo, della giustapposizione, del vicino e 
del lontano, del fianco a fianco e del disperso»
(M. Foucault, Spazi altri. I principi dell’eterotopia, 1985-86)
1. L’invenzione della nazione: percorsi mitici, mistici e utopici
Nel 1851, durante la celebre prolusione con cui inaugurava il corso di di-
ritto internazionale e marittimo della Regia Università di Torino, Pasquale 
Stanislao Mancini sovvertiva i punti saldi della disciplina, immaginando nella 
nazione il nuovo ideale al quale ridurre il dialogo tra soggetti di diritto in-
ternazionale1. A suo dire, nessuna aggregazione territoriale, nessuna società 
naturale di uomini avrebbe trovato altro fondamento politico se non nella 
nazionalità. Nessun patto, nessun contratto sociale: l’unità nazionale non im-
plicava un’unità statale, per quanto le due aspirazioni (nazionale e statale) 
potessero coincidere nel percorso di edificazione di uno stato nazionale. Essa 
era unità profonda che precedeva lo Stato e che derivava da caratteri comuni: 
la lingua, la religione, l’etnia, il suolo. La giuridicità era nella «coscienza di 
una comune nazionalità» e si manifestava, all’interno, nella «libera costitu-
zione della nazione» e, all’esterno, nella «indipendente autonomia verso le 
nazioni straniere»2. La coscienza di essere parte di una nazione legittimava 
di per sé l’esercizio della sovranità statale nei confronti dei cittadini. Lo Stato 
naturalmente perfetto di una nazione era l’etnicarchia, che richiedeva: un 
controllo su tutto il territorio nazionale così come risultato dei suoi confini 
naturali; l’esistenza di un governo in grado di governare; una posizione di 
uguaglianza con le altre nazioni straniere3.
1  Mancini (1851), p. 7. Diffusamente in Nuzzo (2007), pp. 161-186. Per un profilo di 
Mancini, vedi Nuzzo (2012b), pp. 307-310; Storti (2013), vol. II, pp. 1244-1248. 
2  Nuzzo (2007), pp. 165-166. 
3  Mancini (1851), pp. 39-42. 
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A parlare per primo di etnicarchia era stato Giandomenico Romagnosi4. 
Anzi, fu lui a coniare nell’ambito della nuova dottrina della nazionalità il neo-
logismo, frutto, a sua volta, dell’interiorizzazione del pensiero vichiano. L’et-
nicarchia altro non era che il diritto di un’etnia al controllo pieno sul proprio 
territorio. Lo aveva stigmatizzato Jean-Étienne-Marie Portalis nel 1803: la 
nazione era un factum e non un pactum, un prodotto della storia5. Questo 
nonostante, ancora, agli inizi dell’Ottocento le nazioni non avessero una “sto-
ria”: anche quelle che avevano già identificato i loro antenati, infatti, «dispo-
nevano solo di pochi capitoli incompleti di una narrazione di cui resta[va] 
ancora da scrivere l’essenziale»6.
Al di là del soggetto etnicarchico, proiezione sovrana dell’etnia, restava 
la nazione il vero protagonista delle relazioni internazionali, la «monade ra-
zionale»7, scriveva Mancini, forse tenendo a mente quell’idea di nazione che 
correva oltralpe di cosa «una e indivisibile»8. Per quanto però “una e indivi-
sibile”, per quanto fatto di natura, per quanto eredità di caratteri comuni da 
accogliere, «inventariare» e trasmettere, la nazione restava cosa da «inventa-
re». Il processo di invenzione, e costruzione, non fu però un processo privato, 
non fu un affare di famiglia, di “etnia”, nazionale. Come ha colto efficacemen-
te Anne-Marie Thiesse nel 2001, a partire dal Settecento, ogni singolo gruppo 
nazionale si era mostrato “recettivo”, attento a quanto facevano i suoi simili 
e i suoi rivali, aveva cercato di adattare alle proprie esigenze le idee degli altri 
ed era stato, a sua volta, imitato quando aveva scoperto qualcosa di nuovo o 
in grado di migliorare la sua condizione. Le origini della nazione, dunque, ap-
parivano paradossalmente transnazionali9, il processo creativo della nazione 
4  Cf. Manfredi (1961), pp. 463-470. “Etnicarchia” compare in Astuti (1937). Vedi an-
che Scioscioli (1995), p. 143; Lacché (2010), pp. 153-228.
5  Guiomar (1990), pp. 102-112. 
6  Thiesse (2001), p.127. Solo alla fine del secolo sarebbero state in possesso di «un 
racconto continuo che mostra[va] la lunga strada percorsa, il cui senso, nonostante tutte 
le vicissitudini e gli ostacoli, [era] dato dal genio nazionale: storia compiuta se la nazione 
[aveva] raggiunto l’indipendenza, storia che preannuncia[va] un radioso avvenire se la 
lotta per la libertà [era] ancora tutta da combattere».
7  Mancini (1851), pp. 46-47. Cf. Pene Vidari (2013), pp. 117-134; Passero (2010), pp. 
93-100.
8  Rossi (1866-67), vol I, pp. 244 e ss., lo affermò con forza, esaltando il significato po-
litico e il valore esemplare del modello d’oltralpe. Cf. Ghisalberti (2015); Treggiari (1991), 
vol I, pp. 273-297.
9  Thiesse (2001), pp. 8-9.
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nasceva come processo pubblico e partecipato. «Building Nations», scriverà 
Eric Hobsbawm, usando non a caso una forma impersonale10. Politica trans-
nazionale, internazionale e interna sembravano essere strettamente legate le 
une alle altre dal vincolo del principio di nazionalità, permeante e diffusivo.
Non stupisce, quindi, l’intuizione di Giuseppe Mazzini, che aspirava, attra-
verso la nazione, al progresso dell’umanità intera, per quanto la sua umanità 
fosse ancora ed essenzialmente l’Europa. L’umanità poteva ridursi alla na-
zione; attraverso la nazione era possibile immaginare l’umanità; attraverso 
la nazione l’umanità aveva l’occasione di migliorarsi e raggiungere il bene 
comune. Nel saggio del 1847 su Nazionalità e cosmopolitismo, all’indoma-
ni della costituita Lega Internazionale dei Popoli a Londra, Mazzini così ri-
spondeva alle accuse che gli venivano mosse dai cosmopoliti, per i quali “na-
zione” era concetto «retrogrado e pericoloso»: «noi siamo tutti Cosmopoliti, 
se per Cosmopolitismo s’intende la fratellanza di tutti, l’amore per tutti, e 
la distruzione delle barriere che separano i popoli, dando loro interessi op-
posti»11. In questo modo, Mazzini superava il pregiudizio settecentesco del 
popolo-nazione come macro-stirpe mistica di consanguinei, come comunità 
che si prolungava attraverso le epoche grazie a «un patto non solo tra chi è in 
vita oggi, ma tra i vivi, i morti e i non ancora nati»12; come «comunità subli-
me di una lunga catena di generazioni passate, attualmente viventi e ancora 
da venire, le quali sono tutte unite per la vita e per la morte in una grande e 
solida associazione»13; come accampamento armato pronto alla guerra contro 
“eterni nemici” che stanno fuori e dentro il recinto14. La nazione di Mazzini 
apriva alla fratellanza, all’umanità e al suo progresso. Il principio che avrebbe 
dovuto reggere ogni diritto pubblico o internazionale per Mazzini era «il mi-
glioramento di tutti per mezzo di tutti; il progresso di ciascuno a vantaggio 
di tutti»15. Come? Passando per la nazione: condizione «indispensabile del 
moto progressivo dell’epoca» era il «ritemprare» la nazionalità dei popoli nei 
popoli. «L’Umanità è il fine: la Nazione, il mezzo»16, scriveva. Il minimo co-
10  Hobsbawm (2010), p. 101, compare come «Si costruiscono nazioni». 
11  Nazionalità e cosmopolitismo (1847), in Mazzini (2011), p. 83. 
12  Burke (1790), p. 144. 
13  Müller (1989), p. 102. Cf. Merker (2009), p. 22. 
14  La comunità “mistica” non avrebbe potuto tollerare dissidenti ed estranei al suo 
interno e nella guerra verso chi stava fuori, i popoli avrebbero imparato a «conoscere e 
contemplare se stessi», Müller (1989), pp. 29-32. Cf. Merker (2009), p. 23. 
15  Nazionalità e cosmopolitismo (1847), in Mazzini (2011), p. 87. 
16  Nazionalismo e nazionalità (1871), in Mazzini (2011), p. 89. Anche per Mancini il 
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mune denominatore del progresso era nella nazione: non un valore esclusivo, 
ma condiviso, lingua comune per trovare l’accordo, via da percorrere insieme 
agli altri17. Come componenti spettrali con diverse lunghezze d’onda, come 
fasci cromatici attraverso un prisma, le nazionalità avevano un’origine, una 
legge e uno scopo comune, derivavano tutte dallo stesso raggio di luce. Erano 
dispersione di un’umanità di cui non avevano più memoria e alla quale dove-
vano tendere. 
«Non crediamo all’eternità delle razze. Non crediamo all’eternità delle lingue. Non 
crediamo all’eternità e all’onnipotente influenza dei climi sullo sviluppo dell’attività 
umanitaria […] Crediamo a una sola e costante legge generale […] Crediamo che il lavoro 
di tutte queste facoltà, sviluppate e convertite in forze attive, giungerà a fondere tutti i 
membri dell’Umanità nella coscienza d’una origine, d’una legge di moto e d’uno scopo 
comune».
Più che una risposta “in concreto”, però, quella di Mazzini era una risposta 
“in fede”, un atto di fede, meglio, nella fratellanza umana18. In un altro scritto, 
sempre del 1847, chiariva e consolidava la sua intuizione: 
«Non siamo forse tutti, nazioni ed individui, creature di Dio, obbligate a fare il bene, 
a frenare il male, a favorire il Suo disegno, ad ottenere il trionfo della verità sull’errore, 
della libertà sulla schiavitù? I doveri delle nazioni non crescono forse con la loro forza? 
L’indifferenza non è forse ateismo? […] Quando Iddio pone sulla terra un popolo e gli 
dice: «Sii una nazione!» Egli non dice: «Isolati […]», egli dice: «Cammina con la testa alta 
in mezzo ai fratelli che Io ti ho dato […]: prendi il tuo posto fra le nazioni […]. Dichiara 
apertamente la Fede dinanzi al mondo ed ai padroni del mondo, non rinnegare i tuoi 
fratelli, ma aiutali, secondo i loro bisogni e il tuo potere»19. 
fine supremo da raggiungere era quello dell’Umanità delle Nazioni, meglio espresso nella 
«celebrazione dell’umanità e [nel] suo progresso civile nel libero, armonico e compiuto 
sviluppamento delle Nazionalità». Così in Chabod (1961), p. 81. Sugli esiti dell’idea di “na-
zione” nella cultura giuridica italiana tra Otto e Novecento vedi Colao (2001), pp. 255-360.
17  Lo avrebbe chiarito anche Gaetano Filangieri: questa tensione all’umanità era ne-
cessaria, ma solo nella salvaguardia della propria specificità nazionale. «Spogliandoci di 
ogni prevenzione, investendoci di quel sano carattere d’imparzialità, che le ricerche poli-
tiche esigono, noi troveremo l’interesse privato di ciascheduna nazione così strettamente 
unito all’interesse universale e viceversa l’interesse universale così strettamente unito al 
particolare, che da una nazione non può perdere, senza che le altre perdano, e che non può 
guadagnare senza che le altre guadagnino». Filangieri (1784), pp. 53-54.
18  Umanità e patria (1836), in Mazzini (2011), pp. 78-80.
19  La Lega Internazionale dei Popoli (1847), in Mazzini (2011), pp. 261-262. 
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«Sii una nazione! […] prendi il tuo posto fra le nazioni». Era la consacrazione 
del principio di autodeterminazione dei popoli davanti a Dio, «ai padroni 
del mondo» e «ai fratelli». Se il progetto-nazione era un passo obbligato e 
provvidenzialmente segnato, se la neutralità e l’indifferenza dei “fratelli” 
era immorale e, dunque, la solidarietà un dovere, la “nazione” assumeva 
connotazioni misticheggianti e permetteva di sfumare nel metafisico 
ogni ulteriore argomentazione, annientando anche le insinuazioni della 
macchinazione borghese e capitalistica che intorno alla nazione aleggiavano20.
Nel Settecento gli avversari della rivoluzione avevano auspicato il ritorno a 
un popolo depoliticizzato, «di dimensione morfologica, localistica, medieval-
mente premoderno»21, costretto al «doppio giogo della Chiesa e dello Stato» 
per ripensarsi come essere collettivo22. Ora, nell’Ottocento, la nazione si pre-
stava a strumento di riscatto, fornendo al popolo un’occasione di emancipa-
zione e progresso. Federico Chabod lo avrebbe chiarito negli anni Sessanta 
del secolo scorso. Nell’Ottocento si abilitava il ruolo dell’opinione pubblica, si 
avvertiva la necessità di eccitarla, addirittura, attraverso la stampa, di «scal-
dar[n]e» le passioni nazionali e farne un’arma nella disputa diplomatica23. Per 
ottenere lo scopo, bisognava però toccare le corde giuste. La politica, rivelava 
Chabod, «acquista[va] pathos religioso»: la nazione diventava patria, la pa-
tria diveniva «la nuova divinità del mondo moderno»24 e il progetto naziona-
listico finiva inevitabilmente col condividere il linguaggio della cristianità25.
E di linguaggio della cristianità si trattava anche in contesti per così dire 
più “ufficiali”. Il 15 novembre 1818, ad Aix-la-Chapelle, nell’intento di rinsal-
dare il principio secentesco d’intima unione posto già a presidio dei rappor-
ti e degli interessi comuni in Europa, l’unione degli Stati aveva riconosciuto 
la sua indissolubilità proprio in quel legame di «fraternité chrétienne» che i 
sovrani europei avevano creato tra loro, e che avrebbero garantito nel man-
tenimento della «paix générale»26. Ad Aix-la-Chapelle si proclamava la fratel-
20  Cf. Barthalay (1976), p.1; Wallerstein (2013).
21  Merker (2009), p. 21. 
22  De Maistre (1884-87), vol. I, pp. 309-554, (p. 376), citato in Merker (2009), p. 21. 
23  Chabod (1961), p. 60. 
24  Chabod (1961), p. 61. Così anche Padoa Schioppa (2002), pp. 62-63. 
25  Per Smith (2000), p. 16, come per Benedict Anderson, «il nazionalismo è molto 
più vicino alla religione e alle comunità religiose che, ad esempio, al liberalismo o al socia-
lismo». Vedi anche Gellner (1997).
26  Protocole de la Conférence d’Aix-la-Chapelle due 15 novembre 1818, in De Clercq 
(1880), pp. 175-176.
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lanza cristiana. La diplomazia, in realtà, a sua volta traduceva in lettera diplo-
matica un sentimento più antico, lo stesso che aveva portato per esempio, nel 
secolo precedente, Georg Friedrich von Martens a riconoscere come legittimo 
l’intervento (comunque eccezionale) in soccorso dei propri correligionari: si 
sarebbe stati «parfaitement en droit de venir à l’appui de ceux qui professant 
une même religion avec elle», scriveva nei Précis du droit de gens moderne 
de l’Europe del 178927. Immaginando una sintesi tra i due momenti, furono le 
prassi europee di intervento dagli anni Venti in poi nei confronti dei cristiani 
d’Oriente, per esempio, e, dunque, dei focolai nazionalistici in area balcanica 
a dare prova di come quella «fraternité chrétienne» potesse riuscire nel suo 
scopo, “liberando” i semi delle nazioni dalle spine ottomane che li soffocava-
no28. Penso al caso greco o, più in generale, a tutti gli interventi on behalf of, 
promossi a favore delle comunità cristiane d’Oriente29: buona parte di queste 
sarebbe stata avviata e accompagnata dall’Europa verso il processo nazionali-
stico. Era o non era anche questa la «fraternité chrétienne»?
Se, dunque, era dalla fraternità cristiana che bisognava partire per infon-
dere credibilità, forza e fiducia al progetto nazionalistico, quest’ultimo resta-
va comprensibile e legittimo solo nella dimensione internazionale. Nell’in-
venzione della nazione, cioè, non si poteva prescindere dal riconoscere nella 
storia e, in particolare, nella storia del diritto internazionale, un fondamento 
comune. Quel diritto internazionale dell’Ottocento non era altro, infatti, che 
il diritto delle nazioni cristiane e, civili, d’Europa. La cristianità, infatti, no-
nostante gli sforzi della nuova scienza del diritto internazionale volti a lai-
cizzarne i postulati, rimaneva katéchon, avrebbe detto Carl Schmitt30, forza 
frenante in grado di tenere insieme anche un «agglomerato di popoli vari»31, 
ripensandoli nella comunità cristiana. D’altronde, anche a Parigi, nel 1815, 
i sovrani di Austria, Prussia e Russia avevano costituito la Santa Alleanza e 
sottoscritto l’atto nel quale si stabiliva che «il solo principio in vigore tanto 
fra i Governi, quanto fra i loro sudditi, sarebbe [dovuto essere] quello di fa-
27  Von Martens (1789, 1858), p. 316. Sull’intervento rinvio a Augusti (2012), pp. 277-
330.
28  Forte la suggestione della parabola del seminatore, raccontata dai tre vangeli si-
nottici, Matteo 13, 1-23, Marco 4, 1-20 e Luca 8, 4-15. Bat Ye’or (2009), p. 228, parla di 
«compassione e simpatia» degli europei per le «vittime [della] millenaria oppressione» 
ottomana. 
29  Rimando a Augusti (2013), pp. 176 e ss. 
30  Schmitt (2003), pp. 42 e ss. 
31  Chabod (1961), p. 63.
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vorirsi reciprocamente e di considerarsi come membri di una stessa nazione 
cristiana»32.
Ma mentre la cristianità, con forza espansionistica, quasi una nuova 
“evangelizzazione colonizzatrice”, produceva nazionalità, la percezione dell’i-
nevitabilità dell’«assorbimento» nella “grande nazione cristiana” attivava al-
meno due processi opposti: quello dei contronazionalismi di coloro ai quali 
si imponeva di fatto la scelta fra assimilazione e inferiorità33; e quello dei mi-
cronazionalismi, e dei conseguenti fenomeni di conflittualità etnica, intestini 
alle neocostituende nazioni34. «Pietra d’inciampo» nel processo creativo na-
zionale (e comunque salvezza dai fenomeni appena citati) si rivelò l’esistenza 
dei grandi imperi multinazionali, per alcuni «soluzione meno inaccettabile» 
rispetto a quella dell’assorbimento nazionalistico35. Lì, a tenere insieme, non 
sarebbe servita la cristianità: meglio avrebbe un altro culto, «il culto della 
dinastia»36 (si pensi, per esempio, a quella degli Asburgo). Lì la nazione non 
avrebbe fornito alcuna spinta progressista, anzi, avrebbe portato disordine e 
divisione. Lì la nazione restava tradita dall’alternativa dell’impero.
2. Il tempo della nazione. Lealtà e ossessione di un modello
Se nell’impero la nazione restava tradita, nella nazione la nazione finì col 
tradire se stessa. Nonostante il pathos patriottico e l’animus cristiano, nell’Ot-
tocento i «vincoli di lealtà nazionali» rimasero per lo più deboli; la nazione 
«non [fu] – come ci si sarebbe aspettato – il prodotto di una generazione 
spontanea, bensì un manufatto», un’invenzione, appunto37. Il tradimento ve-
niva da quella così osannata eredità di caratteri comuni e dalla loro “irridu-
cibilità”38.
32  Nella traduzione di Coppi (1827), p. 413.
33  Hobsbawm (2010), p. 119.
34  Kelman (1969). 
35  Hobsbawm (2010), pp. 14-15.
36  Chabod (1961), p. 63; Schulze (1995), p. 233, parla a tal proposito di «nazioni no-
biliari» per distinguerle dalle «nazioni popolari»; cf. anche Leonhard, von Hirschhausen 
(2014), pp. 17 e ss. 
37  Hobsbawm (2010), p. 116. 
38  «Lo stesso, che ai costumi delle nazioni, avviene alle lingue. Chi volesse in Italia 
usar vesti cinesi o quei riti, per cagione dei quali tanto si è disputato e si disputa fra teolo-
gi, egli sarebbe dileggiato, perché altro sistema ha questo cielo ed altro il cinese. Ciò che 
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Scongiurando «l’errore modernista»39 e coinvolgendo nella ricostruzione 
del paradigma nazionale anche la riflessione settecentesca, si vede come que-
sta idea di nazione intesa come individualità “irriducibile” fosse già presente, 
per esempio, in Johann Gottfried Herder. Se prima si era creduto nella “co-
munione” della natura umana, “modificata” solo dall’ambiente e dall’educa-
zione attraverso il clima e la storia, dal filosofo Herder in poi, dice Chabod, 
si affermava la diversità fondamentale, originaria e naturale delle nazioni. 
Ogni nazione era impenetrabile, i caratteri di ognuna erano autentici e per-
manenti: sarebbero durati millenni se fossero stati preservati dalle mescolan-
ze straniere, «se [la nazione fosse rimasta] attaccata al suo suolo come una 
pianta»40. Fu Herder, tra l’altro, a creare la stessa parola nazionalismo: 
«lo si chiami pure pregiudizio, volgarità, limitato nazionalismo, ma il pregiudizio è 
utile, rende felici, spinge i popoli verso il loro centro, li fa più saldi, più fiorenti alla loro 
maniera e quindi più felici nelle loro inclinazioni e scopi […] La nazione più ignorante, più 
ricca di pregiudizi, è spesso la prima: l’epoca delle immigrazioni, di desideri stranieri, dei 
viaggi di speranze all’estero è già malattia, pienezza d’aria, gonfiezza malsana, presenti-
mento della morte»41. 
Herder, ad argomentazione e riprova di quanto affermava, usava il caso 
tedesco: certo, in Germania la mescolanza di «lieviti stranieri» c’era stata e 
aveva servito da «fermentazione»; ma per effetto di quei lieviti, aggiunge-
va, «[quei] popoli […] [erano stati] spogliati della loro nobiltà [e avevano] 
completamente perduto la loro natura in una lunga servitù del pensiero»42. 
Il nazionalismo, in quella fase di debolezza ed incertezza sociale, aveva una 
funzione “di dominio”, ritornava utile cioè per «cementificare la coesione del 
sistema sociale»43. Lontano dal catalizzatore della cristianità, funzionava co-
munque, come vera e propria «stampella ideologica» dello Stato sovrano, uti-
le a preservare l’idea dello Stato-nazione44.
Nell’esperienza francese, quell’ “irriducibilità” della nazione cominciò a 
è ornamento ad un Pechinese o Nanchinese, diverrebbe colpa e sconvenevolezza in un 
Romano, in un Fiorentino», Muratori (1706), p. 50. Cf. Chabod (1961), p. 53. 
39  Smith (2000), p. 45. 
40  Chabod (1961), p. 47. 
41  Chabod (1961), p. 48. 
42  Chabod (1961), p. 50. 
43  Corino (2016), p. 12. 
44  Vatikiotis (1998), p. 58. 
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vacillare prima che altrove: per Nicolao Merker, alla nazione apparteneva in 
prima istanza non tanto chi fosse stato etnicamente francese, bensì chi avesse 
condiviso la Dichiarazione del 1789 e via via le Costituzioni nate dall’espe-
rienza rivoluzionaria. Il requisito giuridico principale per la naturalizzazione 
di uno straniero era infatti il cosiddetto “giuramento civico”, ovvero il giura-
mento “di essere fedele alla nazione”45. Non valeva alcun automatismo, ne-
anche per i francesi per discendenza e nascita, ai quali si chiedeva una nuova 
adesione. Così, quando Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, nel pamphlet Che cosa è 
il terzo stato? del 1789 definiva la nazione «un corpo di associati che vive 
sotto una legge comune ed è rappresentato da uno stesso legislativo» e poi 
sottolineava che l’appartenenza di stirpe non contasse più, dato che «le raz-
ze si [erano] mescolate» e che «il discendere dai galli e dai romani vale[va] 
almeno quanto il discendere dai sicambri, dai velchi o da altri selvaggi usciti 
dai boschi e dalle paludi dell’antica Germania»46, non solo spostava l’atten-
zione dal factum al pactum, ma descriveva una nazione in grado di superare 
il piano etno-confessionale, della “fratellanza cristiana”, e di tradire se stessa 
muovendo verso quello della consapevolezza giuridica. La nazione si concre-
tizzava; si trasformava da fatto «puramente linguistico-culturale» in «fatto 
politico»47, da atto di fede in patto di buona fede. 
Lo Stato, lentamente, ricompariva: la sua idea, momentaneamente «ar-
retrata di fronte alla nazione», recuperava terreno48. Per quanto «soggetto 
politico artificiale e arbitrario, frutto ben spesso di esercizii potestativi, di 
compromissioni e di abusi dei poteri supremi»49, tornava al centro dell’anali-
si, nobilitato nella sua missione di risolvere i conflitti politico-sociali interni 
e le relazioni, spesso egualmente conflittuali, Stato/società e Stato/popolo, e 
di stemperare le pretese micronazionalistiche. Negli anni Sessanta dell’Otto-
cento, grazie alle nuove consapevolezze, all’esperienza unitaria50 e al lavoro di 
45  Merker (2009), p. 20. 
46  Sieyès (1789), pp. 16-17; cf. Merker (2009), p. 20. 
47  Chabod (1961), p. 67.
48  Nuzzo (2007), p. 167. Bluntschli e von Gerber, riprendendo la proposta metodolo-
gica avanzata da Friedrich Carl von Savigny, attribuirono ai giuristi il compito di procedere 
alla costruzione giuridica dello Stato. Sul punto vedi Nuzzo (2012a), pp. 101 e ss. 
49  Grossi (2012) cit. Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, in Jayme (1994).
50  «Certamente al dì d’oggi, dicendo nazione, dobbiamo intendere per nazione un 
aggregato di persone formate a Stato», Processi verbali delle sedute della Commissione 
speciale nominata con R. Decreto del 2 aprile 1865 al fine di proporre le modificazioni di 
coordinamento delle disposizioni del Codice Civile e le relative disposizioni transitorie a 
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consolidamento di giuristi come Giuseppe Pisanelli, in Italia, per esempio, si 
arrivò alla sintesi per cui ogni Stato avrebbe dovuto «comprendere integral-
mente la nazione da cui risulta[va], ed ogni nazione [avrebbe avuto] diritto 
ad […] uno Stato proprio […] Le nazioni […] non acquista[va]no un carattere 
individuo, ed una personalità giuridica che nella unità dello Stato»51. Di con-
verso, nello “Stato-nazione” il popolo non sarebbe più risultato semplicemen-
te come «la somma casuale di tutti coloro che [facevano] parte dello Stato», 
ma sarebbe stato un «tutt’uno con la nazione, la quale si presenta[va] come 
una comunità non solo culturale, ma anche politica»52. Per Ernest Renan, la 
nazione era un «plebiscito di tutti i giorni», un rinnovamento quotidiano del 
pactum53. Per quanto “chiaro” in apparenza, questo discorso però si prestava 
ad essere «gravemente fraintes[o]»: anche per questo la nazione necessitava 
dello Stato54.
Romagnosi affrontò il problema dello Stato già nella sua Introduzione allo 
studio del diritto pubblico universale del 180555. Il primo punto veramente 
cruciale del suo lavoro fu il concetto di «Stato elevato a civiltà»: «lo Stato ha 
l’obbligo di promuovere l’incivilimento»56, scriveva. E ancora:
«il perfezionamento che appellasi incivilimento, in alcuni casi è un’ineludibile 
necessità: una nazione ritardando di porsi al livello dei progressi degli altri popoli potrebbe 
avventurare la propria sicurezza»57.
mente della Legge di detto giorno, Torino, Stamperia Reale, 1866, p. 623, citato in Jayme 
(1989), p. 28. 
51  Pisanelli (1862), pp. 18-23; Cf. Nuzzo (2007), p. 167; Lacchè (2005), pp. 149-174; 
Vano (2005). Sull’esperienza italiana, vedi Nuzzo (2012a), pp. 87-124; Costa (1990), pp. 
89-125; Fioravanti (2001). 
52  Schulze (1995), p. 229.
53  Renan (1993), p. 3. Cf. Tuccari (2000); Chabod (1961), p. 71; Scoppola (1998), p. 
81.
54  Secondo Galli Della Loggia (1996), p. 5, «In Italia […] la nazione […] lungi dal 
preesistere allo Stato ne [era] stata, invece, piuttosto una creatura, quasi un effetto de-
rivato. Nella nostra storia – aggiungeva – l’esistenza della nazione è indissolubilmente 
legata all’esistenza dello Stato (nazionale), sicché, da un punto di vista storico il concetto e 
il sentimento di patria costituiscono precisamente il riflesso ideologico-emotivo di questo 
intreccio».
55  Mannori (1984) , vol I; Costa (2000), pp. 497 e ss. 
56  Romagnosi citato in Di Ciommo (2005), pp. 91-92.
57  Romagnosi citato in Di Ciommo (2005), pp. 91-92.
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Sulla via dell’incivilimento, dunque, grazie allo Stato: solo un’ampia e si-
stematica pianificazione legislativa dall’alto poteva «condurre una nazione al 
vivere civile». Lo Stato doveva essere razionale, poiché «il dar leggi non [po-
teva] essere mai un atto di arbitrio, ma di ragione»; doveva essere modellato 
«a norma di giustizia pubblica» più che sulle «leggi di un calcolato interesse», 
e nel contempo [mostrarsi] funzionale a un progetto di civiltà tale da determi-
nare un profondo rinnovamento dell’identità nazionale»58. La nazione si re-
alizzava, si perfezionava attraverso lo Stato: se nella nazione era il progresso 
dell’umanità, nello Stato era la civiltà della nazione.
Il ritorno dello Stato e il suo affiancamento, e poi la sua sovrapposizione, 
alla nazione permettevano finalmente una compenetrazione tra psicologico e 
giuridico. Più che per fatto di natura o per atto di fede, alla nazione si finiva 
con l’appartenere per sentimento d’attaccamento, per senso d’appartenenza, 
per adesione a quella o a quell’altra comunità giuridicamente riconosciuta. 
Charles Tilly, alla fine del secolo scorso, avrebbe parlato dell’attivazione di un 
«processo di identificazione e di collocazione della propria lealtà» dal gruppo 
etnico alla comunità locale, allo Stato-nazione, allo Stato nazionale59.
Al di là delle peculiarità della nazione, dello Stato-nazione o dello Stato 
nazionale, lo strumento per raggiungere le garanzie di progresso e di civiltà 
era la forma-nazione: in quanto “manufatto”, conservava un certo caratte-
re di “generalità e astrattezza”, era disponibile a livello globale e, dunque, 
si prestava ad una immediata trasferibilità. Sembrava innegabile che il «far 
nazioni» («nation making»), come lo chiamava Walter Bagehot60, fosse un 
processo comune a tutto il mondo occidentale, caratteristica ovvia e domi-
nante dell’Ottocento61. Come in un “Lego”, nella costruzione delle identità la 
forma-nazione permetteva assemblaggi differenti a partire dalle stesse cate-
gorie elementari. È in questo senso che il sociologo Orvar Löfgren ha parlato 
di «kit per il fai da te» della forma-nazione, alludendo provocatoriamente ad 
una serie di procedure necessarie alla sua elaborazione, al suo trasferimento 
58  Romagnosi citato in Di Ciommo (2005), pp. 91-92. 
59  Tilly (1984). «È allo stesso tempo vero e significativo che la maggior parte degli 
stati presenta un carattere pluralistico. Sotto questo aspetto, non si tratta chiaramente di 
stati-nazione, ma tutt’al più di “stati nazionali”. In termini stretti, possiamo definire un 
soggetto come “stato-nazione” solamente quando e se un singolo gruppo etnoculturale è 
inserito nei confini di uno stato che a sua volta si estende fino a includere al suo interno i 
confini territoriali del gruppo etnoculturale in questione», Smith (2000), pp. 99-100. 
60  Cf. Bagehot (1872). 
61  Hobsbawm (2010), p. 103. 
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e, addirittura, alla declinazione di un’«anima nazionale»62. Per Thiesse esiste-
va una vera e propria «lista di elementi simbolici e materiali» che una nazione 
degna di questo nome doveva però offrire: 
«una storia che stabilisca la continuità con i grandi antenati, una serie di eroi prototipi 
di virtù nazionali, una lingua, dei monumenti culturali, un folclore, dei luoghi sacri e 
un paesaggio tipico, una mentalità particolare, delle rappresentazioni ufficiali – inno e 
bandiera – e delle identificazioni pittoresche – costume, specialità culinarie e animale 
totemico»63. 
 
Le nazioni che avevano avuto diritto al riconoscimento politico, e soprat-
tutto quelle che lo avevano rivendicato, avevano testimoniato il carattere 
prescrittivo di questa «lista di priorità identitarie». L’ossessione del modello 
forma-nazione, il miraggio della modernità, creavano però, spesso, nazioni 
poco credibili, nazioni in cui, su tutti, il difetto della storia non faceva che 
esasperarne l’inadeguatezza sul piano del confronto tra pari a livello interna-
zionale. “Sistematizzare” la nazione aveva significato rinunciare alla storia64. 
La nazione «non-storica» o «semi-storica» era, infatti, il più delle volte una 
piccola nazione che difficilmente sarebbe riuscita, con le sue forze, a soprav-
vivere a quello spirito progressista che ne aveva avviato l’esistenza. Se, in-
fatti, per i campioni del formalismo nazionalistico, lo Stato-nazione avrebbe 
dovuto sviluppare un’economia, una tecnica, un’organizzazione statale e una 
forza militare dotati di vita propria, era pur vero che una nazione giovane 
e senza un percorso di tensione nazionalistica difficilmente sarebbe riuscita 
nell’intento. La prova del progresso non era alla portata di tutti, e questo per-
metteva di trovare un argomento legittimo alla negazione per i popoli piccoli 
e arretrati del carattere di “vere” nazioni. Le “piccole nazioni” avevano un 
loro tempo, somigliavano più alle antiche formazioni di identità nazionale, 
lontane dai processi di identificazione con lo Stato65. Per Hobsbawm, esse 
erano semmai delle «idiosincrasie provinciali nell’ambito di “vere” e più vaste 
nazioni». Erano queste, le grandi, le «progredite», le consolidate dalla storia, 
ad essere destinate a prevalere o a uscire vincitrici dalla lotta per l’esistenza66. 
Anzi. Le “grandi nazioni”, proprio per la loro natura di «veicolo del progresso 
62  Orvar (1989). 
63  Thiesse (2001), p. 9. 
64  Augé (2009), p. 34. 
65  Padoa Schioppa (2002), p. 62. 
66  Hobsbawm (2010), pp. 105-107. 
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storico e sociale», una volta esaurita la loro funzione nella storia mondiale, 
«consistente nel convogliare tutti i popoli verso il processo di civilizzazione», 
sarebbero state sostituite a loro volta da forme di aggregazione umana ancora 
più grandi e potenti. Le “grandi nazioni” avrebbero ceduto il passo «a unioni 
o comunità a livello continentale e regionale», avviando un “nuovo imperia-
lismo”67.
Esisteva una grande nazione, la grande nazione cristiana, quella della «fra-
ternité chrétienne» e della Santa Alleanza. La grande nazione cristiana instil-
lava il principio di nazionalità nelle nazioni: di queste, le grandi, le cristiane, 
parafrasando Martti Koskenniemi, “le miti civilizzatrici delle nazioni”68, si sa-
rebbero imposte e si sarebbero messe, per quello spirito di “missione” man-
ciniano, alla guida del progresso e della civiltà delle altre, le piccole; queste 
ultime, pur condividendo lo strumentario del cambiamento, sarebbero state 
sempre soggette al dominio delle grandi, legittimandone in questa tensione di 
necessità, le nuove politiche di controllo.
3. Al limite del nomos: l’uso “deviato” della forma-nazione
Negli stessi anni in cui Chabod perfezionava il suo itinerario logico dell’i-
dea di nazione, Elie Kedourie riconosceva le origini europee della dottrina 
nazionalistica e si interrogava sugli esiti di un trapianto della forma-nazione 
in area medio-orientale69; Rupert Emerson, intanto, ripercorreva gli itinerari 
dei nazionalismi emergenti all’indomani della dissoluzione degli imperi co-
loniali in Asia e in Africa70. Al di là della spazialità giuridica europea, fuori 
dal nomos, le “nuove” nazioni risultavano «drammaticamente visibili»71. La 
loro era una storia che iniziava spesso in maniera anomala72: nessuna rivo-
luzione, nessuna sveglia della moltitudine. Non si arrivava alla nazione per 
così dire motu proprio, ma per intervento esterno. Questo implicava che, 
spesso, nell’inquadramento posticcio nella forma-nazione i tre elementi di 
Stato, nazione e società si saldassero a stento. I confini apparivano fragili, 
67  Smith (2000), p. 33. 
68  Koskenniemi (2012). 
69  Cf. Kedourie (1960). Sul concetto di “trapianto” e sui suoi esiti attuali rinvio a 
Augusti (2016).
70  Romeo (1987), p. 144.
71  Hobsbawm (2010), p.103. 
72  Per Reinhard (2002), p. 235, erano «popoli senza storia e senza scrittura».
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disegnati dalle potenze coloniali più in funzione dei propri interessi strate-
gici che della distribuzione dei gruppi etnici. Inoltre, questa assenza di un 
minimo comune denominatore culturale spesso inceppava ab origine il fun-
zionamento della nuova macchina politica73. Una forma di dominio coloniale 
“indiretto”, dunque, che contribuiva all’«obliterazione culturale» immagina-
ta da Frantz Fanon: quei popoli venivano in qualche modo “disconnessi” dal-
la loro cultura attraverso la negazione della loro realtà locale, l’introduzione 
di nuovi rapporti giuridici e l’asservimento sistematizzato a nuovi impianti 
istituzionali74. Un’operazione a sua volta effetto dello storicismo occidentale, 
del tempo storico cioè inteso come misura della presunta distanza culturale 
che separava l’Occidente dal non-Occidente, la civiltà dalla barbarie. Al di là 
della spazialità giuridica europea, fuori dal nomos, le nazioni rispondevano 
a quella struttura del tempo storico globale per cui “prima in Europa e poi 
nel resto del mondo”75. Il Vecchio Continente veniva descritto come il luogo 
in cui tutto era comparso per la prima volta, il “resto del mondo” era il luogo 
del “non ancora”, del not yet76: l’intervallo storico necessario allo sviluppo e 
alla civilizzazione sarebbe stato colmato dall’educazione coloniale77. Per Luigi 
Nuzzo, quello scarto temporale «poteva essere investito dagli effetti benefici 
della temporalità moderna e divenire oggetto dei suoi miti», ma la storia «do-
veva ancora iniziare o iniziava in quel preciso momento con la colonizzazione 
europea»78. La forma-nazione e la sua mitologia rappresentavano quel tempo 
nuovo, deviato perché vincolato ai parametri del discorso, dominante, impe-
riale del quale condividevano lo strumentario79. Fatto salvo (ove ci fosse sta-
to) il livello per così dire “spirituale” dei fenomeni nazionalistici, quell’ambito 
cioè «vero ed essenziale» per cui una nazione esisteva ed era sovrana molto 
prima che lo diventasse anche politicamente, la forma-nazione si trasferiva 
infatti come premessa necessaria all’impianto della complessa discorsività 
73  Scartezzini (2000), pp. 21-22. Sullo spazio coloniale come proiezione della sovra-
nità delle nazioni e, più in generale, sulla costruzione dello spazio “dato” e “deciso”, vedi 
Meccarelli (2015), p. 247. Fu lo stesso Mancini (1851), p. 46, a rilevare come «uno Stato in 
cui molte rigogliose nazionalità vadano a soffogarsi in un’unione forzata, non è un corpo 
politico, ma un mostro incapace di vita».
74  Fanon citato in Nuzzo (2013). 
75  Chakrabarty (2004), pp. 22-23. 
76  Fabian (1983); Mill (1981). 
77  Chabod (1961), pp. 89-91. 
78  Nuzzo (2006), p. 3.
79  Chatterjee (1993). 
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giuridica occidentale (costituzioni, rappresentanza, parlamenti, codici, etc.) 
che l’avrebbe seguita80. Benedict Anderson parlò di carattere modulare del 
concetto di “nazione”, proprio in riferimento alla creazione degli Stati nazio-
nali all’indomani della crisi degli imperi81. Ma non solo. La forma-nazione 
si prestava ad un doppio uso: era sì strumento per superare i vecchi imperi 
dinastici82, ma era anche strumento di controllo dei nuovi imperi coloniali. 
Kedourie rafforzava quest’analisi con una riflessione critica sull’idea di 
nazione e sul nazionalismo: quest’ultimo, scriveva, era un prodotto della 
«disaffection» degli intellettuali, una parte di quel “tragico dispiegarsi” della 
modernità nella storia del mondo; niente di più che una “manipolazione” di 
quel «totally universalistic principle of self-determination» così chiaramente 
enunciato da Kant. Un’inutile complicazione, una distorsione. Il principio, 
a suo dire, era stato «twisted» dai filosofi tedeschi (e non solo) per “servi-
re” «the celebration of particularism and parochialism in nationalist ideolo-
gy»83. L’approccio dello storico capovolgeva, dunque, l’assunto consolidato 
dall’esperienza giuridica occidentale ottocentesca per cui la nazione precede-
va naturalmente (e provvidenzialmente) lo Stato. In questo pensiero, però, 
Kedourie non era solo; su più punti il suo ragionamento riprendeva quello 
del sociologo e antropologo inglese Ernest Gellner, suo contemporaneo. Per 
Gellner le nazioni non erano il prodotto della storia culturale, linguistica e 
religiosa dei singoli popoli, ma la creazione di gruppi di potere che, valendosi 
della mediazione degli intellettuali, avevano predisposto apparati ideologici 
a titolo di giustificazione di un’istanza di unità politica. Più in generale: non 
era stata l’appartenenza a legittimare la sovranità, ma viceversa; non ci po-
teva essere nazione senza Stato84; la nazione altro non era che un’invenzione 
per legittimare l’esercizio del potere dello Stato e, in prospettiva, quello della 
società degli Stati.
L’idea di nazione di Kedourie come di Gellner, così contaminata dalla sua 
80  Chatterjee (1993); Balibar (1991), pp. 86-106. Cf. in questi termini, Conrad (2015), 
p. 149; vedi diffusamente su questo aspetto Augusti (2016).
81  Anderson (2009), p. 91. Sui meccanismi concreti della diffusione della forma-na-
zione, Cf. Goswami (2000), pp. 776-783. 
82  Per Leonhard, von Hirschhausen (2014), p. 9, «dal 1870 in poi, di fronte alla su-
periorità di efficienza, capacità produttiva e attitudine bellica di cui sembrava dar prova lo 
stato nazionale, per gli imperi divenne sempre più urgente decidere come reagire a questo 
modello».
83  Kitromilides (2005), p. 661. 
84  Gellner (1997); Cf. Lanaro (1991), p. 355. 
ELIANA AUGUSTI
80
dimensione “esterna” o “di ritorno”85, ci viene utile nel tentativo di compren-
sione di un’esperienza a sé di uso strumentale della forma-nazione: al limite 
del nomos, mi riferisco a quella dell’Impero ottomano86. Alle tendenze im-
perialistiche degli stati nazionali si contrapposero, infatti, i tentativi di na-
zionalizzazione degli imperi, frutto di un «serrato confronto» con i modelli 
di forma-nazione disponibili, al fine di trasferirli «selettivamente» nella pro-
pria esperienza di società multietnica87 . Quello ottomano ne fu un esempio: 
lo stato di deriva al quale si era avviato nell’Ottocento, aveva convinto l’ala 
progressista della élite ottomana della necessità di superare le obsolete archi-
tetture del governo e di ripensare l’impero come nazione moderna, come Sta-
to-nazione. Da nazione, infatti, avrebbe potuto scongiurare la crisi e ritagliar-
si un ruolo nella comunità internazionale. In questa aspirazione l’İslam non 
sembrava avvertirsi come limite, né giocare alcun ruolo frenante: d’altronde, 
l’episodio della partecipazione al congresso di Parigi del 1856 aveva indotto 
questo genere di ottimismo, per nulla svilito dalla dottrina mazziniana del-
la “fratellanza” e dalla mitopia della “grande nazione cristiana”88. In questo 
percorso di ripensamento, di re-invenzione, la Porta arrivò a promulgare nel 
1869 una Legge sulla nazionalità e, addirittura, nel 1876, a suggellare in un te-
sto costituzionale (per quanto poco duraturo)89 un’identità nazionale impian-
tata ex novo, ricondotta con sollecitudine all’Osmanlılık, all’“ottomanesimo”, 
e legata indissolubilmente all’ideale di integrità e unità dello Stato.
Scollata del tutto dall’elemento “popolare” nonché, ovviamente, da quel-
lo mistico-confessionale della “fratellanza cristiana” (del cui dovere solidale 
non poteva godere), puro artificio nelle mani dell’élite, la nazione ottomana 
somigliava molto di più a quella riletta da Kedourie che non a quella imma-
ginata da Mazzini. L’ottomanesimo ottocentesco non aveva grande appeal 
85  Penso, in questo senso, alle teorie di Becker Lorca, per il quale sarebbero da va-
lorizzare le dinamiche grazie alle quali categorie e modelli d’uso comune nel diritto di 
matrice europea, parzialmente assorbiti dai sistemi di destinazione, vengono restituiti 
all’Europa. Cf. Becker Lorca (2010), pp. 481, 475. Cf. Augusti (2016). 
86  Cf. Gürpınar (2013). 
87  Leonhard, Hirschhausen (2014), p. 10.
88  Prendo a prestito il lemma “mitopia”, così come immaginato da Bellini (2011), p. 
81. Sulle vicende legate direttamente e indirettamente alla “partecipazione” della Sublime 
Porta al congresso parigino del 1856, rinvio a Augusti (2013).
89  Per uno studio sul costituzionalismo nel pensiero politico arabo-islamico, Bahlul 
(2002), pp. 617-645. Cf. anche Makdısı (2002), pp. 601-617. Vedi diffusamente Augusti 
(2013), pp. 334 ss. 
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per i millet ottomani90, appariva come una scelta dettata dalle contingenze, 
un «political style»91, una goffa “reazione nazionalistica” all’ingombrante pre-
senza straniera; la replica acerba alla moltiplicazione di gruppi, nazionalità e 
minoranze etniche di un governo esasperato. L’ottomanesimo ottocentesco 
era l’imposizione del concetto di Stato-nazione a un mosaico di «intermin-
gled people» per religione, etnie, lingue e culture diverse92; l’alternativa im-
posta ai nazionalismi “insoddisfatti” di quelle province la cui «national con-
sciousness» era ancora in formazione93. D’altronde, non ebbe esiti più felici. 
Perché? Per una parte della storiografia l’insuccesso del “trasferimento” della 
forma-nazione era da ascriversi all’estraneità del concetto di nazione alla tra-
dizione giuridica islamica, «che conosce non la “nazione”, ma la “comunità 
dei credenti”»94; al fatto che le nazioni fossero percepite più come «surroga-
to di un concetto squisitamente tribale» che come premesse naturali degli 
Stati, dei quali tra l’altro non convidividevano il linguaggio della sovranità 
territoriale95. L’appartenenza alla comunità dei credenti, alla ummah, pre-
90  Tunaya (1948), p. 48. 
91  Tamer Torun (2015), p. 255. 
92  Kappeler (1992), p. xviii; Nielsen (2012). 
93  Seton-Watson (1971), p. 3. La Porta aveva conosciuto una tradizione di moltiplica-
zione di autonome comunità nazionali, i cosiddetti millet, soggetti ciascuno al proprio lea-
der religioso. Il sistema dei millet aveva applicato il principio della personalità della legge: 
qualsiasi membro, indipendentemente da dove si trovasse, era soggetto alla giurisdizione 
della sua comunità religiosa. Questo della giurisdizione era stato letto come un privilegio e 
dunque, secondo la lettura che ne ha dato recentemente Adanir (1992), pp. 166-167, come 
fonte possibile di conflitto «between the millet hierarchies and the modernising centra-
list state». L’ottomanesimo era un concetto di nazione politica che per sua stessa natura 
superava questo principio della personalità della legge e muoveva verso quello dell’unità 
territoriale dello Stato. Ciò nonostante sarebbe rimasto esso stesso “insoddisfatto”, ferito 
tra l’altro dagli abusi di naturalizzazione dei suoi sudditi, da quelle pratiche cioè avviate 
intorno alla metà del secolo in concomitanza con l’attivazione delle giurisdizioni consola-
ri che avrebbero portato lentamente sotto la protezione europea un numero sconsidera-
to di individui, abbagliati dalle garanzie occidentali e dalla migliore qualità della vita da 
“protetti” delle nazioni occidentali. Erano state queste, tra l’altro, le premesse alla Legge 
sulla nazionalità del 1869. Cf. Bernardini D’Arnesano (2004); Arminjon (1903); Papasian 
(1911), pp. 286-301; Augusti (2017b). Cf. Schulze (2004), p. 35; Donini (1998), p. 70; Poggi 
(1995), pp. 43-53; Muge Göçek (1993), pp. 507-538. Vedi anche Poggeschi (2010).
94  Gozzi (2015), p. 122, cita, con riferimento all’esperienza di nazionalismo algerino, 
Sayad (2003). 
95  Mela (2005), p. 175. Vedi anche Vercellin (2003), pp. 87 e ss. 
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scindeva dall’etnia, dal territorio e dai suoi confini. La Sharî’a, d’altronde, 
non era semplicemente una legge o un codice dello Stato: era un vero e pro-
prio sistema di valori «transcending regional, ethnic, and racial allegiances», 
rappresentava la comunità musulmana globale, «the polity united around 
brotherhood in Islamic faith»96, individuava un’ “altra” fratellanza. In altri 
termini, se quello della Sharî’a era un concetto “metacostituzionale”, quello 
della ummah era un concetto “metastatale”97. La ummah non aveva bisogno 
dello Stato. Nel momento in cui la stessa Costituzione del 1876 riconosce-
va all’articolo 11 l’İslam a religione di Stato, mancava l’appuntamento con la 
secolarizzazione e conduceva irrimediabilmente il progetto nazionale ad un 
corto circuito: il compromesso panislamico era insostenibile e, non essendo 
funzionale allo scopo, avrebbe condotto le ingenue aspirazioni nazional-otto-
manistiche al fallimento98. 
4. Crisi, letture global, contaminazioni e nuove prospettive
Rileggendo la lezione ottocentesca sulla nazione, ciò che suggestiona è 
un’inaspettata attualità della visione mazziniana e un’interessante trasfigu-
razione della ummah nel linguaggio globale: se la nazione di Mazzini sembra 
molto più vicina al mito della comunità globale di oggi che non all’esperimen-
to dello Stato-nazione di due secoli fa, la lezione islamica, per nulla corrotta 
dall’invenzione dello Stato, si lascia rileggere dalle suggestioni di sovrasta-
tualità occidentali. Ciò che condiziona di più queste ipotesi, al limite della 
provocazione, è il rapporto che la nazione conserva oggi con lo spazio, con il 
territorio, a sua volta parte integrante della definizione di comunità naziona-
le, con i confini e le frontiere, con l’individuo e le degenarazioni identitarie e 
iperlocalistiche e con l’avvertita crisi/scomparsa dello Stato99.
Il territorio, nell’Ottocento, appariva unitario in quanto proiezione ge-
96  Senturk (2006), pp. 535-536.
97  Cf. Morbidelli (2006).
98  Cf. Augusti (2013), p. 338. 
99  Il tema della crisi dello Stato moderno è stato oggetto di analisi ricca e densa dalla 
nota prolusione pisana di Santi Romano Lo Stato moderno e la sua crisi del 1909 agli 
interventi di Capograssi del 1921, di Del Vecchio del 1933, proseguendo con Tarello, Maz-
zacane, Ferrajoli, Cassese. Tra gli ultimi contributi, si veda il numero monografico di «Ars 
Interpretandi» 16, 2011, Lo Stato contemporaneo e la sua crisi, ed in particolare Viola 
(2011); Mazzarella (2011); Fioravanti (2011); Corso (2011); Condorelli (2011).
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ografica di una nazione unitaria. Al di là dei buoni propositi e delle giuste 
aspettative, però, spesso si trattava di uno spazio da destinare alla nazione, 
ma non già esistente100; quell’unitarietà e la sua mitologia appartenevano più 
alla dimensione della “fratellanza”, alla dimensione “spirituale”, cioè, che non 
a quella geopolitica della nazione, ad uno spazio “immaginato”, che esisteva 
in quanto proiezione tanto della “grande nazione cristiana” quanto della um-
mah dell’İslam sul globo. Ciò che mise duramente alla prova il discorso spi-
rituale (e universale) della nazione fu dunque la sua traduzione nel progetto 
di Stato-nazione: il confronto con la macchina giuridica dello Stato e con la 
societas civilis101 da una parte, e la declinazione “etnica” della nazione, il suo 
rapporto cioè con i gruppi etno-confessionali e la loro distribuzione entro i 
confini politici dello Stato, dall’altra, produssero la sensazione di una forza-
tura, di una violenza. Nel tempo, questa sensazione si è acuita: quei «piccoli 
popoli virtuali» rappresentati dai gruppi, insieme al periodico “travaso” mi-
gratorio di «intere etnie all’interno di contesti culturali alieni in senso lingui-
stico, religioso e valoriale», hanno inciso irreparabilmente sul discorso della 
nazione e hanno complicato la stessa tenuta dello Stato-nazione. Parlando di 
circolazione dei soggetti, le reti transnazionali, così come si sono strutturate 
nel tempo, hanno facilitato questi trasferimenti e, spesso, messo in discus-
sione il ruolo stesso delle frontiere come limiti stabili nell’organizzazione dei 
territori. La sovranità territoriale degli Stati ne è uscita attenuata, l’immagi-
ne della società incerta: ogni logica di appartenenza si è rivelata decisamen-
te in-stabile102. Alain Tarrius ha parlato a tal proposito di «déplacements de 
proximité», di prossimità inconsuete, imprevedibili, che si sono palesate tra 
luoghi e nazioni103.
Ma è cambiata anche la percezione della nazione. Come ha notato Paolo 
Bellini, l’identità del popolo-nazione, diffusa socialmente attraverso le isti-
tuzioni e la produzione mediatica – poli attuali di implementazione della 
costruzione del consenso e della creazione di un sistema di valori colletti-
vamente condiviso – ha perso nel tempo la sua unità linguistica, culturale 
e valoriale. L’immaginario collettivo ha smarrito di fatto il contatto con la 
nazione; quell’elemento nazionale ottocentesco si è «frantuma[to] in un in-
100  Meccarelli (2015), p. 247.
101  Schiera (1999), p. 30. 
102  Berthomièr, Hily (2011), p. 321; cf. Augusti (2017a), p. 54. 
103  Tarrius (2007), p. 132. 
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sieme complesso di gruppi e di identità – spesso – tra loro in conflitto»104; o, 
forse, quei frammenti, da sempre esistiti, sotto la spinta degli eventi attua-
li sono semplicemente riemersi in tutta la loro drammaticità, segno che nel 
passaggio dalla moltitudine al popolo, dal popolo alla nazione e dalla nazione 
allo Stato, nel tentativo convulso e ripetuto di «tenere in sospeso la crisi della 
modernità», l’impianto teorico ha ceduto e qualcosa è andato perso105.
Nota positiva in questo quadro apparentemente apocalittico è che quei 
gruppi, quelle piccole realtà virtuali, hanno alimentato nuove e inimmagina-
bili dinamiche trans- e sovra-nazionali tra Stati, nazioni e società, stravolgen-
do il rapporto della nazione col territorio, “deterritorializzando” la nazione. 
La globalizzazione ha fatto il resto, contribuendo in modo incisivo a rendere 
tutto questo più immediato e visibile.
Negli ultimi cinquant’anni abbiamo assistito ad una graduale (e virtuale) 
ridefinizione dei confini, esplosi per effetto di una forse sottovalutata “bomba 
informatica”106; abbiamo imparato a convivere con Stati “non-Stati”, usan-
do una declinazione del non-lieu di Marc Augé107, con Stati cioè percepiti 
come contenitori aperti, come realtà dinamiche, come punti di flusso in cui 
la scollatura dal sociale, dalla storia, dalla tradizione, dall’identità è sembrata 
diventare un nuovo fattore caratterizzante. L’esito di questo processo non è 
stato la fine del territorio o la fine dei confini e della proiezione spaziale del 
corpo politico, ma «la fine della spazialità sovrana, della sua natura gerarchiz-
zata, esclusiva, coerente»108. Lo Stato, cioè, ne è uscito “decentralizzato”, tan-
to che si suole correggere il tiro e parlare, più che di crisi dello Stato, di crisi 
dello statocentrismo109. La sovranità si è scomposta e distribuita, nonostante 
le gerarchie formali, tra una pluralità di attori e forze operanti con notevole 
autonomia, e ha prodotto una vera e propria “feudalizzazione” del quadro 
politico-giuridico nazionale e internazionale110. Se a detta di Sandro Mezzadra 
e Brett Nielson, però, i confini statali sono usciti più forti dalla sfida del glo-
bale111 e la nazione ha potuto così consolidarsi come «referente rassicurante» 
104  Bellini (2011), pp. 89-90. 
105  Hardt, Negri (2002), pp. 13 ss.
106  L’espressione è di Virilio (2000).
107  Cf. Augé (2009).
108  D’Andrea (2002b), pp. 103-104; D’ Andrea (2002a). 
109  Scartezzini (2000), pp. 62-63. 
110  Scartezzini (2000), p. 20. 
111  «Borders, far from serving merely to block or obstruct global passages of people, 
money, or objects, have become central devices for their articulation. Borders play a key 
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per la comunità112, c’è che la sensazione che il «bluff» della nazione ottocen-
tesca sia finito resiste. E resiste già dal 1944, da quando cioè lo denunciava 
fuori dai denti Gaetano Salvemini113. La fine di un bluff radicalizzata in una 
più buia «morte della patria»114, in un’epifania complessa che ha portato lo 
Stato-nazione alla schizofrenia, a reazioni cioè ora isteriche ora paranoiche, 
volte da una parte all’abbattimento delle frontiere affinché la circolazione di 
soggetti, beni, capitali e informazioni potesse essere favorita (la linea della 
«logic of modern science» di Francis Fukuyama115); dall’altra, all’erezione di 
nuove barriere, di nuove politiche di consolidamento del “proprio” e di con-
trollo dell’ “altro” («the struggle for recognition»116), di controspinta del loca-
le, di tenuta, stabilità e contenimento, al fine di fronteggiare flussi di “parole” 
e “corpi” estranei sempre più pervasivi117. 
Di pari passo, fuori dal contesto d’origine, è finito anche un altro bluff, 
quello degli “Stati nel deserto”, quello delle piccole nazioni, di quelle realtà 
cioè frutto dei delicatissimi processi di state building e nation making avviati 
forzosamente negli anni della decolonizzazione. Fukuyama ha visto in questo 
fallimento, purtroppo inevitabile a causa dell’uso distorto della forma-nazio-
ne tra Otto e Novecento, e irreparabile dall’esterno a causa dell’inconsistenza 
di una scienza della pubblica amministrazione, la ragione di una serie di frat-
ture e crolli di stabilità geopolitica, di sicurezza e di «considerevoli disastri in 
campo umanitario» in determinate aree del globo118.
Com’è intervenuta in questi processi la globalizzazione? L’inadeguatezza 
dell’impianto ottocentesco alle sfide del globale ha imposto una riflessione 
ulteriore. Al globale, al «pianeta in rete»119 si è provato a rispondere col locale, 
trasformando quello che prima era il rapporto tra universale e particolare in 
un’opposizione legata più al linguaggio dello spazio. Il locale, instabile per 
definizione, è stato alternativamente inquadrato ora in un mero duplicato del 
role in the production of the heterogeneous time and space of contemporary global and 
postcolonial capitalism», Mezzadra, Neilson (2003), p. IX. 
112  Thiesse (2001), pp. 11-12. 
113  Salvemini, Merola (1967), p. 62.
114  Galli della Loggia (1996), pp. 4-5.
115  Fukuyama (1989), pp. 1-18; Fukuyama (1992). 
116  Diffusamente in Fukuyama (1992).
117  Se a questo si aggiunge l’effetto dei flussi migratori, ci troviamo di fronte a un 
quadro estremamente complesso. Su questi aspetti vedi Meccarelli, Palchetti, Sotis (2012). 
118  Fukuyama (2005), pp. 8-9.
119  Augé (2007), p. 9. 
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globale (diventando il glocal di Zigmunt Bauman120), di fatto non rilevando e 
neutralizzando il concetto stesso di frontiera; ora, in elemento perturbante il 
sistema: in questo caso, agendo dall’esterno, il locale sarebbe stato sanziona-
to in termini politici attraverso l’esercizio del diritto di ingerenza121. Parlando 
di diritto di ingerenza e di annichilimento del locale, viene in mente ancora 
una volta il fenomeno della colonizzazione. Per Augé il coloniale ha rappre-
sentato una specie di «avvento del globale», proprio sulla scorta di quella 
persistenza (e azione) del diritto di ingerenza: dopo la colonizzazione non c’è 
più stata alcuna possibilità di osservare l’evoluzione autonoma di un qualsiasi 
gruppo umano; «per amore o per forza, – scrive Augé – l’umanità è diventa-
ta oggettivamente solidale»122, con gli esiti che ne sono derivati. È in questo 
solco che andrebbe ascritto dunque il fenomeno del globale e in questo senso 
andrebbero letti i suoi esiti. 
Perso quasi del tutto il contatto con la nazione, ciò che permetterebbe di 
ricostruire un nuovo itinerario di lealtà e appartenenza dal quale ripartire 
potrebbe essere la civiltà. Riprendendo Samuel Huntington123, Scartezzini ha 
prefigurato un ritorno alla civiltà. Per il sociologo esisterebbe un doppio livel-
lo di lealtà utile a risolvere l’impasse della crisi della nazione: per nulla con-
dizionata dallo Stato, la civiltà è l’unica (e l’ultima) visione tanto al di sopra 
quanto al di sotto degli Stati; permetterebbe ai gruppi substatali che appar-
tengono ad una data area giuridico-politica (cioè ad uno Stato) di richiamarsi 
a, e considerare come luogo di dislocazione della propria lealtà, una sorta di 
entità superiore che sarebbe appunto quella della civiltà di appartenenza. In 
considerazione del fatto che i fenomeni sociali si internazionalizzano sempre 
di più, e che le persone tendono a rifugiarsi in forme tradizionali di lealtà che 
riescono a dare loro un senso di identità, la civiltà potrebbe rappresentare, in 
questa ipotesi, il raggruppamento più ampio in cui una persona possa identi-
ficarsi. Individui sparsi per il mondo, appartenenti a Stati differenti, collocati 
in realtà locali totalmente dissimili, potrebbero sentirsi comunque parte di 
un tutto, di un “noi”, di una comunità culturale più vasta124. Scartezzini, sulle 
orme di Huntington, intravede «un ordine mondiale nuovo» in cui gli alline-
amenti internazionali avvengono non più tra Stati con interessi di sicurezza 
120  Cf. Bauman (2005). Su questo punto rinvio a Augusti (2016). 
121  Augé (2009), p. 11. 
122  Augé (2009), p. 17. 
123  Cf. Huntington (2000). 
124  Scartezzini (2000), pp. 50-51.
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o materiali simili, ma tra Stati “fratelli”, ossia appartenenti alla stessa civiltà. 
Una nuova “fratellanza” mazziniana o una suggestiva trasfigurazione della 
ummah, dunque, frutto dell’accresciuta “esposizione interculturale” che non 
nega l’esistenza degli Stati, ma li supera in un percorso di lealtà più vasto e 
coerente. In questa lettura, a mediare la complessità dei flussi della cultura 
globale (“deterritorializzata” anch’essa), non sarebbe più dunque quello Stato 
che Romagnosi elevava a civiltà125, ma l’individuo stesso126, proiezione locale 
della civiltà.
Questa riabilitazione dell’individuo e del locale, però, apre anche ad un’al-
tra riflessione. Se, come ha scritto Nuzzo, si fa pace con l’idea che non esista 
una civiltà universale, e che lo Stato non sia (o comunque non sia più e sol-
tanto) lo strumento utile per raggiungerne una, si riesce ad ammettere con 
più onestà che il cosiddetto processo di modernizzazione/occidentalizzazio-
ne sia fallito e che, anzi, nei Paesi della “periferia dell’Occidente” si sia teso 
sempre di più a reagire in maniera negativa ai modelli della sua civiltà, non 
ultimo quello giuridico-politico dello Stato-nazione. Questo atteggiamento ha 
innescato una serie di riappropriazioni, spesso distorte, di quelle tradizioni 
culturali locali, di quelle “lealtà” che i tentativi di transizione verso la moder-
nità avevano messo in subordine127. All’imperativo di non perdere la propria 
identità nel “crogiuolo del globale”, si è cioè lentamente ripreso contatto col 
ricordo, con la memoria, con la storia. La storia, come strumento di contesta-
zione del sistema, ha dato voce al locale permettondogli di rinnovare il suo 
patto di lealtà. Che sia la civiltà di cui parla Scartezzini, la fratellanza mazzi-
niana, islamica, o altro, resta che se nell’Ottocento si voleva e poteva immagi-
nare il mondo come diviso in «blocchi sistemici contrapposti e difficilmente 
comunicanti», oggi quei blocchi non esistono più: la “globalizzazione” ci ha 
posto di fronte a infinite comunicazioni tra spazi e all’urgenza di dare voce 
alle complessità storiche e materiali di quei dialoghi. Ignorare tutto questo si-
gnificherebbe cadere a pie’ pari in una «trappola cognitiva»; pertanto, accan-
to a quella storica deve sopravvivere una sensibilità geografica, intesa come 
capacità di rappresentare e comprendere gli spazi nella loro complessità sto-
rica e materiale128. Ma non solo. Occorre ripensare la collocazione degli studi 
125  Vedi qui nota 57.
126  Parsi (1998).
127  Nuzzo (2013), p. 18, parla di «reinvenzione culturale», di un artificiale ritorno alle 
fonti realizzato (anche) attraverso «prestiti da fonti esterne». 
128  Carducci (2014), pp. 2-3.
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sulla teoria dei confini, recuperando una riflessione più aperta sul rapporto 
tra dimensione spaziale e relazioni tra gruppi umani129, nella consapevolez-
za che i confini non abbiano solo una connotazione geografica, ma intima, 
psicologica, analitica, geoculturale. Un approccio ecologico nello studio dei 
confini è necessario al fine di considerare l’impatto delle barriere confina-
rie sulle interazioni tra sistemi sociali130. Occorre, in una, coltivare un «pen-
siero della mobilità»131, ripensando il concetto di “identità” non come idem 
esse, ma come id esse. Questo implica una revisione dell’identità nel contesto 
politico, determinata dalla «necessaria interferenza di ogni singolo con al-
tri uomini» e dal superamento del momento del conflitto, dello scontro fra 
la naturale tendenza all’individuale e il bisogno del sociale, «tra solitarietà e 
solidarietà»132. Il «momento dialettico» che stiamo vivendo «è forte: stiamo – 
ieri, oggi e ancor più domani – costruendo qualcosa di sopranazionale»133, ha 
scritto Paolo Grossi. Questo qualcosa è una nuova identità. «L’identità nazio-
nale134 non è qualcosa di stabile, ma è un processo storico che si costruisce e 
si modifica nel tempo, in relazione a una serie di variabili legate a circostanze 
precise». Proprio e anche per questo non può essere, oggi più che mai, né un 
fatto “nazionale” né un’«opera di assistenza e di creazione [sotto il] patrocinio 
internazionale». L’identità nazionale resta, oggi più che mai, «un processo 
internazionale»135.
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MA COS’È QUESTA CRISI?
Carla Canullo
1. Ma cos’è questa crisi?
Nel 1933 il cantautore napoletano Rodolfo Tonino, nome d’arte di Rodolfo 
de Angelis, scriveva una canzone dal titolo «Ma cos’è questa crisi?». La do-
manda era il refrain della canzone che in alcuni passaggi recitava: «Cavi fuori 
il portafogli metta in giro i grossi fogli e vedrà... che la crisi finirà!»; oppure 
«Tutte quante le nazioni si lamentano così, conferenze riunioni ma si resta 
sempre lì “ah la crisi......eh!” Ma cos’è questa crisi... ma cos’è questa crisi... 
Rinunziate all’opinione della parte del leone e chissà... che la crisi finirà!». 
Infine: «L’esercente poveretto non sa più che cosa far e contempla quel cas-
setto che riempiva di danar… “ah la crisi signor!” Ma cos’è questa crisi... ma 
cos’è questa crisi... Si contenti guadagnare quel che è giusto e non grattare 
e vedrà... che la crisi passerà!». La crisi dalla quale nel 1933 non si era an-
cora usciti era lo strascico di quella che, iniziata nel 1929, preannunciava in 
Europa una crisi sociale e politica che, a pochi anni di distanza dalla Grande 
Guerra, preparava a un’altra e nuova crisi che di lì a poco sarebbe sfociata 
nel Secondo Conflitto Mondiale. Altre crisi sono accadute portando con sé 
cambiamenti. Tra queste, la crisi iniziata già da anni e di cui sperimentiamo 
quotidianamente gli esiti. 
Se De Angelis cantava: «Vedrà, questa crisi finirà!», oggi si potrebbe dire 
che certamente una crisi finisce ma per ricominciare, con conseguenze sem-
pre nuove e inattese. E inattese lo sono perché non sappiamo come essa fram-
menterà l’ordine cui siamo abituati e che conosciamo. Il suo tratto distruttore 
è argomento per economisti, politici ma anche per fisici. O almeno per un 
fisico, Francesco Sylos Labini che alla domanda: «Ma cos’è questa crisi?» ha 
risposto individuando quei paradigmi che, a suo avviso, ne sono alla base1. 
Citando in più luoghi la domanda che la regina Elisabetta II ha posto agli 
economisti della London School of Economics, «Why no one saw the credit 
crunch coming»2, Sylos Labini – nei primi capitoli del libro – salda l’analisi 
economica con i paradigmi matematici e fisici che essa sottende. In breve, 
1  Sylos Labini (2016). 
2  Riportata in « The Telegraph », 5 novembre 2008.
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la sua tesi è che il modello dominante neoclassico e neoliberista si basa su 
modelli matematici e fisici atti a prevedere e individuare delle costanti. In 
realtà (ecco la critica di Sylos Labini) tale modello economico, a dispetto del 
suo preteso poggiarsi su leggi scientifiche stabili, in questi anni ha mostrato 
la propria debolezza essendo incapace di prevedere l’arrivo di tale crisi. Par-
tendo dalla constatazione che nessuna crisi è stata prevista, l’autore scrive:
Da una parte si potrebbe concludere che i modelli economici su cui sono basate le 
previsioni non sono capaci di effettuarne di corrette e che dunque necessitano di una rivi-
sitazione fondamentale. Dall’altra parte, secondo la visione neoclassica moderna esposta 
da Lucas, il motivo del fallimento è intrinseco al modello dei mercati efficienti: se i mercati 
fossero efficienti e si conoscesse con sicurezza […] in anticipo quello che succederà nel 
prossimo futuro, i mercati si modificherebbero proprio per annullare la prossima previ-
sione3.
E poco oltre Sylos Labini, rilevando la banalità delle previsioni degli eco-
nomisti che pretendono ancora oggi di trattare la crisi come un “fatto pre-
vedibile”, scrive che di fatto le previsioni “scientifiche” della crisi si limitano 
a osservazioni banali, quali: «Ci sarà crescita in primavera»4. Se il ricorso a 
paradigmi fondati sull’equilibrio, seguiti dal modello neoclassico, è del tutto 
inadeguato a pensare la crisi, la tesi sostenuta dal libro è che soltanto una 
ricerca veramente innovativa permetterà di trovare spunti altrettanto inno-
vativi e tali da permettere l’uscita da una crisi ormai protratta5.
Si potrebbe obiettare a questa lettura, dai toni spesso polemici e che si 
chiude con una critica al modo in cui in Italia e in Europa è trattata la ricer-
ca6, che in realtà le crisi sono prevedibili e gestibili. Se l’obiezione dice il vero 
(contro l’analisi proposta da Sylos Labini), non resterebbero molte risposte 
possibili alla “Queen’s Question”: se le crisi che pesano in modo devastante 
più sui singoli che sugli Stati sono prevedibili e ciononostante “ci sono” con 
i loro effetti drammatici, allora sono volute. Ovvero: se 1- sono prevedibili 
e 2- si sa che cosa sono e quali assetti cambieranno due sono le alternative 
possibili: o 3- chi sa non può far nulla per far sì che non ci siano ma in tal 
3  Sylos Labini (2016), pos. 1687. Sylos Labini discute a lungo le posizioni dell’econo-
mista Robert Lucas, membro della scuola di Chicago e critico dell’economia keynesiana.
4  Sylos Labini (2016), pos. 1629-1695.
5  Sylos Labini (2016), pos. 1612.
6  Va ricordato che l’autore è membro del comitato di redazione del sito Return on 
Academic research, https://www.roars.it/online/. 
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caso il ruolo di un simile esperto sarebbe del tutto inutile; o 4- essendo il ruo-
lo dell’economista indispensabile e soprattutto efficace, la crisi prevedibile e 
prevista è anche una crisi non evitata e, perciò, voluta. E voluta lo sarà non 
per un’improbabile malvagità di qualcuno ma perché pochi e diversi agenti 
(politici, sociali, culturali, ecc.) decidono che è arrivato il momento di cam-
biare lo status dei più.
Perciò, non volendo seguire l’analisi di Sylos Labini e non volendo soste-
nere che chi adotta il paradigma economico neoclassico, basato su alcuni mo-
delli di prevedibilità, in realtà non riesca nel suo scopo e compito, e volendo 
invece perorare la causa degli economisti sostenendo la loro capacità di svol-
gere adeguatamente e sensatamente il loro lavoro, non restano molte strade 
da seguire. Questi sanno fare il loro mestiere, sanno prevedere e gestire la 
crisi, eppure la crisi c’è e cambia l’assetto sociale, crea nuove paure e nuove 
povertà, come constatiamo da anni. Se chi può fare non fa, allora, non resta 
molto da congetturare né occorrono menti di spicco per dedurre che costoro 
vogliono esattamente che le cose stiano così, oppure decidono che “adesso le 
cose debbono andare così” in funzione della creazione di nuovi ordini e dello 
spostamento di ricchezze e capitali. Forse qualcuno alla regina Elisabetta II 
che chiedeva «Why no one saw the credit crunch coming» avrà pur rispo-
sto: «Because we had no interest to predict it». Oppure, immedesimandosi 
con celebri personaggi dello scorso secolo avrà risposto: «Frankly, my dear, 
I don’t give a damn», senza nessuno a dire «After all, tomorrow is another 
day!» – frase che poco probabilmente leggeremmo sulle labbra di Queen Eli-
zabeth. 
Ciò detto, allora, «cos’è questa crisi»? La filosofia, di fronte al quadro ap-
pena esposto e che va guardato con sereno disincanto, apparentemente non 
dice nulla di utile limitandosi a constatarne e commentarne i disastri – in 
termini culturali ma soprattutto umani7. 
2. Inutilità della filosofia?
Una nuova domanda, così, si pone. Non «perché la crisi non è stata pre-
vista?» ma «davanti alla crisi, che cosa si può fare?». E dato che la filosofia 
ambisce all’universalità e, perciò, parla di tutto, parla anche di crisi e di come 
7  Ma l’inutilità della filosofia è soltanto apparente: vi sono importanti riflessioni 
filosofiche sull’economia, quali quella proposta da Mancini (2014).
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stare davanti a essa. Peraltro, in questo caso è del tutto legittimata a farlo, 
dato che da secoli si parla di crisi della filosofia (che soffre a causa dei colpi 
inflitti dalla scienza, dalla tecnica, dalle scienze sociali e via dicendo). Oppure, 
dato che la filosofia è un discorso il cui scopo è “mettere in crisi” quello che si 
dà per scontato e consolidato, per questa sua specificità si sarà guadagnata il 
diritto a pronunciarsi “sulla crisi”. Sintetizzando mirabilmente tante osserva-
zioni sul tema, in questo contesto si segnala un libro, ampio ed esaustivo, di 
Elio Franzini: Filosofia della crisi8. 
Questo libro è uno dei casi in cui il contenuto non rispecchia il titolo. Ci 
si attenderebbe un libro di etica applicata alla crisi, o di riflessioni sulla crisi, 
invece le sue pagine si dipanano in una sorta di inconsapevole e involontario 
dialogo con il libro di Sylos Labini, condotto da un altro punto di vista. Non, 
tuttavia, il punto di vista umanistico, come si potrebbe pensare, ma il punto 
di vista della “cosa stessa”, ovvero il punto di vista de “la crisi” come tale. Se 
chiediamo che cosa sia una crisi riceveremmo in risposta quanto già detto: 
essa è un momento di rottura, di cambiamento, in cui un mondo affonda e un 
altro appare. L’idea proposta da Franzini è che tuttavia questo affondare del 
mondo accade perché si riduce il potenziale della parola “crisi” obiettivandola 
e riducendola a una razionalità unilaterale9. Contro un’idea più generale e 
complessa di crisi, che il libro indaga nella filosofia dell’illuminismo, in Kant 
ma anche nella fenomenologia (Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty e in molti 
altri autori), Franzini scrive che, dopo essere uscita «dal vocabolario filosofico 
per entrare in quelli dell’economia, della finanza, della società, della politica, 
rivelando di essere centrale in tutti i fenomeni della polis moderna»10, la crisi 
si è lasciata individuare come «processo di semplificazione che omologa, che 
rifiuta il senso delle tradizioni, una globalizzazione astratta del pensiero che 
ne annulla le potenzialità simboliche, gli intrecci motivazionali, in sintesi le 
differenze che costruiscono un’autentica identità e non un simulacro. Crisi – 
e riguarda forse anche la politica economica – significa imporre un modello e 
ritenere fallimentari gli atteggiamenti che a esso non si conformano»11.
Potremmo riassumere trivialmente questo pensiero rimarcando che così 
come, dal punto di vista del paradigma scientifico, Sylos Labini contesta la 
semplificazione imposta dal modello economico neoclassico a suo dire inca-
8  Cfr. Franzini (2015).
9  Franzini (2015), p. 184, corsivo dell’autore.
10  Franzini (2015), p. 171.
11  Franzini (2015), p. 177.
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pace di prevedere e forse anche di vedere la crisi (oltre che di rispondervi), 
allo stesso modo Franzini contesta la semplificazione che la crisi impone ri-
ducendo la complessità che ogni identità è – ma anche la complessità che 
ogni costruzione sociale è. In altri termini, una crisi “obiettivata”, ridotta a 
cosa tra le cose, perde il suo legame con il senso della vita, con il rinnovamen-
to che essa permette, con la riscrittura del mondo. Senza ignorare l’ambiguità 
intrinseca della parola “crisi”, Franzini ne sottolinea allora non soltanto quel-
lo che essa fa perdere ma anche ciò che essa rende possibile, ossia quel «su-
perare il fenomeno reale, cercando di viverne l’irrisolta tensione, mostrando 
la forza infinita di possibilità che anima la realtà in apparenza frammentaria 
del mondo»12. Questa forza non si manifesterebbe se essa non fosse l’essere di 
ogni cosa, e dunque anche della crisi, ovvero quell’essere che la filosofia chia-
ma “ontologia”. A proposito della quale va detto che «è ingenuo ritenere che 
l’ontologia si riferisca alle cose […]. È invece, è sempre stata, una riflessione 
sulle cose, di cui si riconosce un “essere”, il cui significato è tuttavia mute-
vole»13. Passo che prosegue così: «L’ontologia è l’interrogazione su come sia 
possibile rendere conto della nostra credenza nella realtà del mondo esterno 
senza ridurla a un’operazione irrazionale, ma ancorandola al modo stesso di 
manifestarsi, alle regole che governano l’apparire delle cose»14. 
Perciò, ossia perché le cose sono quando e nella misura in cui appaiono, 
«i fatti non si affermano da sé, ma sono portati alla luce, con il loro senso e 
le loro strutture, nel quadro di un processo, di un percorso, di una genesi, di 
operazioni soggettive che ne colgano le varie prospettive, che vengono alla 
luce soltanto se, corrispettivamente, mutano anche i punti di vista»15. Ed es-
sendo anche la crisi un “fatto”, offrirne una prospettiva che la riporti soltanto 
alla sua descrivibilità oggettiva significa ridurla e, perciò, perderne la sua na-
tura di “fatto per qualcuno”. Ridurla a “esperienza naturalistica” e oggettiva 
significa perdere completamente l’impatto che essa ha in ciascuno. 
Ché questo è veramente il punto della questione concernente la crisi. Nel 
precedente paragrafo è stata seguita la critica di Sylos Labini che contesta la 
capacità del modello univoco neoclassico di “spiegare” crisi. Alla fine del suo 
libro egli propone la vitalità della ricerca (in ogni campo, da quelli scientifi-
ci a quelli umanistici) quale possibile volano per attraversare la crisi. Anche 
12  Franzini (2015), p. 189.
13  Franzini (2015), p. 123.
14  Franzini (2015).
15  Franzini (2015), p. 39.
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se questa è voluta per cambiare l’assetto globale, le risorse con cui ciascuno 
affronta la realtà – anche e soprattutto quando questa si trasforma – non do-
vrebbero mai mancare. E tali risorse sono “del soggetto”, non dell’“oggetto”, 
il che ci riconduce nei pressi della proposta di Franzini: la crisi non è univoca, 
non si dice in un solo modo ma in molti modi, dove questi modi non sono 
soltanto i suoi aspetti oggettivi (crisi culturale, politica, economica, finanzia-
ria…), ma quegli aspetti che la percezione umana ne coglie. 
La domanda che apre queste pagine, «Ma cos’è questa crisi?», lungi 
dall’essere una provocazione o un ironico rimando alla canzone di De Angelis, 
finisce con l’indicare questo: siamo proprio sicuri di sapere che cosa sia la cri-
si? Nessuna descrizione intelligente e analitica della crisi sarebbe mai capace 
di ridurre il carico di dolore che l’affondarsi di una realtà morente porta con 
sé, né potrebbe fare altro dal tacersi davanti al disperdersi di nuove energie 
e davanti al naufragio di generazioni, cosa di fatto inevitabile. È inevitabile, 
cioè, che chi può fare e decide di non fare non si preoccupi per chi in questa 
situazione perisce e affonda anziché ricominciare. Avanzare ricette etiche e 
proposte edificanti, in tal senso, è del tutto inutile, e significherebbe aggiun-
gere un capitolo alla lunga serie di litanie ascoltate in questi anni. Quello che 
si può fare e che ciascuno può fare, però, è seguire l’invito di un altro filosofo, 
John R. Searle, a “vedere le cose come sono”16. 
3. “La” crisi: che oggetto è, costei? 
Tra i filosofi grati alla posterità che li ha resi celebri, togliendoli da un ine-
vitabile oblio, va certamente annoverato Carneade. Filosofo greco della cor-
rente degli scettici, sarebbe meno noto di molti nomi illustri della filosofia 
antica ed ellenica se Alessandro Manzoni non avesse aperto l’ottavo capitolo 
de I promessi sposi con la celebre esclamazione di don Abbondio «Carne-
ade! Chi era costui?». Quanto fin qui detto della crisi ripete questa celebre 
esclamazione, tanto essa è difficilmente prevedibile e, al contempo, polivoca. 
Infatti, per i più è imprevedibile, altrimenti non godrebbe del suo devastante 
effetto-sorpresa, ma chi la conosce la cerca per gestire il transito che provoca; 
inoltre essa si dice in molti modi. Ma che cosa diciamo, quando ne parliamo?
Vi è un primo livello, semplice, quello per cui attribuiamo la crisi a qualco-
sa o qualcuno, come diciamo che un uomo o una donna stanno attraversando 
16  Mi riferirò al testo di Searle (2016).
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una crisi di mezza età, o come quando diciamo che un matrimonio è in crisi. 
O anche, come quando parliamo di “crisi di governo”. Diverso è il livello di cui 
abbiamo detto fin qui, che concerne “la” crisi en tant que telle, ossia questo 
sostantivo che, come un Convitato di Pietra, in questi ultimi anni ha riem-
pito le pagine dei quotidiani di tutto il mondo, dalla crisi dei mutui subpri-
me statunitensi in poi. Questo è un livello diverso perché facciamo della crisi 
“qualcosa”, un oggetto di cui parlare. Ma siamo sicuri che le cose stiano così 
e che, invece, la crisi non sia proprio ciò che Carneade era per don Abbondio, 
ossia una sconosciuta? Insomma: di che cosa parliamo quando parliamo de 
“la” crisi? John R. Searle, noto per le sue teorie linguistiche, innanzitutto per 
quella conosciuta come la Speech-Act Theory (1969)17, anni dopo le tesi che 
lo hanno reso celebre scrive The Costruction of Social Reality, apparso nel 
1995, dove avanza alcune tesi che, fermo restando il fatto che sia impossibi-
le rispondere univocamente alla questione «ma cos’è questa crisi?», offrono 
prospettive per cogliere il suo senso insieme “oggettivo” e “soggettivo”. Detto 
altrimenti: aprono squarci sul suo senso oggettivo e sulla sua percezione sog-
gettiva, poiché la crisi prevista o analizzata non è la crisi vissuta. La destabi-
lizzazione del contesto noto e conosciuto, infatti, alimenta paure e precarietà, 
altera la percezione della realtà facendone cogliere un’instabilità ignorata a 
causa del fatto che ogni ordine sembra avere un che di eterno. E sebbene 
quest’eternità non sia il suo tratto vero (basterebbe una rapida riflessione 
sulla dimensione temporale e finita di ogni questione umana a confermarlo) 
ciononostante esso è percepito così. 
Ora, presentificare ogni ente universalizzandolo è una caratteristica che la 
filosofia ha da sempre praticato (sebbene anche altre scienze abbiano cedu-
to a questa tentazione). Tuttavia, dalle ceneri di una metafisica eternizzante 
l’essere di ogni ente e di tre enti in particolare (Dio, anima, mondo, ossia i tre 
“oggetti” che la Schulmetaphysik ha stabilito) è nato un sapere ermeneutico 
e interpretante che, a partire da Sein und Zeit di Martin Heidegger (1927) ha 
riflettuto sulla Endlichkeit dell’uomo e sulla linguisticità di ogni dimensione 
umana. Pur senza reclamare la discendenza dall’ermeneutica, anche Searle 
ha rimarcato questa dimensione linguistica, temporale e finita di ogni ente 
umano, spingendosi fino alla questione della possibilità di costruire “oggetti 
sociali”, o “fatti sociali”. Sfruttando questo felice lemma, che spiegherò e chia-
rirò qui di seguito, pongo subito la questione nella quale vorrei contestualiz-
zare “la crisi”, questo strano “oggetto” di cui si parla senza saper bene di che 
17  Cfr. Searle (1969).
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cosa si stia parlando; questo oggetto che si sa ma che, più lo si conosce, più 
sembra mantenere risorse che resistono a facili analisi. La tesi che propongo, 
allora, è la seguente: tale indecidibilità della crisi (oscillante tra dimensione 
oggettiva e soggettiva, tra rischio e potenziale) appartiene alla sua socialità 
e istituzionalità. Essa, in altri termini, è un “oggetto” o “fatto” sociale, motivo 
per cui è contemporaneamente oggettiva e soggettiva, “cosa” e percezione. 
Se ciò non fosse, non si capirebbe perché in questi anni abbia trascinato 
con sé tante conseguenze sociali e politiche che fanno parlare di emergenze di 
nuovi diritti, o di nuovi assetti politici. Se, cioè, “la crisi” si limitasse a essere 
“un qualcosa di determinato” non si capirebbe come mai sia stata capace di 
cambiare tanto, se non addirittura tutto un assetto globale. Infatti, nessun 
“oggetto determinato” sarebbe capace di estendere la propria sfera di influen-
za in settori tanto distanti tra loro. Inoltre, se fosse un “oggetto determinato”, 
non si capirebbe come mai non si limita a sconvolgere l’ordine al quale appar-
tiene e che rovescia, generando invece nuove paure, diffidenze e reclamando 
anche nuove azioni non soltanto economiche ma anche politiche e giuridiche. 
Se questo è vero e può esser affermato, allora anche il suo status deve essere 
ridetto, e la domanda «Ma cos’è questa crisi?» è tutt’altro che risolta. 
Fatta questa constatazione, ripropongo l’ipotesi già avanzata: la crisi “è” 
(indecidibile) e “fa” (ovvero: sconvolge e apre nuove realtà) perché è un “og-
getto” o “fatto” sociale. Ovvero: essa appartiene a pieno titolo alla costru-
zione della realtà sociale. Prima di dire perché, va però chiarito il senso che 
Searle assegna a questi lemmi. Il filosofo parte da una distinzione generica e 
generalmente condivisibile: i fatti e le cose si distinguono in oggettivo e sog-
gettivo e tale distinzione ha un senso sia epistemico, sia ontologico. Se «par-
lando epistecamente “oggettivo” e “soggettivo” sono principalmente predicati 
di giudizi»18, quando noi parliamo di giudizi soggettivi «intendiamo dire che 
la loro verità o falsità non può essere stabilita “oggettivamente” perché la ve-
rità o falsità non è semplicemente una questione di fatto, ma dipende da certi 
atteggiamenti, sentimenti e punti di vista di chi esprime il giudizio e di chi 
ascolta»19. Che il confine tra queste diverse realtà sia labile e che l’una sfoci 
spesso nell’altra può essere quotidianamente constatato. Ad esempio, «l’as-
serzione “Il monte Everest è più bello del monte Whitney” riguarda entità 
ontologicamente oggettive, ma svolge un giudizio soggettivo nei loro confron-
18  Searle (2006), p. 14.
19  Searle (2006), p. 14.
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ti»20. Invece, l’asserzione «“adesso ho un dolore al fondoschiena” riferisce un 
fatto epistecamente oggettivo nel senso che esso è reso vero dall’esistenza 
di un fatto effettivo che non dipende da nessun atteggiamento, attitudine o 
opinione di osservatori»21. Tuttavia, prosegue Searle, «il fenomeno stesso, il 
dolore reale, ha una forma di esistenza soggettiva»22, tanto è vero che ognuno 
possiede una diversa soglia del dolore e, soprattutto, nessuno può dire di “ve-
dere” il dolore allo stesso modo in cui vede il monte Everest. Eppure il dolore 
resta un “fatto” constatabile che domanda interventi (la cura). 
Posta questa prima e generica distinzione, Searle si chiede se anche per fat-
ti sociali da tutti condivisi si possa dire lo stesso, e la sua risposta è affermati-
va. Infatti, oltre a tutti i fatti che ciascuno (oggettivamente o soggettivamente) 
può censire, vi sono “fatti istituzionali”, ossia fatti o oggetti che tutti condivi-
diamo per convenzione, che non sono “cose” pur possedendo un valore reale. 
Una prima distinzione che il filosofo americano introduce per affermare l’esi-
stenza di questi “oggetti” è la differenza tra regole “regolative” e “costitutive”. 
Tra le prime si annovera ad esempio la regola della guida, a destra o a sinistra, 
che, però, non dice nulla rispetto al guidare. Quest’azione, infatti, preesiste o 
esiste indipendentemente dalla regola di guida, la quale può variare. Invece, 
«le regole degli scacchi non regolano un’attività antecedentemente esistente. 
Non si dà il caso che ci sia un mucchio di gente che ordina pezzi di legno sui 
tavoli, e allo scopo di impedire che si urtino l’un l’altro tutto il tempo e creino 
ingorghi, si sia dovuto regolare la loro attività. Piuttosto, le regole degli scac-
chi creano la possibilità stessa di giocare a scacchi. Le regole sono costitutive 
degli scacchi, nel senso che giocare a scacchi è costituito in parte dall’agire 
in accordo con le regole»23. Ora, che vi sia la possibilità di “enti” e “fatti” che 
preesistano a un accordo collettivo (si guida indipendentemente dal fatto che 
ciò accada a destra o sinistra) e, viceversa, che vi sia un’intenzionalità collet-
tiva che si accorda nel riconoscere il valore oggettivo di qualcosa (giocare a 
scacchi significa riconoscere tutti insieme che il gioco si chiude con lo scacco 
matto) e porre la distinzione tra regole costitutive e regole regolative, sono gli 
elementi alla base della “costruzione della realtà sociale”24.
Per rendere meno astratto il discorso di Searle è utile andare subito a un 
20  Searle (2006), p. 15.
21  Searle (2006), p. 15.
22  Searle (2006), p. 15.
23  Searle (2006), p. 37.
24  Cfr. Searle (2006), p. 39.
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esempio di tale costruzione, il denaro, che l’autore descrive attraverso alcune 
caratteristiche che si impongono per la loro evidenza e permettono di parlare 
di realtà sociale. Mi limiterò a elencarle con rapida spiegazione, essendo ve-
ramente “evidenti”. 1- L’autoreferenzialità di molti concetti sociali: «Se tutti 
pensano sempre che “qualcosa” sia denaro e la usano e trattano come denaro, 
allora è denaro. Se nessuno pensa mai che questo tipo di cosa sia denaro, 
allora non è denaro»25. Questa citazione basta a chiarire l’autoreferenzialità 
del sistema sociale, ché l’esempio del denaro e delle sue “regole” è chiaro a 
tutti. 2- L’uso degli enunciati performativi nella creazione di fatti sociali. Se 
dico o scrivo: «“Lascio tutti i miei beni a mio nipote” o “Con questo la guerra 
è dichiarata” […], questi enunciati creano lo stato di cose che essi rappresen-
tano; e, in ogni caso, lo stato di cose è un fatto istituzionale»26 (ovvero: non 
è il monte Everest). 3- La struttura gerarchica dei fatti bruti e dei fatti isti-
tuzionali: «I fatti sociali in generale e i fatti istituzionali in particolare sono 
strutturati gerarchicamente. I fatti istituzionali esistono, per così dire, al di 
sopra dei fatti bruti. Spesso i fatti bruti non si manifestano sotto forma di og-
getti fisici ma sotto forma di suoni provenienti dalla bocca della gente o come 
segni sulla carta, o anche come pensieri»27. Poco importa che il denaro siano 
fiches, banconote, metallo o pietre (diamanti?), o che sia in forma di tracce 
magnetiche: l’importante è che esso si manifesti sia in forma fisica (fatto bru-
to), sia in quanto denaro (fatto istituzionale). Oggettivo e istituzionale, dun-
que, non si escludono a vicenda ma si “gerarchizzano”. 4- Si danno relazioni 
sistematiche tra fatti istituzionali: così come i fatti oggettivi non sono isolati, 
anche i fatti sociali si costituiscono in una rete di relazioni che coinvolgono 
vari ambiti. L’esempio del denaro potrebbe essere declinato, anche in questo 
caso, in tanti e differenti contesti, da quello economico e politico (le riserve 
degli Stati, i loro bilanci, ecc.) ad ambiti più genericamente sociali. 5- Si dà 
il primato degli atti sociali sugli oggetti sociali, dei processi sui prodotti: si è 
sempre tentati, scrive Searle, «di pensare gli oggetti sociali come entità che 
esistono indipendentemente e in analogia con gli oggetti studiati dalle scienze 
naturali»28. Invece, «gli oggetti sociali sono sempre […] costituiti da atti so-
ciali e, in un certo senso, l’oggetto è soltanto la possibilità continua dell’atti-
vità. Un biglietto da venti dollari, per esempio, è una possibilità sussistente di 
25  Searle (2006), p. 41.
26  Searle (2006), p. 43.
27  Searle (2006), p. 44.
28  Searle (2006), p. 45.
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pagare qualcosa»29. 6- Ultimo punto, la componente linguistica di molti fatti 
istituzionali. Questo punto, centrale per ogni discussione sulla “costituzione” 
degli oggetti sociali, chiederebbe una conoscenza o, almeno, una sommaria 
esposizione dei capisaldi della Linguistic Turn di cui anche Austin e Searle 
sono stati protagonisti. Essendo ciò impossibile nel presente contesto, mi li-
miterò a questa osservazione: il linguaggio, con la sua valenza metaforica, è 
costitutivo, almeno parzialmente, di fatti sociali, come quando leggiamo che 
«certe colonie di formiche hanno schiavi o che gli alveari hanno regine»30.
L’ultimo passaggio che vorrei segnalare per passare poi alla possibilità di 
intendere la crisi come oggetto sociale (cosa che, va precisato, Searle non ha 
fatto), è un punto a mio avviso centrale che l’autore svolge parlando di in-
tenzionalità collettiva che conduce all’oggetto sociale. Gli esempi che adduce 
sono il denaro e i confini fatti con una successione di pietre, e dunque quei 
confini che delimitano prevalentemente la proprietà (pubblica o privata). 
Poiché del primo ho già detto, mi limito al secondo esempio, introducendolo 
con una rapida osservazione: «La forma più semplice del fatto sociale impli-
ca forme semplici di comportamento collettivo»31. Immaginiamo, riassumo 
il testo, una tribù primitiva che marchi il proprio territorio con un muro che 
protegga la loro privacy. Da barriera fisica, nel tempo il muro diventa barrie-
ra simbolica riducendosi a una fila di pietre. Ma 
si immagini che gli abitanti e i loro vicini continuino a riconoscere la fila di pietre come 
ciò che demarca i confini del territorio in modo tale da influenzare il loro comportamento. 
Per esempio, gli abitanti attraversano il confine solo seguendo speciali condizioni, e gli 
estranei possono entrare nel territorio solo se ciò è accettabile per gli abitanti. La fila di 
pietre ora ha una funzione di indicare qualcosa al di là di se stessa, cioè i limiti del terri-
torio. La fila di pietre svolge la medesima funzione di barriera fisica. Non lo fa, però, in 
virtù della sua costruzione fisica ma perché le è stato assegnato collettivamente un nuovo 
status, quello di demarcatore di confini32. 
Poco oltre Searle scrive che «l’elemento chiave nella mossa dall’imposta-
zione collettiva di funzione (che potrebbe caratterizzare anche la demarca-
zione del territorio degli animali, ndr.) alla creazione di fatti istituzionali è 
l’impostazione di uno status riconosciuto collettivamente a cui è connessa 
29  Searle (2006), p. 46.
30  Searle (2006), p. 46.
31  Searle (2006), p. 47.
32  Searle (2006), p. 49.
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una funzione»33. È il motivo per cui a un “oggetto” attribuiamo un grande 
valore al punto di volerne possedere sempre di più. Il denaro, non a caso, è 
l’esempio che Searle fa dopo essere arrivato a questo punto. 
Queste tesi, giustamente molto celebri, andrebbero seguite in tutte le loro 
movenze e, anche, discusse e criticate, ma – di nuovo – non è questa la sede. 
Tuttavia, l’intuizione di fondo che l’autore ha avuto aiuta a comprendere “che 
genere di cosa sia la crisi”. Questa, come altri oggetti sociali, è autoreferen-
ziale perché sia che si tratti della “cosa” che è in crisi (matrimonio, governo, 
ecc.), sia che si tratti de “la” crisi, quest’ultima può essere descritta al suo 
interno, per così dire, come qualcosa di individuabile “in quanto crisi”. Ov-
vero: vi sono delle caratteristiche de “la” crisi che ce la annunciano e la fanno 
riconoscere come tale. E dato che non siamo la prima epoca storica di crisi, 
nella quale cambiano i sistemi di lavoro ed economici, oggi come un tem-
po possiamo individuare la costante autoreferenziale della crisi nel fatto che 
1- qualcosa cambia – perlopiù in modo destabilizzante. 2- È performativa 
in quanto “fa quello che dice” o anche: è riconosciuta quando la si afferma, 
essendo stata annunciata attraverso una serie di enunciati che ci hanno det-
to che stava accadendo prima ancora che i suoi effetti diventassero concreti 
(solo gli addetti ai lavori, anni fa, avevano intuito quello che sarebbe accaduto 
in seguito alla crisi dei mutui subprime statunitensi). 3- Si caratterizza per 
un singolare intreccio di affermazioni e fatti concreti. 4- Provoca un effetto di 
cambiamento evidenziando l’interazione di diverse sfere sociali – e soprattut-
to portando alla luce quelle differenze sociali che non erano più percepibili. 
5- Si caratterizza per la stretta relazione tra atti e fatti sociali, tanto è vero 
che si definisce in quanto rottura di uno status quo e si afferma provocando 
“cose nuove” – non necessariamente soltanto negative o soltanto positive. 6- 
Possiede evidentemente una forma linguistica: anche se nessuno vede la crisi 
perché se ne vedono soltanto i suoi effetti, noi continuiamo a parlare “della 
crisi”. Perciò, così come concordiamo sul valore del denaro e dei confini, con-
cordiamo tutti intenzionalmente sul fatto che la crisi c’è – anche se nessuno 
l’ha mai vista come può dire di aver visto il monte Bianco. Ciononostante c’è, 
è un fatto sociale che cambia e ha cambiato la situazione politica, econo-
mica e sociale in cui viviamo, anche se non la si vede in quanto “crisi” (così 
come vediamo altre cose); per questi motivi, essa è un fatto e oggetto sociale 
che interroga e interpella. Soprattutto, essa – invisibile – determina la nostra 
percezione delle cose visibili. 
33  Searle (2006), p. 51.
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È di nuovo Searle a riprendere il tema della percezione – evidentemente 
soggettiva – in relazione ai fatti “oggettivi” e “sociali”. Mi limiterò a questa 
sua osservazione: «C’è un’esperienza visiva ontologicamente soggettiva che 
esiste interamente come un’entità “privata” nella testa dell’agente che per-
cepisce e c’è un’entità ontologicamente oggettiva e “pubblica” nel mondo al 
di fuori della nostra testa. Come può la descrizione essere la stessa? […] (Lo 
è perché) la descrizione del contenuto della presentazione deve corrispon-
dere allo stato di cose che costituisce le sue condizioni di soddisfazione nel 
mondo esterno»34. Ciò che Searle non si stanca di ripetere è che «i contenuti 
nella testa (scilicet: le nostre percezioni) sono presentazioni intenzionali delle 
condizioni di soddisfazione, e quelle sono gli oggetti nel mondo che io vedo. 
Qualsiasi teoria della percezione deve spiegare questa comunanza»35. Ma c’è 
di più. Oltre a dovervi essere una corrispondenza che verifichi la conformità 
tra ciò che crediamo e percepiamo e la realtà, niente si dà senza uno sfondo 
dal quale emerge (e dunque i dati sensoriali si danno sempre anche con e in 
uno sfondo che li precede), il che non ci esime dal dover imparare a vedere 
quello che appare, come alcune celebri immagini (ad esempio l’anatra-coni-
glio di Joseph Jastrow36) mostrano. Se per un verso non possiamo né dobbia-
mo rinunciare alla realtà, dall’altra parte nessuna realtà si dà se non in uno 
sfondo e a un soggetto che, però, deve imparare a guardarla. Se, allora, la crisi 
è un oggetto sociale che non essendo al modo delle “cose naturali” si mescola 
alla nostra percezione della realtà, resta soltanto da dire che cosa possa voler 
dire “percepire la crisi”. 
4. Ah! La crisi…
Riparto dalla “Queen’s Question”, ponendola come obiezione a queste ul-
time osservazioni: se la crisi è un particolare “oggetto sociale” che si distin-
gue per delle caratteristiche sulle quali tutti concordano, perché non è stata 
prevista e ancora non è risolta? Alla questione della previsione si risponderà 
come già risposto, ossia che poteva essere prevista ma che ciò non è avvenuto, 
non per malvagità o incuria ma per scelte compiute da agenti (impiego qui il 
termine di Searle) che potevano e volevano compierle. Ma la questione non 
34  Searle (2016), p. 65.
35  Searle (2016), p. 71.
36  Searle (2016), p. 80.
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si limita a questo aspetto che rientra, per così dire, nel quadro della “storia” e 
delle vicende delle nazioni – così come vi rientra la cosiddetta “globalizzazio-
ne”. Se, allora, non si tratta di mettere in discussione un “oggetto sociale” che 
(comunque e malgrado tutto) c’è, che cosa resta da fare? Forse, sperare che 
alcune menti sensibili continuino a formare le coscienze mostrando che nes-
sun sistema economico è absoluto, sciolto da ogni condizione, e continuino a 
sollecitare lo spirito critico di chi non partecipa alle grandi decisioni – e anzi 
le subisce. Già questa consapevolezza che, forse, nel tempo porterà all’assun-
zione di modelli economici diversi, è più di niente. Essa riguarda, tuttavia, un 
unico tratto dell’“oggetto sociale”, il suo tratto oggettivo, e non tiene conto 
dell’altro versante della questione, quello soggettivo.
Infatti, se ogni “oggetto sociale” si distingue per il proprio carico di ogget-
tività e soggettività, di linguisticità e fatticità, ecc., e se la realtà si rivela anche 
in una percezione, allora – per e grazie a questo elemento “soggettivo” – an-
che altro si può fare. In quanto “oggetto sociale”, “la” crisi è oggetto da tutti 
riconosciuto ma non ineluttabile. È un oggetto come il denaro o il confine, o 
il monumento o la bandiera. Certo, l’impoverimento che ha portato, in questi 
anni, è notevole, ma peggiore di tale impoverimento è la paura e il senso di 
precarietà che arreca con sé. Peggiore della realtà che cambia (non in meglio) 
è la sua percezione perché percepire che il cambiamento imposto è inelut-
tabile, l’incapacità di comprenderlo e la paura che ne consegue, insieme a 
tanti altri fenomeni sociali che abbiamo riscontrato questi anni, blocca in una 
situazione inevitabilmente mutata e impedisce di cogliere che una rottura è 
tale in riferimento a un ordine che non c’è più ma rispetto al quale qualcosa 
di nuovo s’avanza. La percezione, Searle lo diceva, ma anche Merleau-Ponty 
e altri autori nel secolo scorso lo hanno rimarcato, è il modo in cui entriamo 
in contatto con la realtà, è il tramite con cui un fenomeno manifesto si fa evi-
dente per noi. Sottolinearlo e capirlo, però, non significa che quel fenomeno 
ormai manifesto sia del tutto ineluttabile e inaggirabile. O almeno, se “ogget-
tivamente” lo sembra, “soggettivamente” rimane tutto lo spazio per seguire 
le tracce del cambiamento, per l’appello alla creatività e al rinnovamento, per 
l’invito a stare nella situazione non come “cosa tra le cose” (dato che neppure 
la crisi lo è!) ma con tutto il carico che la creatività della percezione “sogget-
tiva” rende possibile. 
Percepire significa dare un peso di valore e di realtà all’oggetto, tanto che 
una serie di pietre (che non è altro da una successione collocata sul terreno) 
diventa altro, ossia la delimitazione di una proprietà o di un confine. Ma chi, 
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se non il “soggetto”, è capace di quest’individuazione? E se il soggetto è stato 
capace di questa creatività – ossia cogliere nelle pietre più di quello che esse 
sono e farne un fatto sociale da tutti soggettivamente condiviso – potrà essere 
ancora capace di reinvestire tale percezione della realtà nel vedere i molti 
aspetti che il cambiamento della crisi arreca – da punti di vista e in ambiti 
diversi. 
Un re-investimento della percezione che va declinato come riconoscimen-
to di nuove emergenze in ambito politico, economico e sociale sapendo che a 
essere in gioco è la costruzione di una nuova realtà sociale. Allora il compito 
di ogni sapere, sia esso “umanistico” o tecnico, potrà valorizzarsi nel recipro-
co convergere di intenti.
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The Problem of Democracy

DEFENDING COLLECTIVE SOCIALITY:
THE ORESTEIA AT SHAKESPEARE’S GLOBE
Louise Owen
“There’s more than one way to rebuild a haunted mansion.”1 So begins New 
York Times’ theatre critic Ben Brantley’s review of two recent British adapta-
tions of Aeschylus’ ancient trilogy The Oresteia, whose London productions 
appeared one after the other in summer 2015. The first, entitled Oresteia: 
Aeschylus: a new version created by Robert Icke, was directed by its author 
to great critical acclaim at the Almeida Theatre in north London. Next came 
The Oresteia: adapted by Rory Mullarkey from the original by Aeschylus, 
directed by Adele Thomas at Shakespeare’s Globe, the late twentieth century 
reconstruction of the early modern theatre located on the South Bank of the 
Thames. Brantley’s ‘haunted mansion’ metaphor refers to two aspects: the 
place of these differing interpretations in the trilogy’s extensive production 
history, and to its plot, whose three parts trace the unfortunate story of the 
cursed House of Atreus. Icke’s adaptation presented the travails of its power-
ful family in a sleek and minimal contemporary setting. Meanwhile, Mullar-
key and Thomas’ slow and disquieting production was otherworldly. Though 
it was also very well received, its chosen strategy of aesthetic anachronism, 
bringing historical periods into dialogue, baffled some critics and audiences.2 
Here, I argue that The Oresteia’s anachronistic approach, pursued in the en-
virons of the rebuilt Globe, represented an astute theatrical response to the 
European crisis and the context of continued austerity in Britain. Its theatri-
cal images and sense of prolonged, elongated time cultivated through its pace 
subtly reflected on the historical dimension of present experiences of crisis. 
And, taking advantage of the space of the Globe, it meditated on the consti-
tution of the collective social body as demos – a contested construct I define 
broadly here, along with Wendy Brown, as “democratic citizenry”.3
1  Brantley (2015).
2  Speaking of his translation, Rory Mullarkey says: “I feel like Aeschylus himself was 
relatively anachronistic, he switched between archaisms and neologisms and colloquial-
isms. I guess I wanted it to feel like there was a sense of anachronism running through it.” 
Bano (2015).
3  Brown (2015), p. 65. Brown surveys debates concerning the definition and sub-
stance of the demos in writings by Agamben, Rancière and Balibar, concluding that for her 
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The punishing effects of policies of austerity, enacted in Britain since the 
election of the Coalition government in May 2010, informed the development 
of The Oresteia. Thomas explicitly stated her utopian aim as to treat the Globe 
as “‘a spiritual and even ritualistic space, but also a space of community, of 
political expression’”.4 In a public talk with Mullarkey at the University of Ox-
ford in November 2015, she reflected on the political and economic situations 
in Greece and her own Welsh hometown, and their influence on the produc-
tion, commenting that “what’s going on at the moment was at the forefront 
of our minds, and that chimed I guess to some degree with the feeling of the 
world [of the play] being slightly shut down or in flux”.5 The production was 
also inflected by immediate political events. The show’s run commenced in 
late August 2015, as headlines continued to address various responses to aus-
terity: lawyers’ demonstrations against cuts to legal aid in Britain, the fallout 
from Greece’s ‘no’ vote in the EU bailout referendum, and huge turnouts to 
public meetings staged as part of Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour leadership cam-
paign. The production thus took place in the context of an upsurge of sup-
port for social democratic alternatives to austerity, and struggles to defend 
them. When I saw the production live, I was unable to disentangle it from 
current events, in particular the legal aid protests. Of course, the production 
had entered into development many months before, but in performance its 
attention to justice and revenge became accentuated by the events unfolding 
around it in ways that were not shared by the Almeida production. The visual, 
aural and sensorial approach taken in Thomas’ staging, and its concomitant 
play with historical time, emphasized aspects of the European crisis and the 
constitution of collective sociality in a manner that the material specificities 
of Shakespeare’s Globe were uniquely able to provide.
The three plays that make up Aeschylus’ The Oresteia tell a violent tale of 
blood vengeance displaced by trial by jury. The first play, Agamemnon, de-
scribes the slaughter of its eponymous protagonist by his wife Clytemnestra. 
She exacts furious vengeance upon her husband, returned to Argos from the 
Trojan War with captured slave Cassandra, for his sacrifice of their daugh-
ter Iphigenia ten years before, done strategically to assuage the anger of the 
project “the open and contestable signification of democracy is essential to this work be-
cause I want to release democracy from containment by any particular form while insisting 
on its value in connoting political self-rule by the people, whoever the people are” (p. 20).
4  Tonkin (2015), p. 44.
5  The Oresteia at the Globe Theatre (2015).
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wronged goddess Artemis and to assure military success. Next, in The Liba-
tion Bearers, Agamemnon and Clytemnestra’s son Orestes returns from exile 
to avenge his father’s murder, killing his mother and her lover Aegisthus, who 
have seized control of the city. The final play, The Eumenides, dispatches the 
cycle of blood vengeance by submitting Orestes’ crime to a trial by jury, where 
Orestes is required to defend his violent retaliation against his mother. The 
trial is presided over by the goddess Athena – with a jury performed, in the 
Globe’s production, by members of the amateur Borough Market Choir. This 
play also sees the suppression of the Furies, goddesses of vengeance and de-
fenders of the murdered mother Clytemnestra, who find themselves literally 
pushed to a domain beneath the ground. The principles of abstract justice 
and due process which replace blood vengeance are commended by Athena, 
in Mullarkey’s version, as “a new evolving system / Which works for everyone, 
for those in charge / And those most vulnerable in society”.6 Aeschylus’ plays 
seem to endorse both René Girard’s theorization of the “self-propagating”7 
characteristics of violence, where violence inevitably begets further violence, 
and his thoughts, in Violence and the Sacred (1972), regarding the modern 
judicial management of violent revenge. Girard writes that “public vengeance 
is the exclusive property of well-policed societies, and our society calls it the 
judicial system”;8 he theorizes its effect as curtailing the cyclical, private ex-
ecution of vengeance. Applying Girard to Aeschylus, George Newtown reads 
The Oresteia as chronicling “the mythic quantum leap of the Athenian Greeks 
as they replaced sacrificial ritual with judicial law as a preferred means of 
controlling violence”.9 Yet, despite Athena’s claim in Mullarkey’s version re-
garding the universality of the new democratic system of justice, the struc-
tural transformations the trilogy narrates are highly gendered. As such, as 
a canonical drama, as Newtown argues, The Oresteia threatens to “sanctify 
gender, ethnic, and class inequities well into the future in societies that revere 
the artwork as an iconographic text”.10
Both writer and director were acutely conscious of The Oresteia’s politics, 
and worked to present a feminist production. Throughout, their version of 
the drama was keenly attentive to The Oresteia’s inequalities, injustices and 
6  The Oresteia, Adapted by Rory Mullarkey (2015), p. 105.
7  Girard (2005), p. 27.
8  Girard (2005), p. 16.
9  Newtown (1999), pp. 135-146 (p. 136).
10  Newtown (1999), p. 145.
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contradictions. Thus, its powerful Clytemnestra, in anguish at the loss of her 
daughter, was also figured as an agent of asset-stripping autocracy in cahoots 
her lover Aegisthus. As their grip on the state tightened as the drama unfold-
ed, the power dynamic between the two subtly tipped away from Clytemnes-
tra. Mullarkey’s Cassandra describes the actions of the god Apollo, the back-
drop of her capture by Agamemnon, in uncompromising terms:
Yes, I hope my debt is paid to you now, great Apollo.
You raped me and then saw me raped and raped,
You stood by the razing of my city,
And at the gutting of my family,
And instead of letting me die at home,
You bring me here to face this butcher’s block,
Wet with the blood of my fresh-slain conqueror.11
Mullarkey remarked upon his sudden awareness as the text’s transla-
tor, during the final performance of the run, of “something that I’ve some-
how osmosed from the Greek: almost every single line has something about 
‘man’ or ‘woman’, and what that means”.12 In performance, the final act of 
the production strongly asserted the phallocratic underpinnings of suppos-
edly abstract justice. Speaking on behalf of the defendant, Apollo dismisses 
the female body as “just a vessel”; in casting her own vote to acquit Orestes, 
Athena confirms that “though a female being, I am my father’s child / And so 
side with the avenger of his father”.13 Athena exhorts the vanquished Furies 
to “swell on your new thrones, all purple-dyed / With manly excellence and 
civic pride”.14 And, as part of the ritual dance that concludes all Globe produc-
tions, the audience enjoyed a huge burst of golden confetti and a concluding 
Dionysian pro-democracy pageant featuring a gigantic golden winged phal-
lus – a finale intended to produce a discomfiting sense of “triumph”.15 While 
audiences responded in a range of ways, Thomas hoped primarily that this 
moment would register as “unsettling, because I find the dominance of the 
patriarchy at the end of the play really terrifying”.16 The feminist significance 
11  The Oresteia, Adapted by Rory Mullarkey (2015), p. 37.
12  The Oresteia at the Globe Theatre (2015).
13  The Oresteia, Adapted by Rory Mullarkey (2015), pp. 104-105.
14  The Oresteia, Adapted by Rory Mullarkey (2015), p. 110.
15  The Oresteia at the Globe Theatre (2015).
16  The Oresteia at the Globe Theatre (2015).
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of this gesture and the politics of the wider production were lost on some crit-
ics – for example, The Guardian’s Michael Billington, who complained of a 
lack of “consistent approach” throughout the production, and for whom “the 
parading of a giant penis of a kind we haven’t seen since Peter Brook’s 1968 
production of Seneca’s Oedipus” was not a moment of critique, but one of a 
series of “oddities”.17
Though the aesthetic variability of the piece thus registered as incoherent 
to some critics, this strategy was intrinsic to its argument and its dialecti-
cal effects. In performance at the Globe, The Oresteia deliberately located 
the bodies of its audience members and actors in multiple temporal sche-
mas – the classical Greek polis represented in the drama, the theatre’s imi-
tation early modern architecture, and the political, cinematic and broadcast 
cultures of postwar Britain and Europe – in a commentary that unmistakably 
engaged with contemporary political and economic crisis. As a spectator, the 
most striking impression on entering Shakespeare’s Globe was first the alter-
ation made to the playing space. Shakespeare’s Globe is a smaller but faith-
ful reconstruction of the ‘wooden O’, the early modern Globe Theatre first 
built in 1599. Sheltered by a shallow roof, its finely decorated stage thrusts 
into the yard. The yard itself is open to the elements, and can accommodate 
around 700 people, with a further 800 in the surrounding covered galleries. 
The standing tickets in the yard, on sale for £5, are easily the best in the house 
in terms of sightlines and proximity to the performance, and at this point are 
arguably the cheapest available in London. For this production, a cladding of 
rough wooden planks (Thomas: “‘really nasty chipboard’”)18 hid the Globe’s 
ornate stage backdrop, the vengeful aphorism ΤÝΜΜΑ ΤÝΜΜΑΤΙ ΤΕIΣΑΙ 
(“you will pay stroke for stroke”)19 sprayed upon them in red. This scenog-
raphy both concealed the Globe’s gilt columns and balustrades, and brought 
them into dialogue with the Eurozone crisis and its consequences for Greece 
– communicating an interruption to the building as spectacle, and, through 
the semantic content of the words upon the cladding, the relevance of revenge 
to the contemporary political situation. The boarded-up stage communicat-
ed, as Giulia Pallidini writes evocatively of the post-2008 moment, “a time 
dispossessed of a future and yet projected towards – and marked by – a hori-
17  Billington (2015). For a brilliant response to Billington’s review, see Haydon (2015).
18  Tonkin (2015).
19  Shapiro, Burian (2003), pp. 3-38 (p. 35).
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zon of potential, forthcoming failure and collapse”.20 And yet the imitation 
early modern structure, still partially visible behind it, acted as a reminder 
of the provisionality of dispossession and failure. A set of steps built specif-
ically for the production provided a means for actors to ascend to the stage 
from the yard. The play’s action began with a Watchman, clad in twenty-first 
century riot gear, witnessing a beacon signalling victory at Troy. He depart-
ed as the members of the Chorus made their way slowly through the audi-
ence, up the steps, to the stage – all six in suits and overcoats that advertised 
their social standing and historical time as lower middle-class workers of the 
1940s. When Agamemnon appeared, driving through the audience with the 
captured Cassandra, he wore ancient military garb, his face, arms and attire 
soaked in blood. So when were we exactly?
The sense conjured by the production was that we – performers and au-
dience – were at all and none of these moments. Like one of its cinematic in-
fluences, Theo Angelopoulos’ The Travelling Players (1975), in watching The 
Oresteia we were engaged in a “‘voyage in time and space’”.21 Angelopoulos’ 
film offers an account of Greek politics and society between 1939 and 1952, 
encompassing popular resistance to fascism, betrayal by the British govern-
ment and the eventual success of the right-wing Papagos government in a 
US-sponsored election. This account is told through the story of a theatrical 
troupe whose own relationships broadly map onto the myth of the House of 
Atreus. The film, structured around the troupe’s attempts to stage Spyridon 
Peresiades’ pastoral Golfo the Shepherdess, uses theatrical devices and tem-
poral shifts throughout. As Linda Myrsiades proposes, the use of theatrical 
devices to tell this story on film “puts history itself onstage and reveals the ex-
tent to which agency is reduced to ‘audiencing’ and social life is prescripted”.22 
Angelopoulos himself comments of his film: “what I was trying to achieve is a 
kind of Brechtian epic, where no psychological interpretation is necessary”.23 
Thomas refers to her love of the cinematic image, and the influence for 
this particular project of Derek Jarman’s films, Angelopoulos’ The Travel-
ling Players and another late twentieth century avant garde film, Alejandro 
Jodorowsky’s The Holy Mountain (1973).24 This influence was seen especial-
20  Pallidini (2015), pp. 17-36 (p. 18).
21  Tarr, Proppe (1976).
22  Myrsiades (2000), pp. 135-149 (p. 135).
23  Demopoulos, Liappas (2001), pp. 16-22 (p. 18).
24  The Oresteia at the Globe Theatre (2015).
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ly in Hannah Clark’s design. The similarity between the Chorus and Ange-
lopoulos’ Players in the film’s opening moments is very striking: a group of 
respectable but slightly down-at-heel men and women, sporting dark over-
coats, hats, and carrying suitcases. At an early moment in The Travelling 
Players, a Roman centurion makes an appearance, tailing two fascist officers 
down some public steps, while three of the Players proceed in the opposite 
direction. This uncanny and unremarked upon sighting of an ancient mili-
tary figure by people in the film narrative’s present proposes the continuity 
in modernity of older imperial struggles, and suggests a point of inspiration 
for the presentation of Agamemnon at the Globe. In the production’s final 
act, Athena’s courtroom took a psychedelic monochrome design, replete with 
black oval braziers and, for the jury, 1960s stools bearing iconic eye symbols. 
The goddess herself wore a long-sleeved and high-necked floor-length gown 
covered entirely in golden sequins – injecting a sense of divine glamour into 
the hitherto drab and crumbling situation. This final act of the production 
thus bore a clear visual affinity with the aesthetic of Jodorowsky’s film – a text 
that grapples with religious iconography, structures and systems of author-
ity and belief, and the ideological function of cinematic representation. But 
beyond visual referents, the logic of The Oresteia resonated strongly with An-
gelopoulos’ aim of thinking history dialectically through aesthetic form25. If, 
for Angelopoulos, the theatre was the ground of this thinking in the cinematic 
context, The Oresteia pursued its dialectical thinking through the juxtaposi-
tion of stage images – some of which, as I have described, were re-mediations 
of cinematic images – with the world of texture and sound it created in the 
Globe auditorium.
For The Oresteia, the vibrations of music, sound and silence in the space 
of the Globe proved critical. As Paige DuBois has argued, the genealogy of 
criticism addressing ancient tragedy has focused unduly on the plays as “por-
traits of individuals”.26 However, taking advantage of the Globe’s collectiviz-
ing architecture, this production undid any impetus to or focus on the heroic 
protagonist Orestes, and turned its attention instead to the group, the social 
body. The body is worth emphasizing, as it was precisely in an embodied mode 
that the production’s intervention was most affecting. The approach the pro-
duction took, punctuating the action throughout with music and sound, and 
during the scenes located in sacred sites, with incense smoke and haze, served 
25 Tarr, Proppe (1976).
26  DuBois (2004), pp. 63-81 (p. 65).
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to deepen its engagements with embodied historical experience. While the 
production’s narrative spoke of structural transformations, in performance it 
also asserted the sensate and co-present dimension of theatrical assembly, to 
sometimes contradictory effect.
For The Oresteia, composer and sound designer Mira Calix wrote acoustic 
instrumentation and choral compositions performed by its musicians, actors 
and choir. And against these compositions, she layered electronic sounds that 
strongly invoked the BBC Radiophonic Workshop – a small but hugely influ-
ential unit which produced futuristic electronic sound effects and music for 
the corporation’s experimental arts, education and children’s radio and televi-
sion programming between 1958 and 1998. As many attest, the distinctive au-
ral aesthetic of the Radiophonic Workshop is highly recognizable, especially 
to those who grew up hearing its compositions, and is redolent of a particular 
moment in public broadcasting.27 For one broadsheet critic of Calix’s earlier 
recordings, the “pebbles, insects and a studio cluttered with temperamental 
machines” used by Calix on her second album Skimsitta (2003) suggest that 
she “would have felt right at home alongside Delia Derbyshire in the BBC 
Radiophonic Workshop of the early 60s”.28 Derbyshire, famously, was instru-
mental in producing one of the Radiophonic Workshop’s most distinctive 
outputs, the theme tune to sci-fi television series Doctor Who (1963-date). 
Mark Fisher argued that the citation in 2000s electronica of the Radiophonic 
Workshop’s radical aesthetic represented a kind of oppositional nostalgia for 
twentieth century social democracy, and the “expectations raised by a public 
service broadcasting system and a popular culture that could be challenging 
and experimental”.29 But, for Fisher, its use in such music in the mid-2000s 
also appeared as a symptom of ideational and political exhaustion: in the face 
of the ‘end of history’ and global capitalism’s apparent victory, the ‘futuristic’ 
offered not radical potential but an ossified “established style”.30
As I interpret it, in The Oresteia, the combination of electronic sounds with 
non-electronic music and theatrical images did not represent a similar failure 
27  As Guardian critic Ed Miller puts it (2004, p. 23): “Its sound, imperceptibly, was 
thrust into the background of millions of British lives in shows such as John Craven’s 
Newsround, Tomorrow’s World and Blake’s 7. For many of us thirty-to-fiftysomethings, 
the BBC Radiophonic Workshop was the sound of our childhood”.
28  Empire (2003), p. 16.
29  Fisher (2012), pp. 16-24 (p. 18).
30  Fisher (2014), p. 9.
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of imagination regarding the future, but something rather more ambiguous.31 
While in other contexts the use of these sounds might have seemed like a nos-
talgic “formal attachment to the techniques and formulas of the past”,32 here 
they deepened the production’s attention to the historical and the mythic, 
and paradoxically enabled it implicitly to offer a reflection upon the future. 
Critical to this effect was the interaction of the sound design with the acous-
tic space of the Globe. One of the founding principles of the reconstructed 
Globe was to offer conditions for performance as close to those offered by the 
early modern theatre as it was possible to provide. Prior to the controversial 
first season of the Globe’ third artistic director Emma Rice in 2016, it made 
limited use of artificial light and sound.33 Instead, as stage manager and re-
searcher Linnéa Rowlatt puts it, it has been “a venue that eschews electrici-
ty”34 to prioritise natural light and sound. For The Oresteia, Calix negotiated 
unusual permission to use amplified sound in the theatre. She deployed a set 
of portable Bluetooth speakers, which were concealed in the costumes of the 
members of the chorus. Calix remarks that she treated the Bluetooth speaker 
“as an instrument”:35 
I really wanted that sound to come from the Greek chorus, and it’s only the Greek cho-
rus that have these units hidden in their costumes. So it actually feeds into that tradition 
of the Greek chorus being the musical element of the play.36
Paige DuBois refers to the performance, in ancient drama, of “choral song 
that is necessarily collective, diverse and heterogeneous”, and through its per-
formance, “its insistence on another place from which the tragedy addresses 
its audience”37 – that is, beyond the voice of the heroic protagonist. I read 
DuBois’ use of the word ‘place’ here as metaphoric, connoting an alternative 
dimension of communication. With its use of the portable speakers, this pro-
31  Fisher (2014), pp. 4-5, refers an account of the incidental music of British tele-
vision show Sapphire and Steel (1979-1982), whose construction takes a similar form: 
“a small ensemble of musicians (predominantly woodwind) with liberal use of electronic 
treatments”.
32  Fisher (2014), p. 11.
33  For some insight into the controversy, see Lukowski (2016).
34  Rowlatt (2013).
35  Bowers and Wilkins (2015).
36  Bowers and Wilkins (2015).
37  DuBois (2004), pp. 71, 64.
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duction recalled that dynamic – both in terms of the substance of the ‘speech 
act’, as it were, and also the speakers’ literal emplacement in the auditorium. 
During the run, actor Dean Nolan reflected that in performance “there are 
moments when we walk in as a Chorus – we walk through the audience and 
suddenly they’re like: ‘where’s this sound coming from?!’”38 The commingling 
of the Chorus with the audience and the sound emanating unpredictably from 
their bodies thus offered a twenty-first century aesthetic manifestation of the 
ancient choral emphasis on the collective. And, in the final act, members of 
the Borough Market Choir played Athena’s jury. They were dressed in simi-
larly workaday costumes as the Chorus in the first two acts of the play. As they 
filed onto the stage, they intoned a choral song. But for the majority of the 
scene, they were completely silent. They ultimately delivered their votes on 
paper slips to a receptacle in the middle of the stage. Given the richness of the 
texture of sound throughout the production, the silence of these characters 
during the enactment of the trial was conspicuous, with the effect of drawing 
attention to the limits and context of the individual juror’s ‘voice’.
As an audience member in the yard, the effect of the sound design was un-
usually pervasive and creepy. The performance was not restricted to the stage 
platform, but amongst us in a way that felt surprising; the textures of the stage 
world were physically proximate to us, reinforced by the production’s consis-
tent use of heavy incense smoke and haze. Bruce R. Smith shows that the mate-
riality of Shakespeare’s Globe lends itself to this particular distribution of sound 
and its engagement of its audience in the yard as unregimented assembly:
In a cylindrical structure like the Globe, open at the top with nothing for soundwaves 
to strike against and closed at the bottom with highly absorbent material in the form of 
human bodies, sound waves would have been reflected mainly from side to side, not top to 
bottom. The result would have been a ‘broad’ as opposed to a ‘round’ sound. […] Perform-
ers in the reconstructed Globe in London have commented on the way audience response 
can start in one part of the theatre and spread laterally to the rest. The experience of broad 
sound comes not only from the actors onstage but from one’s fellow auditors.39
In other words, the spatial context of the Globe provides an environment 
in which sound can spread contagiously. The Oresteia’s “‘voyage in time and 
space’”40 and its reflection on collective sociality was thus effectuated through 
38  Bowers and Wilkins (2015).
39  Smith (1999), pp. 213-214.
40  Tarr, Proppe (1976).
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a theatrical combination of image, texture and sound – with sound in partic-
ular offering a haunting meta-representational echo of cultural production 
of the recent past. For this reason, as I watched, I began to understand the 
production in terms of science fiction – a speculative genre of course deeply 
concerned with such voyages. This effect became intensified in the final act, 
with the appearance of the zombie-like Furies and Athena’s court as a glitter-
ing dream-like domain. It was not the future that was being addressed in this 
mode, but the past – familiar signifiers being used for an unfamiliar purpose, 
to solidify in our minds a deep sense of our estrangement from the ancient – 
alien – world of the play, while at the same time, a sense of shared experience 
of assembly as a social body in the present. 
At the beginning of the final act, the Pythia, Apollo’s high priestess, gives 
a direct address to the audience on the theme of devotion to the gods. It is 
made not in terror of the consequences of Orestes’ murderous actions, as in 
Aeschylus’ text, but about the fragility of political balance in the present, to an 
imagined secular theatre audience now unconcerned with the “old gods” and 
“the temples”.41 It might be thought as sabotage to the production’s dialecti-
cal mode, and a moment of didacticism. Following a very well received gag 
about unused churches as prime real estate (“They’re huge, almost empty, 
and in really good locations”),42 the priestess says:
It only takes 
A hot thought to steal into someone’s head 
To start a revolution
It only takes a vote to go one way
For those in charge to dismantle all your rights.
So what then? When the universe’s curtain
Twitches and rips, and blood boils up again,
What then? […]
So don’t dismiss the temples, keep them safe.
For there shall come a time when you shall know
The old gods are not dead, they’re just… asleep.43
However, the performance did not finish with this moment, but instead its 
carnivalesque celebration of democracy, making of the Pythia’s speech not a 
41  The Oresteia, Adapted by Rory Mullarkey (2015), pp. 89-90.
42  The Oresteia, Adapted by Rory Mullarkey (2015), p. 89.
43  The Oresteia, Adapted by Rory Mullarkey (2015), pp. 89-90.
LOUISE OWEN
128
summary exhortation but a position taken in dialogue with others. 
As darkness began to fall, and the performance ended, I understood the 
show’s argument to have been this: in the context of economic crisis, where 
notions of “political fatality”44 authenticate brutal cuts, social democratic 
structures should be defended. However, then and there – wherever then and 
there were – they were not yet good enough, the aim of providing a system 
“for those in charge / And for those most vulnerable in our society”45 being 
laudable, but predicated on fundamental inequality. The production brought 
forward the gendered antagonism that is at the heart of Aeschylus’ drama 
of justice and democracy. Viewed in the context of this production, Thomas’ 
utopian desire to use the Globe as a space for “‘political expression’”46 for 
me connoted not a naïve commitment to theatre as a space of democratic 
engagement.47 Instead, it seemed to engage with what Nicholas Ridout com-
mends in his discussion of this theme: a “politics of theatre, in which the 
form’s entanglement with the constitution of political relations is exposed”.48 
The key aspect for me in this regard was its use of the materials of theatre – 
narrative, image, sound, and the gathering of bodies in space to watch and be 
watched – to play with historical time. It shuttled backwards and forwards in 
time with the use of cinematic and broadcast cultural references, asserting 
a dialogue between theatre and other modes of representation. In doing so, 
it challenged the ubiquitous and politicized narrative of crisis that “affects 
both the individual and the collective body by imposing a continuity of time 
perception: defining the present as a perpetual falling towards its end”.49 It 
also refused an analogous dynamic, which Margherita Laera refers to as the 
“mechanism of the classical”,50 which imagines canonical texts as universally 
relevant and applicable to contemporary concerns, thereby obliterating cul-
tural and historical difference. At the same time, it drew clear and explicit 
attention to the transhistorical purchase of patriarchal social relations. The 
44  Pallidini (2015), p. 19.
45  The Oresteia, Adapted by Rory Mullarkey (2015), p. 105. Athena’s subsequent plea 
to the Furies to “help us war down all our foreign foes / In just conflicts, to bring peace to 
the world / To civilise the planet, bring our better systems / To those who need them” (p. 
107) articulates the imperial feminism critiqued by Hester Eisenstein (2009).
46  Tonkin (2015).
47  Ridout (2008), pp. 11-22 (p. 15).
48  Ridout (2008), p. 19.
49  Pallidini (2015), p. 19.
50  Laera (2015).
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Oresteia’s iconoclastic yet deeply serious approach to Aeschylus approached 
time as recursive, and audience members, gathered together for a moment in 
time to witness the performance, not as a singular unit locked irretrievably 
in a given set of circumstances but a differentiated group. For this nuanced, 
aesthetically complex and entertaining version of The Oresteia to have been 
staged at the Globe, mounting a critical feminist defence of collective sociali-
ty, marked a moment.
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REPRESENTATION OF THE CRISIS VS
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY IN ITALY
Roberta Calvano
1. The European constitutional systems’ reactions to the crisis
In the last few years a big debate has developed in the social sciences 
over the impact of the international financial crisis on the European Union 
and its Members States. This was just one aspect of a wider discussion over 
the dominance of neoliberal theory in the western political and economic 
arena, and especially in the European integration process. The legal pro-
file of this debate concerns mainly the impact of the crisis on EU Member 
States’ Constitutional systems, together with the peculiar aspects of an-
ti-crisis measures adopted by the EU institutions. The aim of this paper is 
to offer a small contribution to this debate from the Italian Constitutional 
point of view, by looking at it from the perspective of a Representativity 
versus Representation dichotomy. 
One of the main questions I would like to address concerns the effects of 
the crisis on the functioning of the Italian government framework. Constitu-
tional law scholars have for decades been studying the difficulties and frag-
mentation of the Italian constitutional and political system, widely considered 
way too inefficient and unstable in comparison to other western democracies. 
This structural weakness of the Italian political system, as could be easily pre-
dicted, has made Italy a sitting target for international financial speculation. 
Since 2011 this element has been influencing its democratic process, which is 
being limited by the constant threat of financial speculation. This is one of the 
reasons why, when the 2008-2009 economic crisis exploded, it could not but 
deepen the gap existing among Italy and other larger and richer EU member 
States, generating strong international pressure on the Italian Government 
regarding the level of public debt. At the end of 2011, this pressure led to the 
resignation of the Italian Prime Minister and its Government and the birth of 
a new Government guided by Mario Monti. 
Since then, political developments not only in Italy, but also in Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, and lately in other Member States, seem to show that the 
international financial crisis is at the root of a transformation concerning not 
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only the functioning of the constitutional frameworks in European democra-
cies, but the effectiveness of fundamental principles of the EU Treaty. 
Though several interesting EU law questions could be raised concerning 
the EU reaction to the crisis, the EU institutional actors involved, and the der-
ogation to some important rules of the Treaty, the main focus of this analysis 
is on compliance with some fundamental rules of the Italian Constitution of 
1948. As I will briefly recall in my conclusions, however, other members of 
the Union are also being affected by this process, as shown by the European 
Parliament elections in the first place, and then by those in Austria, France, 
Germany and by the British referendum on EU membership (Brexit).
2. Italian and European integration, constitutional developments and the 
representation versus representativity problem
Most scholars and observers converge on the idea that government sta-
bility has been a serious problem since the birth of the Italian Republic. Nev-
ertheless, throughout the first fifty years of the Republic the Parliamentary 
majority and the Government have been firmly held by one party – Chris-
tian democrats and its allies – and the following period has seen the pre-
dominance of a party led by the notorious tycoon, Silvio Berlusconi. Thus the 
frequent changes of Government seem to depend mainly on the nature and 
character of Italian parties, their internal conflicts and the dialectic among 
different factions. This issue however hardly appears in the discussion on 
governmental stability, which often shifts to finding the perfect solution, a 
sort of panacea, in a comprehensive Constitutional reform. 
Constitutional Reform has then become some kind of utopia, being dis-
cussed and pursued over the last three decades, while the highly fragment-
ed political system and the loss of political parties’ legitimacy after the huge 
“Tangentopoli” bribery scandal, affecting the political system as a whole, led 
to some remarkable legislative reforms. Above all, the 1993 bill, transform-
ing the electoral system into a majority model abolishing voting preferences, 
started a major development with a spillover effect on the Constitutional sys-
tem of government as a whole. 
The ‘90s saw a gradual transformation of the Italian form of government 
with consequences involving not only the political structure of the system, but 
also economic and regional development. This process, together with the ac-
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celerating transfer of competences to the EU after the Maastricht Treaty, in-
creasingly involving national Governments rather than Parliaments, further 
impoverished the role of the Italian Parliament, which was intended to be 
major in the Constitutional architecture. Since the nineties, it has to be add-
ed, the abuse of governmental legislative powers regulated by art. 76 and 77 
Const. helped contribute to the marginalization of parliamentary legislation.
Looking at the issue in a wider perspective, it has to be recalled that sev-
eral studies concerning the European integration process from a legal point 
of view show quite well how the Maastricht Treaty and the following Treaties 
have been pushing towards an ever stronger role for national governments 
in the European Union. This trend has been moving the center of gravity of 
Member States’ constitutional systems in the direction of stronger Executives 
and, again, towards the risk of a consequent weakening of Parliaments. Italy 
is one of the clearest examples of this process, the Government being the only 
actor deeply involved in legislative procedures in the EU, due to a certain 
underestimation of regional and national parliamentary powers in the EU 
decision making procedures.
While this process emerged, the EU institutional framework was evolving 
towards a greater role for the European Parliament, together with an increas-
ing transfer of powers to the European Union due to the changes in EU Trea-
ties. As has already been said, the transfer inevitably led to a loss in the role 
of representative bodies – at both local and national level – inside members 
States’ constitutional systems. EU architecture has for decades privileged in-
tergovernmental cooperation (not only in the second and the third pillar), 
and a similar trend has been recently confirmed by EU anti-crisis measures1. 
All these elements have resulted in an inevitable transformation in the bal-
ance among constitutional institutions – in other words the marginalization 
of national Parliaments. 
Lack of transparency is another consequence of this process. The Council 
of the EU discussions, as a rule, are not public. The Council meets in a public 
session only when it discusses or votes on a proposal for a legislative act2, 
whereas the influence of comitology and lobbies representing big corpora-
1  Such as the EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility), agreed by the Council of 
the European Union on 9 May 2010, with the objective of preserving financial stability 
in Europe, or the ESM (European Stability Mechanism) intergovernmental treaty estab-
lished on 2 February 2012.
2  In these cases, the meeting agenda includes a ‘legislative deliberation’ part.
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tions and financial interests has been censured ever since the birth of the 
integration process. Due to this character of the EU decision making process, 
national Governments often engage in a blind shift game, blaming “Brussels” 
for all the unpopular EU choices they helped approve. We are all familiar with 
public statements by prime ministers, which can be summed up as “Europe 
asks for it”. How this practice in public discourse affects the responsiveness of 
European Governments towards Parliaments can be easily imagined.
European integration affects many aspects of constitutional systems in 
several different ways. Legal sources, judicial protection of constitutional 
rights, public services are all strongly influenced by EU law. They all now 
seem to be hit by negative effects of the crisis, spreading from the economic 
to the institutional sphere and showing the inherent weakness of the EU ar-
chitecture, which had been hidden by prosperity and economic growth during 
the golden era of the integration process. 
In such a scenario, marked by the fast spread of populist parties in Europe 
and reaching its highest point in the European Elections of 20143, the main 
difficulty for national Governments seems to be the matter of communication 
with an impoverished and angry electorate. Imitating the sirens of populism 
has become a big temptation for traditional parties, and part of this game 
passes through public declarations, social media and a “representation” of po-
litical decisions not always corresponding to their actual content. Some clear 
examples of these tendencies can be found in the Italian experience, where 
provisions adopted with legislative measures are often preannounced even 
before they are written (urgent decrees are often implemented by approving 
only the cover, which is disclosed to the press, while the act itself is then pub-
lished in the official journal only several weeks later). The constitutional re-
form bill approved in 2016 can be considered another remarkable example of 
this practice. Its title (referring to measures aimed at a “reducing the costs of 
politics and the number of members of Parliament”) seems clearly designed 
to put a “good gloss” on the set of measures (gathered in 47 articles) that citi-
zens then rejected in the constitutional referendum of December 2016. 
3  Since that election, the French Front National and the British UKIP are the most 
represented French and British parties in the European Parliament, and the M5S move-
ment is the second largest Italian party. This tendency has since then continued, and Front 
National seems ready to contest the next Presidency of the Fifth Republic, while the Italian 
M5S is set to challenge the primacy of the Democratic Party in the 2018 political elections.
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3. The Italian answer to the crisis: “reforms” by urgent decrees
Urgent decrees offer a very good example of the impact that the financial 
crisis produced on the representativity versus representation issue under dis-
cussion. 
As a result of the difficulties arising from the crisis and the serious threat 
of an attack on the Italian public debt on financial markets, as previously 
mentioned, Prime Minister Berlusconi, (who at that time was leader of the 
majority party and member of the Parliament) was forced to resign during the 
XVI Legislature and a new Government was appointed. The appointment of 
an economist and former European Commissioner as President of the Coun-
cil, quite clearly on the basis of his technical competence and Brussels’ appre-
ciation of his name as he was not member of any political party, was quite an 
innovation in the context of the traditional “Westminster system” and side-
lined some of its basic rules.4
When the new Government took office in November 2011, it presented to 
the Houses of the Italian Parliament a political program entirely focused on 
a series of measures related to the economic situation. The main instrument 
in this phase, since then largely prevailing over regular legislation, despite 
two rotations of the Government helm, was urgent decree, regulated by art. 
77 Const. While the use and abuse of the instrument had steadily grown in 
previous legislatures, from 2011 onwards the scale of the problem of abuse 
of urgent decrees increased even further and their content shows distinctive 
features that we shall try to analyze in the following pages.
One aspect of these legislative acts deserves to be pointed out in the first 
place. The contents of these measures correspond, to a large extent, to those 
listed in the letter sent in August of 2011 by the outgoing and incoming Gover-
nors of the ECB to the Italian Premier Berlusconi5. Momentarily leaving aside 
the constitutional (and fractious) issue of the real political source of norma-
tive acts in this phase, we have to linger on the vehicle used to marshal them 
in the Italian legal system, the already mentioned urgent decrees.
The preambles of these acts must state the reasons of necessity and urgen-
cy functioning as their constitutional legal basis. (art. 77 Const. allows these 
4  Sen. Monti had been appointed “senatore a vita” only a few days before his new task 
as the chief of the Executive.
5  The letter can be read on the website of Corriere della Sera: Draghi and Trichet 
(2011); on the subject see Olivito (2014). 
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acts only if on “casi straordinari di necessità e urgenza” – under extraordinary 
and urgent circumstances). It ought to be underlined on this subject that, 
during the last few years, these circumstances are assumed to be constantly 
standing because of the crisis, as if it the crisis itself could permanently legit-
imize Government legislation. A legislation going outside of its constitutional 
limits, and overflowing the normal scope of Government competence, both in 
quantity and quality one could say.
These acts are important both for their scale (the number of the provi-
sions they contain)6, and because they relate to matters which would require 
stable regulation over time, so as to be necessarily approved after an appro-
priate parliamentary debate among all political parties. These measures often 
have highly dishomogeneous content. (e.g IMU – Banca d’Italia decree No. 
133/2013, introducing rules about the proprietorship of the treasure of the 
Italian Central Bank together with home taxation abolishment, but well re-
nowned also for the hasty approval of the Parliamentary bill confirming it, 
through the so called “guillotine” clause, arousing sharp indignation among 
the Parliamentary minority).
Beyond the question of the content of such urgent decrees, which raised 
substantial and procedural issues at the same time, certain rules need legis-
lative procedure guarantees, (art. 72 c. 6 and 77 Const.), whereas the way the 
Parliament interpreted its task to convert them into statutes provoked other 
constitutional complaints.
The regularity with which a precise sequence occurs at this stage does not 
seem to show significant exceptions. The resolution of the decree is followed 
by the presentation of a maxi-amendment to the bill proposal by the Govern-
ment, presenting at the same time a “questione di fiducia”. Such “questioni 
di fiducia” are instruments governed by Italian parliamentary regulations, in-
volving the Government’s commitment to resign in the case of rejection of a 
bill, with a blackmail effect of the majority by its Government.
This way, the role of the parliamentary debate is diminished, to the point 
that any possibility of impact on the measures taken by the representative 
institution par excellence is cleared out.
An important aspect of this legislation deserves to be underlined as it con-
6  Interesting analysis developed in relation with the number of columns in the official 
journal, compared to the past. See this data by Cimino, Morettini, Piccirilli, (2013), pp. 
59ff. Since 2006-2010, when 95% of spending through parliamentary decisions was delib-
erated by urgent decree, the data trend has worsened. Lippolis (2011), p. 22.
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tributes to compromising its quality and efficacy. The role of parliamentary 
commissions involved in converting urgent decrees into parliamentary stat-
utes has been diminished by the fact that, as anti-crisis measures, they were 
assigned mainly to the budget commission, with other competent Commis-
sions being only consulted. Due to the heterogeneous content of the decrees, 
up to ten Commissions would have been involved. The inevitable consequence 
is merely superficial examination of the measures of the disciplines being ap-
proved but meant to produce an impact on the economic situation. Because 
of the poor quality of the technical elaboration of these acts, this effect could 
not always be assured.
Another interesting feature of this governmental activity should be under-
lined. At the beginning of the XVII legislature the Government took account 
of the huge backlog consisting of the implementing measures of urgent de-
crees overdue (those regarding decrees approved by Mr. Monti Government 
amounted to 832). A majority of the provisions adopted urgently because of 
the crisis and which thereafter pressured the constitutional limits of legisla-
tive process, were not self-executing and needed regulation to allow them to 
be implemented. 
On December 2013, the percentage of Governmental acts already imple-
mented was 38% (more than 50% of them by the Mr. Monti Government, 
12% by the following Government chaired by Letta). In that same month, the 
Budget act referred to 117 implementing measures.7
The desire to portray what was unfolding as an incisive action against the 
crisis, and perhaps the desire to reassure markets, appeared to be at the basis 
of the work of the Government, but also of the Parliament. All this, however, 
seems to have triggered phenomena detrimental to political representative-
ness. A decision-making process increasingly secluded from public debate 
and influenced by international financial markets, in which, however, an in-
ability to meet the economic challenges of the emergency prevailed.
4. Representative democracy vs representation in political party financing
A particularly interesting area in which a similar trend can be detected 
is the regulation of party funding adopted by Decree Law No. 149 of 2013, 
whose conversion into law was signed by Prime Minister Letta on February 
7  See Pitruzzella (2013); Calvano (2014).
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21, 2014, on the last day of his tenure. Not only its contents, but also the for-
mal procedures followed are interesting, in light of what has been briefly re-
ported regarding the practices of parliamentary proceedings during the XVI 
Legislature. This case provides in fact a further opportunity for reflection on 
the distortion suffered by the constitutional system in relation to the crisis. 
Its emergence seems to have produced the need to give visible – rather than 
effective – answers to problems. 
The regulation in question had been initially presented as an ordinary bill, 
and had already been passed in the House. Then, during the examination by 
the Constitutional Affairs Committee of the Senate, the Government sudden-
ly withdrew the bill approving an urgent decree with the same content. The 
unexpected removal of the measure from the Senate and the will to circum-
vent the parliamentary debate was evident in this case and seems highly sig-
nificant, especially considering the content of the regulation then approved. 
The decree is headed “Abolishment of parties’ direct public funding”. It in-
troduces a regulation which will fully apply from 2017, based on the matching 
of two forms of indirect public funding, for parties seeking to be included in a 
public registry by respecting certain formal requirements in parties’ internal 
regulatory arrangements. 
It is therefore required that party organizations respect a minimum reg-
ulation aimed at promoting the democratic processes as set out in art. 49 
Const., as a condition for access to the indirect financing tools, which will 
therefore continue to burden the State budget
The bill allowed public financing for four financial years, providing for a 
gradual reduction thereafter. From 2017 the new regulation allows parties to 
be eligible under the terms provided by law, to get 2‰ of income tax from 
those citizens who choose to act in their favor.
In addition, donations by individuals, permitted up to a maximum of one 
hundred thousand euros per year, will be encouraged by the deduction of 
26% from income tax, provided the donations are kept within a maximum of 
thirty thousand euro per year. 
The preamble of the decree states the constitutional urgency basis thereof, 
motivated by the need to respond to the demands of austerity at a time of cri-
sis with reference to political customs.8 The regulation seems to be quite un-
suitable both to implement the democratic method the Constitution requests 
for parties and to revitalize the role of political mediation between society and 
8  See Dickmann (2014).
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the representative institutions which seems rather tarnished, especially in the 
Italian constitutional and political experience of the last three decades. 
As seems quite clear, the Italian crisis is not only an economic phenome-
non but also a regime crisis. A crisis of representative bodies and a crisis of 
the political party system. 
One may wonder then if the answer to this state of affairs can be found by 
stiffening financial budget standards through austerity measures and com-
pressing participation and social rights, as the new provisions suggest, in-
stead of stimulating a renewal of the democratic circuit.
 
5. “Public consultation” and decision-making in the school reform bill
The relationship between what has been defined as the “sovereign debt 
crisis”, and the increasing welfare state cuts already taking place in Europe, 
had one of its main turning points in the Greek crisis. The first raft of mea-
sures imposed by the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF in 2012 
had triggered the objections of workers and pensioners unions. The Europe-
an Committee of social rights of the Council of Europe thus condemned those 
measures as illegitimate in relation to their purpose, having unnecessarily 
squeezed rights to wages, retirement and study. In this regard, it must be 
held that the imposition of conditions for access to international financial aid 
for States in difficulty cannot justify any kind of measure that is restrictive of 
social rights. The EU Treaty dispositions on social rights, in fact, request its 
institutions to comply with democratic procedures when they set procedural 
obligations to take such measures, and to show the proportionality of mea-
sures and the absence of better alternatives for the protection of social rights.9 
Although the contrast between social rights and welfare reforms intro-
duced in Italy has not yet reached the dramatic levels seen in Greece or in 
Portugal, the Italian experience of the last few years shows a series of gov-
ernmental actions developing in the same direction, in accordance with the 
constitutional revision of article 81. Even in this context, the Government 
seems to have replaced the representative democratic process with its own 
representation, using mechanisms and marketing techniques that have been 
referred to in previous pages and that this article tries to describe.
9  Decisions by the European Committee can be read at http://hudoc.esc.coe.int. On 
the European Social Charter see Russo (2013).
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Thirty billion Euros of national health budget cuts in five years is the first 
chapter in this story,10 but the linear cuts in these years also concerned edu-
cation, assistance to the disabled, social security and the University system. 
In this framework, the salary freeze in the public sector is a measure en-
abling the State to recover a large amount of resources, requiring a major 
financial sacrifice to civil servants. This sacrifice was not “represented” in the 
sphere of public discourse, whereas the media often devalues civil servants. 
In such a social and political scenario, the mantra “Europe asks for it” is 
consistently cited, even before the Constitutional Court when it was called on 
to review the constitutional compatibility of the salary freeze of academics. 
The contested provision was defined before the Court as one of the “cooling 
mechanisms of public sector wage growth demanded of the Italian State di-
rectly by the EU”11, thus recalling not a directive or the EU Treaty, but the 
letter by Mr. Trichet and Mr. Draghi, referred to above, concerning the need 
to reduce the ratio of GDP and public deficit in Italy.
On the subject of education, the public representation of a listening proce-
dure involving the world of education (teachers, school administrators, fami-
lies, students) through the dialogue process activated online by the Ministry of 
Education on its website is worth mentioning12. This can be considered quite a 
good example of how the representative process is being twisted to the needs of 
political communication. The democratic debate in Parliament has been eluded, 
as the discussion and deliberation of the bill concerning the school system (the 
so called “buona scuola” approved with law No. 107 del 2015), was cut off by the 
Government, calling on its majority to approve a “questione di fiducia” (involv-
ing the Government commitment to resign in case of rejection) on a single arti-
cle consisting of 212 subparagraphs that had no heading and was thus illegible. 
The reflection on media representation vs representative democracy finds 
a very good case study in this bill. In fact, its immediate consequences already 
show what awful results such legislation techniques can produce. The bill del-
egates to future legislation the solution of some of the urgent problems, such 
as teachers’ recruitment, while its hastily approved regulation is already fail-
ing its objectives as many applicative difficulties are arising and disputes are 
being brought to courtrooms.
10  These are the data collected by CGIL (Italian largest syndicate).
11  This sentence is part of the plaidoyant by the State defense in the case for judicial 
review by the Constitutional Court ruled with decision No. 310/2013.
12  The website https://labuonascuola.gov.it/ can still be visited online.
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Despite endless application issues raised by the teachers’ recruitment pro-
cedures, (due to the abuse of successive fixed-term employment contracts in 
violation of EU law and the connected infringement procedure and ECJ rul-
ing in the Mascolo case13), the bill is now being spoken of as a commendable 
stabilization of tens of thousands of temporary teachers. Less publicity was 
given to the fact that teachers’ recruitment procedures in Italy were compul-
sory due to the judgment rendered by the Court of Justice on November 2014.
The dichotomy of representativity vs representation regarding welfare re-
forms in Italy is quite remarkably evident in the labor market reform too. 
A harsh debate has raged between the Government, INPS (National Social 
Security Institute) and ISTAT (National Institute of Statistics) since summer 
2015, concerning unemployment data after entry into force of the so-called 
job’s act (a 2015 bill reforming the labor market), the flagship measure and 
the reforms demanded by the European institutions of the Italian Govern-
ment since 2011 aimed at making workers’ guarantees more flexible in order 
to stimulate new employment. 
Unlike the data published by the Ministry of Labor and INPS, those dis-
closed by the National Institute of Statistics in fact showed a decline in em-
ployment, and a progressive deterioration of the quality of wage labor in our 
country in terms of salary levels and guarantees of stability.14 Figures are not 
improving, and no amazing effect seems to be developing as a consequence of 
a measure whose efficacy, according to labor law scholars, will show through 
and be apt for evaluation only on a long term basis.
In this area too, however, it does not seem incorrect to say that we are 
witnessing a phenomenon of predominance of the representation of the re-
sponses to the crisis, while political representative bodies seem to have been 
ousted from the scenario of the most crucial decisions of this phase.
6. Constitutional case law and the public debt crisis: the Constitutional Court’s 
control over the financial implications of its rulings
The crisis of political representation and the inertia of national legislators 
in the face of the need for protection of social rights initially shifted the em-
13  ECJ, ruling in C-22/13, November 26, 2014.
14  Worrying figures by Istat can be found on Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Istat, 
http://www.istat.it/it.
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phasis onto the role of the courts, and especially the constitutional courts. 
To many, they seem to be in the best position to be entrusted with a rebirth 
of rights in Europe. Those who do not share this optimistic “Court-centered” 
view highlight the necessity to emphasize that only a revitalization of the po-
litical representation circuits might be able to bring pluralistic democracies 
back to their task of safeguarding fundamental social rights. Even at a time of 
economic crisis. The preservation of the heritage of European constitution-
alism, in which theoretical reflection leads us to prefer political representa-
tion to the representation, is not the only issue involved. Though, in the last 
decade the tendency of many scholars to endow Courts with a messianic role 
has spread widely. However, from a more pragmatic point of view, it has to 
be said that an attitude more attentive to the effectiveness of the instruments 
of protection, paired with a knowledge of Italian Constitutional Court case 
law, as well as that of supranational courts, does not allow us to indulge in 
enthusiasm about it, but demands continued advocacy for judicial creativity. 
The Constitutional Court has in recent years developed case law quite 
critical of the abuse of legal sources by the government which was censored 
above. It finally handed down a true “condemnation” in judgment no. 32 of 
2014. In that case, the court was called to rule on the legality of provisions 
introduced in a conversion law, without any correlation to those posed in the 
urgent decree, “aimed at implementing a radical and comprehensive reform 
of the Statute on Narcotic Drugs”. The Court blamed the dishomogeneous 
maxi-amendment practice and its impact on legislative procedures and the 
role of Parliament. According to the Constitutional Court, “due to the ‘locked’ 
vote effect that the ‘questione di fiducia’ produces under current parliamen-
tary procedures, any possible intervention on the text presented by the Gov-
ernment was prevented”. It then remarked on the importance of “keeping 
within the constitutional framework the institutional relations between the 
Government, Parliament and President of the Republic in legislative perfor-
mance”. With similar harshness, it ruled on the electoral system in decision 
No. 1 of 2014 (despite numerous procedural obstacles that could have led it 
to rule the question as inadmissible) as if to unblock a system jammed by the 
party crisis. Despite the courage shown by the Constitutional Court in these 
areas, its case law does not seem to have produced any change in the practice 
of the constitutional organs on these issues. 
Actually, the same mechanisms provided for in the electoral system and 
declared unconstitutional in 2014 were reproduced, in good part, in the reg-
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ulation then approved in 2015. However, in the field of fundamental rights, 
the attitude of the Constitutional Court in its case law was quite different 
compared to what we found in the area of constitutional adjudication on the 
configuration of constitutional organs and procedures. The Court’s courage 
seems to come to an end in the numerous cases regarding the protection of 
social rights, with rulings in the last few years on compliance with the golden 
rule set out in the new article 81 Const and the risk of its case law determining 
an impact on the State budget15. 
The Constitutional Court’s self-perception seems to have changed during 
these years of crisis. It no longer seems to see its role as one of Constitutional 
guarantee of social rights, as the case law of the Court in 2015 shows. Several 
were the cases in which declaring a legislative act void would have a signifi-
cant impact on public finance. Among the other examples, it is worth recall-
ing controversial ruling No. 10 of 2015 concerning the Robin tax, in which 
the Constitutional Court made an almost unprecedented choice, limiting the 
retroactive effects of its ruling of unconstitutionality. Such a judicial tech-
nique is not explicitly allowed in the regulation of the effects of constitutional 
judgments. The Court has chosen to produce this result contra or praeter 
legem to limit the financial impact of the decision, by creating a balance with 
the new art. 81 Const. – a constitutional amendment approved by large ma-
jority in 2012 – and the Constitutional principles involved in the judgement. 
A gradual implementation of constitutional values in a case requiring consid-
erable expenses to the State budget, as the Court pointed out, was necessary 
“a fortiori after the introduction of the principle of a balanced budget in the 
Constitution, which reaffirmed the need to respect the principles of balancing 
of the budget and public debt sustainability”. For this reason, it ruled to stop 
the “effects of the provisions declared unlawful from the day of publication 
of this Decision in the Official Journal of the Republic.” This is not the place 
to fully examine the content of the question of constitutionality, but only to 
note the technique used for the first time. This ruling elevated the role of the 
constitutional norm of budget balancing to that of a kind of super-principle, 
laying the groundwork, or at least that is the outcome to be feared, for a neg-
ative evolution in terms of protection of social rights. It should however be 
remarked that the obligation not to apply the rule, declared void following a 
decision on the constitutionality of the Court, does not ensue from a principle 
15  We have already mentioned one of the many decisions rejecting constitutional is-
sues related to the wage freeze in the public sector.
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but from a precise constitutional rule and, as such, is not liable to balancing 
operations with other constitutional principles. 
Even more remarkable was the “sequel” of Ruling No. 70 of 2015 of the 
Constitutional Court, censuring the freeze on pensions revaluation. The 
“courage” of the Court in declaring this measure unconstitutional, with a de-
cision that could have a significant financial impact on the state budget, did 
not give the expected result. The Government approved an urgent decree in 
order to execute the ruling, and in fact only partly implemented the decision, 
citing reasons arising from EU legislation and the possible financial impact of 
the decision.16 Again, the exceptional nature of the crisis cancelled the basic 
rules on the normal functioning of the constitutional system, both in relation 
to the government’s intervention in implementing a judgment, and to gradu-
ating the protection of individual fundamental rights.
Finally, with ruling No. 178 of 2015 concerning the suspension of the 
Unions’ collective bargaining system, the Constitutional Court again estab-
lished limits to the retroactive effects of its decision. This time it ruled that 
these effects should begin from January 1 2015, due to the occurrence of the 
censured facts. 
The extension of the suspension of collective bargaining established by 
the budget act for 2015 is qualified by the Court as a decisive change in the 
regulatory framework under consideration. This change seems apt to render 
the reviewed regulation limiting rights acceptable, if temporally limited (rea-
sonable), and intolerable if excessively prolonged over time and (no longer) 
compatible with the Constitution.
The question as to why this effect did not appear at the time of the entry into 
force of the Budget act, but only since January 2015 seems worth considering. 
The Court’s concern about the financial impact of its rulings seems to make it less 
steadfast in applying procedural rules. This case shows how it is certainly more 
appropriate to keep the courts away from such concerns, such as those regard-
ing compliance with art. 81, involving an overly severe discretionary and politi-
cal evaluation, which is likely to undermine the legitimacy of the Constitutional 
Court. It has to be underlined again how necessary it is for a return to political 
decision making taken in the proper representative institutions. Decisions would 
thus be accompanied by a public debate and all other procedural safeguards, 
making them more reliable. In other words, the “old way” seems to be the only 
way out for issues that the crisis has raised in representative democracies.
16  On this story Esposito (2015).
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7. Some short concluding remarks
Similar reflections may be developed in relation to the process taking 
place within the European Union regarding the coordination of the economic 
policy of the member States of the euro area in recent years17. It is impossible 
in these last few lines to perform a sufficiently thoroughly analysis that the 
complexity of the issue requires, but we can at least remember how the crisis 
has caught the EU institutions unprepared, notwithstanding the economic 
policy competences regulated in the EU Treaty. It gives the EU coordinating 
competence in this area (setting a no bail-out clause in par. 125 TFEU), but it 
also establishes, in the fiscal compact and in several previous acts, hard bud-
get constraints that have strangled the economies of some Member States. 
In this context, as said earlier, national governments are often encour-
aged towards unaccountable and non-transparent attitudes by the opacity 
of supranational decision-making processes, allowing them to blame “Brus-
sels” for the unpopular measures resulting from decisions taken by the EU, 
to which they may have contributed decisively. It is to be believed that at that 
level some crucial matters should be solved if we want to go back to a correct 
representation corresponding to a system of representative institutions.18
This seems the only way to counteract the rising wave of populism, a trend 
which in just the last three years has made parties such as UKIP and Front 
National the leading British and French groupings in the European Parlia-
ment and has allowed the Brexit referendum to undermine European integra-
tion. Such phenomena, as well as the rise of extreme right xenophobic parties, 
as witnessed in the 2016 Austrian and German elections, can be overcome 
only by a more transparent and democratic functioning of EU institutions. 
Such a result can be obtained only by starting here and now a debate on a new 
Reform of the Treaty, bringing Europe back to its original track.
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THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BREXIT
AND IMMIGRATION1
Lucia Barbone, Erik Longo
1. Introduction
During the campaign for the EU membership Referendum in Britain2, a 
decisive focus was put on EU immigration and its social and economic con-
sequences by both sides3. A particular emphasis was laid on the possibility of 
regaining control of national borders and solving the issues related to access 
to welfare benefits. The threat posed by foreigners has strongly influenced 
the public anti-EU sentiment4, more than other factors such as consideration 
of the potential loss of a national identity5. One key message from the poll’s 
result is that migration and the free movement of persons are closely linked 
to the political and economic destinies of the country. 
Therefore, the victory of the ‘Leave’ side suggests that at least some of the 
British voters were motivated by anti-immigration feelings6, and that the 
1  Albeit its unitary conception, Lucia Barbone drafted Sections 4, 5, and 6, while Erik 
Longo drafted the other Sections.
2  51.9 percent of votes were in favour of leaving the EU. The question of the Referen-
dum was “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave 
the European Union?”. The referendum turnout was 71.8 percent, with more than 30 mil-
lion people voting. The details about the results of the Referendum are summarized by Elise 
Uberoi, European Union Referendum 2016, «Briefing Paper», CBP-7639, 2016, http://re-
searchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7639#fullreport.
3  The campaign groups are described efficaciously by Vasilopoulou (2016). 
4  The Eurosceptic message that made the Brexit Leave campaign so effective is clearly 
linked to electoral successes of populist parties across Europe in recent years. See Hobolt, 
Tilley (2015).
5  The relationships between European integration and nationalism is well explained 
by Polyakova, Fligstein (2016), pp. 60-83.
6  The Ipsos MORI “Issues Facing Britain” analysis has consistently found that re-
spondents cite immigration as the most important problem facing Britain in this moment, 
and the UK membership is an important part of this issue, https://www.ipsosmori.com/
researchpublications/researcharchive/3715/Economist-Ipsos-MORI-March-2016-Is-
sues-Index.aspx, See also De Vreese, Boomgaarden (2005).
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presence of foreigners, especially Europeans, is generally identified as a real 
threat for the survival of the British economy7. Voters perceived a clear link 
between EU membership and the immigration levels in the country, and they 
consider leaving the European Union as an opportunity to curb immigration 
flows and improve general welfare as a result. Surveys clearly show the 
relevance of this relationship for the vote8, but the real determinants of the 
immigration fear are yet to be understood. More than a year later, almost a 
third of the population still considers immigration control as one of the three 
most worrying issues in the UK9.
However, after a year of discussions and negotiations on the Brexit deal, 
an agreement on immigration control has still not been reached, and there is 
a lack of clarity of what would happen to EU citizens already in the country. 
The debate over Brexit has revealed a major problem in any discussion on 
the effects of the EU’s freedom of movement policies, i.e. the lack of accurate 
data as a basis for the public debate over immigrants’ integration in the UK.
Our article tries to address this incomplete awareness through an analysis 
of the official statistics on immigration to the UK and the related burden for the 
welfare state. It then shows the likely implications of the Brexit negotiations 
for the free movement of people.
The paper proceeds as follows. Sections 1 and 2 discuss the events that have 
led to the Referendum and the issues that were at the centre of the campaign. 
Section 3 presents data to quantify the presence of EU citizens in the UK. 
Sections 4 and 5 consider the likely consequences of the Referendum, and 
analyse the effects of the negotiations for the EU-nationals currently residing 
in the country, with a particular focus on the welfare of these persons. 
2. From the New Settlement for the UK in the EU to the Negotiations of the 
Withdrawal Deal
The UK’s relationship with the European Union has always been difficult10, 
7  Goodwin (2016), pp. 20-25.
8  Eurobarometer, Standard Eurobarometer 84. Autumn 2015. Public Opinion in the 
EU, 2015, passim.
9  Ipsos Mori, What Worries the World? July 2017.
10  Gifford (2010).
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but it has never been as turbulent as in the past three years11. The decision on 
‘Brexit’ comes after months of complex negotiations among the EU countries 
on the migration crisis that has been affecting the ‘old continent’ since 201312.
After the 2015 general election the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
promised to renegotiate the terms of the EU membership, and to announce 
a Referendum over the new deal13. During the European Council meetings 
in January and February 2016, the PM put on the table the possibility of 
creating a ‘two speed Europe’, where those Members States that want to 
integrate further can do so, while those willing to retain autonomy on spe-
cific issues would be allowed to do so14. All of the Member States would 
still remain part of the Union, and would benefit from its advantages, such 
as the single market trade deals. One of the most important parts of this 
proposal was the reform of the free movement, with the restoration of an 
immigration regulatory system. In a letter sent to the President of the EU 
Council, Donald Tusk, on 10 November 2015, the PM brought attention to 
the unsustainable flow of European workers to the UK, and the abuse of 
the free movement right. He also declared a willingness to reduce the draw 
that the British welfare system can exert on other European countries. The 
more differentiated “Europe à la carte” advocated by the UK Prime Minister 
did not eventually emerge, but the European Commission declared, after 
the European Council meeting on 2 February 2016, a willingness to amend 
both Regulation 492/2011 and Directive 2004/38 on the free movement of 
European citizens15. 
The EU Referendum of 23 June 2016 has stopped these processes, and 
has opened a new chapter of the relationship between Britain and the EU. 
After the vote in favour of Brexit, a stormy period of political and economic 
uncertainty started. The former Prime Minister interpreted the results as 
a clear message of defeat for his political aims and stepped down from his 
office. On July 23rd, the Conservative Party appointed a new Prime Minister, 
Theresa May, and a new Cabinet. The appointment of politicians strongly in 
favour of Brexit as ministers, such as Boris Johnson, the former Mayor of 
11  Curtice (2016).
12  Council on Foreign Relations (2015). See also the introduction at the issue of the 
«Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies» by Hampshire (2016).
13  Dagnis Jensen, Snaith (2016), pp. 1-9.
14  Craig (2016).
15  For a comment of the negotiations see Kroll, Leuffen (2016). 
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London, seemed to call for a fast conclusion of the negotiations necessary to 
leave the EU, using Article 50 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU). 
On December 7th, the UK Parliament voted with a strong majority16 in favour 
of the PM’s intention to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union 
in March 2017. Two months later, on February 8th, the House of Commons 
backed the government bill on the Withdrawal deal17, and on March 29th, 
Theresa May invoked Article 50 and officially started the process of exiting 
the EU. Then, on June 21st the UK government published a ‘Great Repeal 
Bill’, with the official title ‘European Union (Withdrawal) Bill’ with the aim 
to repeal the European Communities Act 1972 and provide a UK ‘legislative 
footing’ for all EU legislation18.
The debate then focused on whether the UK should opt for an ‘hard’ Brexit,19 
i.e. an exit process without compromises on issues such as the free movement 
of people and the single market, or a ‘soft’ one, i.e. a solution that would allow 
the UK to negotiate the membership of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
and the participation to the single market. The PM was openly in favour of 
the hard Brexit option, and decided to call for a general election, hoping to 
obtain a strong majority in Parliament to back the Brexit negotiation process. 
However, on June 8th 2017, Theresa May lost her parliamentary majority, and 
could not avoid a ‘hung’ Parliament. This result has been interpreted as a 
clear disagreement of the population over the hard Brexit option. 
As a consequence, the flow of events remains turbulent and the future 
uncertain: as of July 2017, the great majority of the population believed that 
the country was on the wrong track20. After the second round of negotiations, 
which took place from 17 to 20 of July 2017, the UK and the EU representatives 
drafted a joint technical note on their positions on citizens’ rights21. The EU 
chief negotiatior, Michael Barnier, confirmed that there is a ‘fundamental 
16  448 versus 75.
17  The Government introduced this Bill following a decision of the Supreme Court 
that an Act of Parliament is required to give notice of the UK’s decision to withdraw from 
the European Union. The decision is: R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the Eu-
ropean Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin), http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ad-
min/2016/2768.html.
18  Kaithan (2017).
19  In this situation, the UK could have been leaving the EU with or without a ‘free 
trade agreement’ (FTA).
20  Ipsos Mori, July 2017.
21  European Commission 2017.
READING THE CRISIS
153
divergence’ on how best to guarantee the rights of citizens, the rights of future 
family members and the exporting of certain social benefits22.
3. The Campaign: Immigration and the Welfare State
Anti-immigration sentiments have been identified as a key variable to 
understand the reluctance of some countries regarding the EU integration 
process23. Indeed, the public debate preceding the Referendum was mainly 
focused on the three key themes24: i) border controls and immigration, in terms 
of both flows and admission criteria, ii) the UK Welfare State, in particular the 
burden produced by benefits to foreigners on the government budget, and on the 
National Health System (NHS), iii) the law-making process and sovereignty25. 
Other factors, such as housing pressure, inequality, and discontent, 
affected the vote, but the three listed above were the core of the discussion 
and at the centre of the media’s attention. This paper analyses the first two 
issues, while the third one is left to further research. 
3.1. From immigration control to limitations for the free movement
During the early 2000s, the British Labour government, together with 
other Northern countries, embraced a very liberal position for the mobility 
rights of citizens from the new Member States, the Eastern European 
countries. While the other EU-15 member states made use of transitional 
arrangements to manage immigration from these Countries, allowing for 
restrictions of worker mobility for up to seven years, the UK opted for a 
complete openness of the borders. As a consequence, the net migration from 
EU countries quadrupled in 2004 and grew in intensity over the following 
years. The 2008 economic crisis has surely reduced the mobility flows, but it 
was not a stopping factor for immigration. Indeed, during the period 2008-
2012, EU immigration decreased, but did not collapse to zero (see Figure 1).
22  Herszenhorn et al. (2017).
23  De Vreese, Boomgarden (2005), pp. 59-82.
24  See, for instance: http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/why_vote_leave.html; 
http://leavehq.com/why.aspx; ; https://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/re-
searcharchive/3748/Concern-about-immigration-rises-as-EU-vote-approaches.aspx.
25  See What the papers said: a referendum special, British Journalism Review, vol. 
27(3), pp. 19-23.
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Figure 1: Immigration to the UK. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on Eurostat data.
One of the main drivers for the relocation decision has been identified as 
the gaps in wage levels and unemployment rates between the EU countries, in 
particular after the accession of new Member States in 200426. The freedom 
of movement acted as a mechanism to cope with such differences, and to 
respond to economic shocks. Attracted by the promise of higher wages, young 
generations living in countries with high youth unemployment reached 
the UK, looking for a job or better earnings. This has also produced many 
consequences for the population composition and living conditions across 
Europe, in particular in large cities and the suburbs surrounding them. 
An analysis of the British history of the last fifteen years shows that a social 
and economic disproportion has been produced between the different groups 
of the population, which have unequally gained from the openness of borders. 
This is usually considered as the main reason why the UK has completely 
changed its attitude towards labour migration. Indeed, for migration to have 
a positive impact and be socially and economically sustainable, it would be 
necessary for all the strata of the population to perceive the benefits and 
the potential gains linked to immigration, such as demographic growth and 
skills acquisition. The legitimacy of the freedom of movement relies on the 
26  Portes (2016b). Missing data (2005/2007) was imputed with linear interpolation.
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assumption that mobility is beneficial for the “single market” operations and 
for the EU integration process, as well as for the economy and society of both 
sending and receiving countries. 
Nevertheless, since the early 2000s, Britain has been facing a clash between 
the strategies for the integration and the admission of new immigrants. The 
fear of immigration generated the decision to adopt some “fortress policies “, 
designed to both deter irregular migrants from living in the territories, and to 
implement strict border-control measures. Since 2010, the UK government 
has decided to place more emphasis on inland immigration controls and 
border controls: new measures were implemented to both tighten sanctions 
in case of expulsion, and to restrict the access of migrants to welfare benefits. 
The coalition government put unlawful migration at the top of the list of 
severe issues for the country, and opted for an approach based on deterring, 
controlling and criminalizing undocumented migrants27. To cope with the 
concerns related to the large number of unlawful migrants28, in 2012 the 
government started to consider a change in immigration laws, aiming to 
both sharpen the expulsion rules and to find deterrents for immigrants either 
entering or staying in the country. The outcome of these reform processes 
are the 2014 and 2016 Immigration Acts, which aim to maximise the benefits 
from migratory inflows, and minimise the costs related to them.
After the victory of the Conservative Party in the 2015 general election, the 
free movement right of EU citizens, protected by Treaties since the inception 
of the European communities29, has been put into serious discussion. The 
government considered the high number of votes for the anti-EU party UKIP as 
a clear sign of a general disaffection with traditional political parties, and that 
this was due to a “deadly” combination of Euroscepticism sentiments, anti-
immigration feelings, and welfare benefits accession rules30. The fallout of the 
Referendum should be considered as part of a broader picture regarding the 
difficulties related to the presence of both lawful and unlawful migrants. Those 
campaigning for Brexit have long argued that EU membership prevents the 
government from delivering its pledge to reduce the presence of immigrants.
27  Partos, Bale (2015).
28  Office for National Statistics (2015).
29  Freedom of movement for persons and workers is a funding EU principle safe-
guarded by EU primary and secondary law: now article 21 of the TFEU and Directive 
2004/38/EC.
30  This situation was yet clear after the European elections in 2014. See Treib (2014), 
pp. 1541-1554.
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3.2. Free Movement and Welfare State
The freedom of movement of individuals also generates fundamental concerns 
about the sustainability of the welfare system in those EU countries which receive 
workers. The open access of foreigners to the labour market clashes with the 
traditional nature of welfare systems, built on a social and economic pact between 
different generations, established under the auspices of national sovereignty. 
The formation of the social states during the 20th century hinged on 
the recognition of nation-states as “communities of destiny”31, based on 
a pluralistic vision of human society and on the fair distribution of wealth 
among each social category. The translation of this view is the development 
of citizenship as not only civic and political but intrinsically social32. The 
building of the Common Market and then the mobility of workers among 
countries have implied a change in the State sovereignty, firstly because 
it limits the control over the people residing in the territory, and secondly 
because it forces the Member States to also give access to social benefits to 
those EU citizens who are in the country for reasons of work or study33.
During the 2010 election campaign, the freedom of movement became one 
of the most politicized issues in the UK, and so it is not surprising that those 
parties against the free mobility of EU citizens obtained a large consensus. 
The issue that raised the greatest concern in the British public, and gained 
attention in the political debate, was the possibility of “welfare tourism”, i.e. 
the relocation of EU citizens to the UK with the purpose of accessing more 
favourable non-contributory benefits. This, together with rising prices in 
the housing market, and the overpopulation of semi-urban and rural areas, 
created the perception of immigration as a public concern. However, it was 
clear that migration from EU countries, although in smaller figures than 
immigration from other countries, could not be restricted. The former Home 
Secretary, Theresa May, announced a plan to reduce net migration to the “ten 
of thousands” before the end of the parliamentary term. In such a context, 
31  As Milward, Sorensen (1993), p. 4 expressed European states embarked on an en-
terprise of systematic intervention in economic and social life with « the express purpose 
of shaping and controlling their national destinies. » See also Milward, Brennan, Romero 
(2000), passim.
32  This view derives mainly from the formulation of Thomas Humphrey Marshall in 
his essay Marshall (1950). For a contemporary discussion of Marshall’s conclusions see: 
Stephens (2010), pp. 512-525; Dean (2013), pp. 1-18; Garland (2015), pp. 622-628.
33  Giubboni (2006).
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the inability to control the admission of EU migrants was blamed as the true 
source of the British migration problems34.
An attempt to address this situation clearly required a tightening of the 
rules to access welfare benefits, restrictions on labour market participation, 
and changes in the freedom of movement for EU workers, and various 
reforms were implemented in this direction. In 2014, the government 
changed the removals and appeals system, and prevented the abuse of 
Article 8 of the ECHR, preventing unlawful immigrants to access benefits 
and public services. The 2015 general election revealed the need to overhaul 
the migration system with a reform of the rules around the eligibility of non-
British citizens for social benefits. The former PM, David Cameron, used two 
main strategies to address the problem: first he proposed a list of reforms 
to the European Council, and then he used this new settlement with the EU 
partners as a milestone for the campaign to keep the UK in the EU. At the 
heart of these negotiations, there was the introduction of special restrictions 
on welfare benefits eligibility for EU workers settled in Britain. On February 
19th, the European Council agreed on two main reforms: child benefits could 
be linked to the conditions of the Member State where the child resides; and 
changes to Regulation 883/2004, containing social security coordination 
rules. However, the general commitment towards free movement and anti-
discrimination remained untouched during the negotiations. The restrictions 
proposed acted as an “emergency brake” to work only in a period of mass 
immigration and not generally as a stable system. 
At the European level, the UK has been granted the power to prevent EU 
citizens from accessing welfare benefits. A judgement of the European Court 
of Justice ten days before the Referendum (14 June 2016), has acknowledged 
the power of the British government to restrict access to social security 
benefits for EU citizens35. This decision was the final step of an infringement 
procedure by the European Commission against the UK, due to the rules 
allowing access to child benefits only for EU citizens with a long residence 
history in the country. The judgment adopts a clear pro-state reading of the 
EU rules on freedom of movement and access to social benefits, while at the 
same time sends a message that such rules do not infringe the state’s freedom 
to regulate access to its social security system.
34  Paul (2016).
35  ECJ, Judgment of 14 June 2016, Case C-308/14, European Commission v. United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. For a comment see Costamagna (2016).
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From an ex-post perspective, one could say that the attempt to retain 
the UK in the EU through the concession of some powers, did not work 
effectively. However, it puts a new focus on the problem of the compatibility 
between intra-EU mobility rules and the access to national welfare spaces. 
The Court seemed determined to make its voice heard on such a topic, and to 
offer a clear-cut response to some of the arguments put forward by the Leave 
campaign. Nevertheless, the Court should have adopted a more cautious 
and fine-grain approach. The judgement originates from an infringement 
procedure directed against benefits established in legislative measures and 
able to be applied in a wide array of different cases. Therefore, the judges 
should have avoided giving a Member State such a complete discretion over 
a topic that is clearly a European-level issue. In the reasoning, there was no 
reference to the principles of solidarity and EU citizenship, as it was stated in 
other similar cases. 
In any case, both the judgement and the situation created after the 
Referendum vote show the nature of an issue that is first and foremost political, 
and only marginally legal. The decision presents some shortcomings and 
logical fallacies in some paragraphs, as well as a general lack of clarity. These 
are due to the difficulty to solve an issue conditioned by inter-governmental 
decisions and political aims.
Indeed, the complications faced by the Court emerged clearly in the 
following statement: the “need to protect the finances of the host Member 
State justifies in principle the possibility of checking whether residence is 
lawful when a social benefit is granted in particular to persons from other 
Member States who are not economically active”. Despite this statement, the 
judgement does not contain any evaluation of the costs and benefits of the 
EU’s free movement regime, and particularly of the burden of this freedom 
for the societies in both sending and receiving member states.
4. The facts: a data analysis36
This section aims to examine available data on immigration and the welfare 
state, and to analyse whether the fear of the public opinion on the impact of 
EU membership on the UK economy are misplaced or not. The main sources 
of the data used are Eurostat, the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS), 
36  See also Barbone, Green, Speckesser, Broughton (2017).
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and the UK Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), who publish their 
databases online. 
4.1. Migration Flows
Immigration is an umbrella term that includes groups of individuals 
living in a country which is different from their country of birth. These 
individuals might have different characteristics and might be involved in 
various activities, from unlawful immigrants, to students participating in 
short or long term courses, to EU citizens living and working in the UK 
under the protection of the freedom of movement regulation. Official 
migration flows statistics count all individuals who establish, or intend to 
establish, their usual residence in a Member State for a period of at least 
12 months, having previously been resident in another Member State or a 
third country37, following the definition provided by Article 2.1(a), (b), (c) of 
Regulation 862/2007. 
Table 1 reports the total migration flows to and from the UK over the period 
1998-2014, separated into immigration, emigration, and net immigration. 
Net immigration is calculated by deducting the emigration figure from the 
immigration one, and is a particularly interesting figure to examine, since 
it shows the number of individuals that are actually increasing the baseline 
population of the country. There has been an upward trend in this figure over 
time, with a sharp increase after 2012 (see Figure 2). The year with the highest 
net immigration flow was 2015, with 332,269 net immigrants. The figure is 
generally higher for those coming from EU countries, when compared to 
China and the Commonwealth countries, with the only exception of 2010 
when net immigration from India was the highest flow. 
Table 1: Migration Flows to and from the UK
Year ImmIgratIon emIgratIon net ImmIgratIon
1998 332390 198934 133456
1999 354077 245340 108737
2000 364367 n/a n/a
2001 372206 n/a n/a
37  See International Migration Statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/meta-
data/en/migr_immi_esms.htm,  July 2017.
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2002 385901 305931 79970
2003 431487 313960 117527
2004 518097 310389 207708
2005 496470 328408 168062
2006 529008 369470 159538
2007 526714 317587 209127
2008 590242 427207 163035
2009 566514 368177 198337
2010 590950 339306 251644
2011 566044 350703 215341
2012 498040 321217 176823
2013 526046 316934 209112
2014 631991 319086 312905
2015 631452 299183 332269
Source: Eurostat data. n/a means that data is missing.
Figure 2: Net immigration to the UK
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on Eurostat data.
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4.2. Population Analysis
The ONS publishes data on the population in the country, and reports a total 
of 64,265,000 individuals in 2015 for the United Kingdom, and 58,655,000 
for England only. Looking at the data by nationalities, British citizens account 
for more than 90 percent of the population, while EU nationals for around 
5 percent, followed by Asian countries (around 2 percent), other European 
countries (less than 1 percent), and the rest of the world (1.6 percent). 
Thus, EU nationals constitute a relevant part of the immigrant population 
of England (3.2 million), but the proportion is quite low in absolute figures. 
Total net immigration constitutes less than 0.5 percent of the population, and 
net immigration from the EU-25 Countries accounts for less than 0.2 percent 
of the population. 
It is also important to note that the statistics do not provide information 
on the intended duration of stay in the country. Research by the UK Home 
Office38 has shown that a high number of non-British citizens typically 
leave the UK after a period of up to four years, and that EU-nationals 
are less likely to stay permanently in the country, often for work-related 
reasons. Also, EU immigrants are more responsive to changes in economic 
conditions in their source country, and are more likely to relocate if the 
conditions in the home country improve. Therefore, even if EU nationals 
represent a high percentage of the immigrant population, this figure is 
likely to be more dynamic and subject to changes than the figures from 
non-EU countries. 
Table 2 reports the ten most common nationalities for the non-British 
population in the UK, in 2015: seven out of ten nationalities are from the 
EU. Poland is the most represented nationality (916,000), with a figure 
that is almost three times the number of individuals from the second most 
represented nationality (India, 362,000). 
Table 2: Most Common Non-British Nationalities in the UK
natIonalItY total (1.000)
Poland 916
India 362
Republic of Ireland 332
38  Home Office (2012).
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Romania 233
Portugal 219
Italy 192
Pakistan 187
Lithuania 170
France 165
United States of America 161
China 140
Source: Author’s own elaboration on ONS data
The EU population in England can then be further separated into four 
groups of countries, following the ONS classification:
- EU-1439: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Republic of Ireland, Spain, and 
Sweden.
- EU-8: Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia.
- EU-2: Bulgaria and Romania.
- Other EU: Malta, Cyprus, and Croatia.
Table 3 reports the EU population in England separated accordingly. The 
majority of EU nationals originate from the EU-14 countries, but the figures 
are only slightly higher than for the EU-8.
Table 3: EU Population in the UK, by Group of Countries
UK Percent England Percent
EU 3159 4.92 2825 5.22
EU14 1426 2.22 1297 2.40
EU8 1412 2.20 1223 2.26
EU2 299 0.47 283 0.52
Other EU 22 0.03 22 0.04
Source: Author’s own elaboration on ONS data. Figures are in thousands.
39  Usually, this group is defined as EU-15, since it includes the United Kingdom as 
well.
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The ONS also collects information on the main reasons for the decision to 
migrate to the UK, grouped as:
- Work Related: people arriving in the UK for employment reasons.
- Formal Study: people arriving in the UK for education purposes.
- Accompany/Join: people arriving in the UK as spouse of a UK citizen or 
someone relocating to the UK.
- Other: people arriving in the UK to get married, to seek asylum, as a 
visitor, or for another reason.
Table 4 reports the number of individuals from the four groups of EU 
countries separated by the main reason for relocation: the main motivation 
for EU nationals is typically employment, followed by accompanying a 
spouse. While employment is the main driver for all of the groups, the 
proportion of individuals indicating this reason relative to the other 
ones is substantially higher for the EU-8 countries. This is likely to be 
related to the difficult economic situation of these countries. However, it 
is not possible to distinguish whether those immigrating for work-related 
motivations have already received a job offer or intend to look for one 
upon arrival.
Table 4: Main Reason for Relocation to the UK
Work Related Formal Study Accompany Other
EU 1490 773 1726 674
EU14 553 207 421 148
EU8 763 79 313 103
EU2 169 20 72 17
Other EU 6 4 8 3
Source: Author’s own elaboration on ONS data. Figures are in thousands.
4.3. Benefits Expenditure
Figure 3 shows the National Insurance Number (NiNo) registrations 
for “overseas nationals” when entering the UK labour market for the first 
time over the period 2002-2016. This registration is a requirement in 
order to work, and it allows workers to pay taxes. EU nationals have the 
highest percentage overall of NiNo registrations (59 percent), showing 
an increasing trend over time, followed by citizens of Asian countries (22 
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percent). Interestingly, the EU numbers over the period show a trend 
similar to the net-immigration figures (Table 1), and this suggests the 
validity of considering employment as the main motivation for individuals 
relocating to the UK. Figure 4 shows the percentages of people living in 
households with very low work intensity, i.e. households where the working 
age members work less than 20% of their potential working time (as defined 
by Eurostat40). EU nationals have a lower rate than UK citizens and non-EU 
nationals, and thus show a significantly high rate of participation in the UK 
labour market in terms of work intensity.
Table 5 reports the number of working-age benefit claimants by type of 
benefit and nationality: overall, there were around 5,130,000 claimants in 
the country in 2015. Of these, 93 percent are UK citizens, and only 2 percent 
are EU-nationals. The most frequent benefits are employment-related, 
namely the Job-Seeker Allowance (JSA) and the Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA), which support unemployed or less-able individuals during 
the job search process. Of the total benefits distributed by the government, 
60 percent are given to UK citizens for this purpose. Figures related to EU-
nationals do not seem to suggest that a particularly high proportion of benefits 
are allocated to them: employment-related benefits account for only less than 
2 percent of the total, and other benefits for less than 1 percent. These figures 
appear particularly low, especially if compared with the corresponding NiNo 
registration statistics. Furthermore, the different groups of EU countries 
do not show significant differences in the benefit-claiming behaviour: in 
particular, EU-14 and EU-8 have similar percentages of claimants. Thus, 
it seems unlikely that EU-nationals could create a heavy burden for the 
government budget. 
40  See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Per-
sons_living_in_households_with_low_work_intensity.
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Figure 3: NiNo Registrations
Source: Author’s own elaboration on DWP data.
Figure 4: People in household with very low work intensity
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on Eurostat data.
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Table 5: Working age claimants by nationality and benefit type
natIonalItY total Percent emPloYment 
related Bene-
fIts (Percent)
non emPloYment 
related BenefIts 
(Percent)
  
All 5129.52 100.00 64.70 35.30
  
UK 4758.3 92.76 59.96 32.80
European Union EU15 55.33 1.08 0.79 0.29
European Union EU8 50.25 0.98 0.70 0.28
European Union EU2 5.1 0.10 0.07 0.03
European Union Other 3.28 0.06 0.05 0.02
Other Europe 17.85 0.35 0.24 0.11
Middle East and Cen-
tral Asia
37.89 0.74 0.56 0.18
East Asia 3.44 0.07 0.03 0.03
South Asia 76.54 1.49 0.80 0.69
South East Asia 7.71 0.15 0.08 0.07
Sub-Saharan Africa 72.66 1.42 0.89 0.52
North Africa 13.32 0.26 0.19 0.07
North America 3.52 0.07 0.04 0.03
Central and South 
America
13.2 0.26 0.17 0.09
Oceania 1.86 0.04 0.02 0.01
Unknown 9.29 0.18 0.12 0.06
  
 Non UK 371.22 7.24 4.74 2.50
7.2% 0.01
Source: DWP data. Figures in thousands.
In summary, this section has provided an analysis of the available data 
on migration flows to and from the UK, the reasons driving it, and the access 
to welfare benefits of the EU-nationals. Migratory flows to the UK show an 
increasing trend over the last decade, and citizens of some Member States, such 
as Poland, Ireland and Romania, tend to be over-represented. Nevertheless, 
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the percentage of EU-immigrants remains relatively small compared to the 
overall population. The main driver of the relocation decision is work-related, 
and indeed there are a large number of EU-citizens officially registered 
for NiNo numbers. Finally, the benefit claim rate of other Member States’ 
nationals constitutes only a small fraction of the overall benefit expenditure, 
and it is unlikely to generate particular budget issues for the UK government.
5. The Immediate Outcome of the Referendum: the British Economy and a 
discussion of the Leaving Process 
Harsh economic predictions were linked to a Brexit decision by the 
majority of the experts41, both in the UK and abroad. S&P, a ratings agency, 
forecasted that the leave vote would reduce GDP growth by 2.1 percentage 
points over the period 2016-201842.
Indeed, just after the results were announced, the value of Sterling and the 
stock exchange were dramatically hit on the markets, due to investors’ fears 
on the economic future of the UK. Sterling dropped to a three-year low of 
€1.107 in October 2016, and, after rising again over the year, dropped to 1.10 in 
July 2017. After the initial period of uncertainty though, the UK economy has 
been shown as being substantially stable over time, with a steady continuous 
growth of GDP, and the employment rate hitting its highest level (74 percent) 
since 197143. However, the impact of the referendum on some key economic 
indicators will only be observed either later on this year or in the longer term, 
i.e. after at least some years. These include house prices, the service sector 
performance, migration flows, investment by insurance companies, pension 
funds and trusts, and the composition of the population. Thus, it is still too 
early to assess the true impact of the Referendum on the economy. 
Furthermore, the “Leaving” process is still unclear. A number of possible 
policies and reforms have been discussed, with the publication of some ‘white 
papers’ by the government, and immigration has been revealed again as 
the most important issue on the table: the PM, Theresa May, stressed that 
41  For a review, see Armstrong, Portes (2016), pp. 2-6.
42  Source: Lewin (2016); Thomas (2016).
43  Source: ONS Statistical bulletin, uk labour market (Nov 2016), http://www.ons.
gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/
bulletins/uklabourmarket/november2016.
LUCIA BARBONE / ERIK LONGO
168
immigration rules and border controls were more important to the country 
than obtaining access to the EU single market. One of the main objectives of 
the Conservative Party is to avoid foreigners taking “jobs that British people 
could do”, said the PM, and to reduce immigration to so-defined “sustainable” 
levels44. 
These proposed new policies might be counterproductive for the British 
economy, as various experts have suggested over the past weeks. Indeed, 
Broughton et al. (2016)45 have shown that there is no evidence of immigrants 
‘stealing’ jobs from UK workers, and that EU applicants tend to be more 
successful in some jobs due to a lack of motivation and skills in British 
applicants. Therefore, a reduction in immigration flows to the UK, due to 
either new rules or a perception of an unwelcoming environment, might 
be damaging for many sectors. It can also reduce economic growth, since 
immigration flows can increase the size of the economy, creating new jobs 
and increasing national GDP. Indeed, recent research46 has shown that the 
displacement effect of British nationals due to immigration is quite small 
in magnitude, and that it dissipates over time: the labour market tends to 
expand over time, and adjusts to the new workforce availability.
6. The likely consequences of the Referendum: a long journey to find new 
approaches to EU-integration and immigration
The dynamics of the Referendum process clearly show a drastic shift in the 
perception of migration and the role of immigrants for both the economy and 
society. It is difficult to identify one factor as the main cause of such a change, 
since many are likely to have contributed to it: the increase in house prices, the 
2008 economic crisis and the cut in government spending that followed it, the 
numerous terrorist attacks which have happened over the past ten years, and 
many others, including sociological and psychological determinants. What is 
certain is that this change has happened, and that nowadays immigrants are 
considered by both the population and the UK government more as an issue 
to be solved rather than as an asset for the country. Indeed, the last ten years 
have seen an increase in regulations on border controls, and various attempts 
44  Mance (2017).
45  Broughton, Adams, Cranney, Dobie, Marangozov, Sumption (2016). 
46  Home Office (2014), Home Office. 
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to limit access to welfare benefits from non-British citizens, even though the 
data illustrated show that EU nationals do not constitute a particularly high 
burden for UK public expenditure, while they contribute to the economy with 
their spending and with more than £3bn in taxes47.
The Brexit decision has also raised new questions and issues related to 
EU integration, and the aim of an “ever closer Union”48. It is indeed the first 
case in the history of this Union of a country deciding to opt out. This will 
inevitably have consequences, not only for the nature of the EU but also for 
the protection of the fundamental rights of European citizens49. 
This is strictly related to the yet-to-be-defined shape of the relationship 
between the UK and the EU. On this side, the possible options are a number 
of ‘fixed-price’ menus as illustrated by the Economist50, some of which are not 
currently discusses on the media. The first option is a full-EU membership, 
with a rejection of the Referendum results. The second and third options are 
models of quasi-integration, such as those followed by Norway, Iceland, and 
Liechtenstein, and Switzerland, which are part of the  European Economic 
Area (EEA) or the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). These two 
models require the acceptance of all the four freedoms of movements, 
including people, a full contribution to the EU budget, and limitations in 
terms of the law-making process. However, the new PM has already made 
clear that these models will not be considered as a good enough solution for 
the UK51. Not surprisingly, this is mainly related to the strong willingness of 
the government to obtain complete control over immigration inflows, and 
to refuse the freedom of movement that those models would impose. Other 
options are the Turkish model, with a custom union for specific goods, or 
trading under the WTO terms, with the consequent difficulties related to the 
setting up of trade tariffs. These options are likely difficult to be defined and 
implemented, and could cause harm to the UK economy, since they could 
prevent the UK to access free-trade deals with third countries. 
Thus, a new model will need to be developed over the next two years, and 
this will also inevitably shape the structure of the rest of the EU itself. 
Furthermore, the UK will need to develop a new internal approach to im-
47  Portes (2016c).
48  Craig (2016),  p. 12.
49  Alston, Weiler (1998).
50  The Economist (2017).
51  Pisani Ferry, Rottgen, Sapir, Tucker, Wolff (2016).
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migration, compatible with both the standards of the Western Nations, and 
with the concerns of the population. As Portes has recently noted52, the gov-
ernment could opt for a “light touch” system, with a cap on numbers and lim-
its to benefits access. However, this seems unlikely considering the increasing 
trend of immigration controls that have characterised the country for the last 
decade. At the other extreme, the same rules currently applied to non-EU im-
migrants might be extended to EU-nationals as well. The only certainty is that 
some degree of selectivity will be applied, but this might discourage immi-
grants from trying to reach the country. Also, higher levels of selectivity might 
leave important economic sectors with a shortage of skills and workers, while, 
as our data analysis has shown, the likely reduction of benefits expenditure 
for EU-nationals will not save a substantial amount of economic resources. 
Over the next few years, both the UK and the EU will face dramatic changes, 
both economically and politically, and these will have a profound impact on 
the destinies of each country, as well as of the Union. To maintain internal 
cohesion and unity, either within the country or in the EU area, Euro-sceptic 
sentiments and anti-immigration feelings will need to be addressed in a way 
that public opinion would find convincing.
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REPRÉSENTATION, PERCEPTION DE LA CRISE ET MODIFICATION DE 
LA «SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE». ENTRE PRÉDICTION ET ANTICIPATION,
QUE SIGNIFIE AGIR DANS UN MONDE INCERTAIN?
Jean-Philippe Pierron
Le mot « crise » est un mot emprunté au vocabulaire médical. De fait, 
rappelons-le, « crise » et les mots apparentés viennent du grec krinein, qui 
signifie « juger, juger comme décisif ». Dans la médecine hippocratique, le 
sens médical de la crise désigne l’étape d’une maladie au cours de laquelle un 
changement subit se produit, et dont les conséquences peuvent être salutaires 
ou fatales. La crise est le moment où la maladie rend son jugement : in quo 
morbidi judicium. On parlera ainsi de crise cardiaque ou de crise de nerfs. 
Très vite, le mot « crise » a ainsi fait partie, tout comme le mot « régime » qui 
glissa de la diététique vers la politique, des nombreuses métaphores médi-
cales et du soin exportées pour éclairer « le corps social » et démêler des réali-
tés sociales ou politiques équivoques. En effet, la crise, la maladie, etc. posent 
et imposent une difficulté inhérente à l’art d’interpréter. Il s’agit de discerner, 
dans des situations équivoques, pour délibérer et juger au risque de l’erreur. 
Ces métaphores organiques seront convoquées pour penser, interpréter les 
signes et la dynamique du corps social et du corps politique (crise financière, 
crise des valeurs, crise de la conscience européenne). Elles présupposent, ce 
qui ne va déjà pas de soi, de faire du social ou du politique un organisme. 
L’intérêt de cette métaphorisation tient au fait que « juger » de l’histoire 
et de son cours est devenu un exercice difficile, d’autant que sont devenues 
suspectes les philosophies du sens de l’histoire. Prendre soin de ce qui y ger-
mine ou s’inquiéter de ce qui s’y nécrose, entre ce qui est fin du monde, fin 
d’un monde, et nouveau monde, est une tâche délicate. Juger ce qui est déci-
sif ? Avec la fin des idéologies qui promettaient des lendemains qui chantent 
(dans les philosophies de l’histoire et les religions séculières) apparaissent 
d’autres figures promettant d’orienter en temps de crise et dans l’incertain. Le 
prophète de malheur dont le coup de force annonce l’apocalypse (le discours 
du catastrophisme éclairé). L’omnipotente figure de l’expert qui revendique 
fonder indubitablement et en vérité des choix relevant de la justice politique, 
entretenant une confusion entre déduire et décider. La démocratie participa-
tive et avec elle l’inventivité démocratique d’un art de décider (focus group, 
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conférence de consensus, cellule de conseil, etc.) dans un monde incertain et 
complexe. Sur son flan, l’expertise apprivoise l’avenir incertain dans le lan-
gage de la planification et de la programmation, de la prévision et de la futu-
rologie. 
1. Les experts de la crise et la crise de l’expertise
La crise dramatise le moment de la décision ou du jugement : il faut tran-
cher parce qu’il y a là une rupture, un déséquilibre, une discontinuité. C’est le 
moment décisif. On ne décide peut-être pas de la crise mais la crise, quant à 
elle, impose de se décider. Le jugement médical (interpréter les signes équi-
voque d’une crise) sert ainsi de paradigme pour penser et élaborer le jugement 
social voire judiciaire, éclairant d’autres décisions en situation marquées par 
de l’incertitude, du flottement, de l’ambiguïté. C’est une analogie qui établit le 
rapprochement entre médecine, droit et société. La prise de décision dans le 
cadre de la crise est toujours l’exercice d’une forme de jugement en situation 
concernant des relations. Ainsi ce travail de métaphorisation engage et mo-
bilise une intelligence interprétative. Cette herméneutique des signes est ca-
pable de produire une intelligence diagnostic sur la situation examinée, sur la 
qualité des relations de soins mutuels engagées ou détériorées par l’organisa-
tion et le pilotage de nos manières de faire monde (aujourd’hui le développe-
ment de la civilisation technologique accompagné par ce que Sandel nomme 
« la société de marché »). De la sorte, dans l’histoire une métamorphose se 
prépare dont nul ne sait si elle est un tournant (Hans Jonas et le principe res-
ponsabilité ouvrant sur une responsabilité pour les générations futures), un 
choc (cf. le choc des civilisations de Samuel Huntington), ou un effondrement 
(Effondrement1 est le titre du livre de Jared Diamond). Des savoirs, une sé-
miologie, des connaissances théoriques sont mobilisés en vue d’une décision 
relative à une situation de crise envisagée éventuellement comme un texte : 
le texte du corps, le texte littéraire, le texte de loi, le texte du corps social et 
la texture de l’histoire en train de se faire. Ce qui explique la réunion, dans ce 
volume, de sciences ou disciplines interprétatives ou exégétiques (droit, litté-
rature, sciences humaines). Tout comme la crise du corps malade appelle un 
diagnostic en vue d’une thérapeutique, on fait l’hypothèse que l’état de crise 
du corps social exigerait un diagnostic en vue d’une thérapeutique politique. 
1  Diamond (2009).
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Ce diagnostic, on le délègue aux sciences, - sciences de la nature lorsqu’il 
s’agit du climat ou de l’érosion de la biodiversité ; - sciences sociales, lorsqu’il 
s’agit de migrations, d’économie ou d’enjeux sociétaux comme le mariage ho-
mosexuel, les relations entre genres, la métamorphose des mœurs, etc.
Dans nos sociétés, que l’on dit réflexives, c’est aux sciences, et notamment 
aux sciences humaines et sociales (psychologie, histoire, sociologie et l’écono-
mie si on se souvient que cette dernière est aussi une science sociale) qu’est 
confiée la tâche de produire une réflexivité sur la réalité sociale et une intelli-
gence de la crise. Le rôle de l’expertise des sciences de la nature (l’exemple des 
experts sur le changement climatique qu’est le GIEC) et sciences humaines 
dans la décision politique, et dans nos sociétés déboussolées quant au sens et 
l’orientation de ce qu’il y aurait à faire, doit être discuté2. 
Entre la prédiction qui relève du discours scientifique (conception intel-
lectualiste de la décision) et l’anticipation qui relève du rôle de l’imagination 
et de la volonté politique (conception volontariste de la décision), se trouve 
deux réponses à la question : que signifie agir dans un monde incertain ? On 
peut vouloir valoriser la prévision en se concernant sur le possible ou le pro-
bable ; on peut encourager l’imagination en travaillant à de l’imaginable. Ac-
tuellement, dans le conflit des interprétations concernant le monde qui vient, 
c’est encore le langage de la prévision travaillant sur des scénarios possibles 
ou probables qui l’emporte. En effet, l’utilisation d’une science appliquée pa-
rait pourvoir nos sociétés désorientées d’un sens définitif, d’une vérité indu-
bitable ayant le pouvoir de cautionner ce qui devrait être. Ceci aussi bien dans 
une expertise a posteriori qu’a priori. L’expertise a posteriori enregistre des 
transformations et des évolutions sociales observables qui prétend dire ce 
qui doit être et ce qui devra être (demain), anticipant parfois exagérément 
sur les mouvements des sociétés, au nom de ce qui est déjà (aujourd’hui ou 
hier) dans les mots d’une logique de la prévention (de risques déjà connus). 
L’expertise a priori, grâce à un travail de modélisation, anticipe l’avenir (de-
main) à partir de structures immémoriales (de tous les temps) par les simula-
tions, l’anticipation par les modèles, les analyses de structures qui, au-delà du 
superficiel social à décrire, font apparaitre des invariants) dans une logique 
de la responsabilité ou de la précaution. Or, si l’on se souvient de Weber op-
posant le savant et le politique, la figure de l’expert, si elle éclaire les choix de 
société ne peut tenir lieu seule de décision publique, car les choix de société 
ne lui appartiennent pas mais appartiennent, - et l’expert en est un -, aux 
2  A titre d’exemple on pourra lire Fassin (1999), pp. 89-110.
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citoyens. On pense ici au rôle dévolu au discours des expertises économiques 
ou sociologiques dans les politiques publiques concernant l’éducation, le trai-
tement social du chômage ou la cartographie de la couverture hospitalière par 
exemple ou au rôle des psychologues/psychiatres dans les affaires criminelles 
pour mettre l’accent sur des capacités d’être en relations, plus ou moins alté-
rées. 
Ainsi, au-delà de la réflexion d’épistémologie des sciences politiques por-
tant sur l’expertise et sa dérive en expertocratie, l’insécurité sociale qu’en-
gendre la crise en appelle à un enjeu philosophique se demandant que signifie 
prendre soin d’un monde vulnérable. Cet enjeu philosophique voit émerger 
une façon de répondre pratiquement à cette insécurité sociale dont on fait le 
diagnostic par une attention à des pratiques de soins apportées aux vulné-
rabilités. On le trouve sous la rubrique générale d’une philosophie du soin 
(allant de l’éthique du care à l’ontologie relationnelle) résolument anti-utili-
tariste et plutôt convivialiste. 
Retenons de ce qui précède que pour percevoir et répliquer à un état de 
crise, il faut commencer par construire un cadre interprétatif qui mobilise la 
possibilité de l’interprétation. La perception de la crise, si elle est tonalisée 
par un sentir profond phénoménologiquement liée à une forme de compré-
hension symbiotique3 (on sent la crise avant de la percevoir/de la savoir sous 
la forme d’un « malaise dans la civilisation ») est, en fait, aussi une construc-
3  Tout d’abord, cette compréhension renouvelée serait caractérisée par une atten-
tion à l’expérience de la coprésence du vivant humain avec les vivants, de sorte que le 
mot vulnérabilité, dans le champ linguistique serait la tentative d’exprimer sur le mode 
d’une compréhension symbolique – avec le risque de perte que cela comporte, une co-
présence sentie, éprouvée sur le mode d’une compréhension symbiotique. On pense ici à 
cette idée de Erwin Strauss pour lequel le sentir est plus profond que le percevoir, et que 
l’idée de vulnérabilité comme modalité originaire du sentir explicite. Expérience pathique 
que le mot « vulnérabilité tente avec justesse de ne pas trahir. Il ne veut pas trahir l’ex-
périence qu’il cherche à traduire et qui porte sur la relation originaire du vivant humain 
dans et avec les non humains et la nature. Si le passage du sentir au connaitre suppose une 
métamorphose de la communication avec le monde, le prix à payer pour cela est que la 
connaissance échappe à la communauté fugace de l’instant en y substituant une distance 
objectivante. Dans ce moment que constitue pour nous notre « malaise dans la civilisation 
en crise, le mot de vulnérabilité veut retrouver ce sentir d’avant le connaitre qui est la 
condition première du connaitre même si celui-ci l’oublie. La connaissance détruit ou dis-
tancie la connivence. La vulnérabilité est peut-être la tentative de donner un nom à ce qui 
est alinguistique : la coprésence et une communauté fondamentale immédiate du vivant 
humain avec les vivants antérieure à toute connaissance. 
READING THE CRISIS
179
tion sociale et culturelle. Cette dernière est élaborée dans une forme de com-
préhension symbolique dont les mots d’« insécurité sociale » ou de « vulné-
rabilité » sont aujourd’hui les catalyseurs. C’est dire par conséquent qu’une 
crise est à la fois dans la réalité (on la sent ou pressent) et dans le jugement 
porté sur la réalité jugée (on la juge, se la représente : la crise en ce sens ma-
nifeste d’une discordance entre la réalité et la représentation qu’on en avait 
forgé jusque-là). Avec toute la difficulté de savoir si ces signes sont univoques 
–on tendra à ce qu’ils le soient – ou équivoques – prêtant alors à polémique et 
conflits des interprétations. La crise ou l’insécurité sociale actuelle engendre 
un conflit des interprétations dans la mesure où il n’y a plus une interpréta-
tion dominante qui emporte le régime général de la signification lorsque s’est 
effondrée idéologiquement cette domination – la révolution communiste 
d’hier ou le néolibéralisme d’aujourd’hui). La crise, toute crise, c’est vrai aussi 
pour une crise économique, est ainsi la mise en travail critique des différentes 
lectures possibles de celle-ci. 
2. La crise ? Quelle crise ?
Il faudrait donc répondre à la question : qu’est-ce que l’insécurité sociale ? 
L’insécurité sociale4, titre d’un livre de Robert Castel, demandait qu’est-ce 
qu’être protégé lorsqu’on parle de protection sociale contre les aléas de l’exis-
tence. La sécurité sociale est prise entre la sécurisation stable et normée des 
manières de faire monde par des procédures standardisées et fiabilisées (on 
pense à l’exemple en France de la sécurité sociale comme dispositif d’assis-
tance mutuelle portée par l’Etat sur fond d’égalitarisme, système fort diffé-
rent de la protection sociale pensée sur un mode assurantielle dans le cadre 
de l’utilitarisme anglo-saxon) et le sécurisant (prendre soin des relations du 
monde contre le déploiement d’un utilitarisme violent (cf. Martha Nussbaum 
commentant Temps difficiles de Dickens). Une philosophie du soin recherche 
un principe d’unité capable de faire monde, de maintenir et porter un avenir. 
Elle le fait dans le prendre soin de (le lien secure/sécurisant en psychanalyse) 
dans et au sein d’une activité technique et sociale qui pense moins en termes 
de relations qu’en termes de fiabilisation et de maîtrise de rapports fonction-
nels mais impersonnels (le sécuriser propre à une société du risque (passage 
de l’aléa au risque). La sécurisation par la prévision relève d’une logique des 
4  Castel (2003).
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dispositifs de contrôle, de surveillance et de fiabilisation qui assure et rassure 
contre l’imprévisible et les discontinuités vectrices d’instabilités et d’inquié-
tudes. Mais l’excès de sécurisation produit aussi une crise : le sécuritaire dans 
l’exaltation verrouillée du dispositif : le refus de l’imprévisible dans la clôture 
du temps et de ses « surprises ». Le sécurisant relève d’une disposition re-
lationnelle et éthique, qui consiste à donner un avenir à la vulnérabilité en 
l’accompagnant de façon sécurisante (cf. le lien secure et les analyses du phi-
losophe Guillaume Le Blanc), la laissant advenir (permettre à la vulnérabilité 
de s’ouvrir et de se présenter dans son exposition) au risque de se contenter 
d’une sorte de bienveillance inopérante. 
Il ne s’agit donc pas d’opposer le sécurisant et la sécurisation mais de les 
dialectiser. La sécurisation risque de se figer dans le discours sécuritaire écra-
sant de l’extérieur ; le sécurisant est tenté de s’idéaliser dans une sollicitude 
étouffante de l’intérieur. Il s’agit d’apprendre à sécuriser plus pour être mieux 
sécurisant ! Notre hypothèse est alors que notre crise (dont nous allons devoir 
dessiner les traits) qui n’en est peut-être plus une, tant elle dure, tient à ce 
qu’il y a une hypertrophie du discours de la sécurisation par la soft law : la 
crise est une crise du sens parce que la gestion a pris la place de la direction, 
ou la gouvernance celle du gouvernement. Le poids des normes, des indica-
teurs et des certifications et la gouvernance par les nombres (la statistique 
comme usage normatif de la quantification vient de l’Allemand Staatistik qui 
est devenue une science de l’Etat Staatswissenschaft, une arithmétique po-
litique) manifestent une pathologie bridant la créativité des acteurs et des 
sociétés, tuant leur capacité d’initiative et d’adaptation au temps qui vient 
(moins penser en termes de perspective que de prospective, de possible, de 
probable que d’imaginable)…
Les crises sont des vécus dramatiques. Le continuum tranquille et sé-
curisant devient discontinu et produit de l’insécurité ; la rupture soudaine 
exacerbe des tensions et met en opposition frontale, parfois jusqu’au drame 
et la violence, de ce qui jusque-là, était de l’ordre de l’équilibre. Les crises 
manifestent une série de transformations. En ce qui nous concerne la crise 
serait marquée par une individualisation jusqu’à l’individualisme, un déclin 
des collectifs protecteurs, la précarisation des relations de travail, la prolifé-
ration de nouveaux risques dans une « société dite du risque ». On pourrait 
ainsi isoler quelques traits : 
- la crise est la conscience d’une situation historique dont on mesure l’ins-
tabilité, passant de la prévention eu égard à des risques connus à la précau-
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tion devant des risques inconnus. Emerge ainsi une société post-tradition-
nelle ou société du risque (cf. Ulrich Beck) qui exigera d’apprendre à agir dans 
un monde incertain. 
- de la sécurité sociale à l’insécurité sociale. Dans un monde qui connait la 
globalisation technologique et la mondialisation économique et financière, ce 
que Hans Jonas place sous la figure d’un Prométhée définitivement déchainé 
dans une civilisation technologique, la crise met au jour l’impuissance du po-
litique face à des logiques et des puissances internationales (force des entre-
prises multinationales et discussion sur l’évasion fiscale et la responsabilité 
fiscale des entreprises à l’heure de la responsabilité sociale des entreprises). 
Elle met aussi au jour l’impuissance face à la dimension du translocal avec 
la « crise écologique » qui bouleverse les logiques territoriales et les tech-
niques politiques classiques sur le plan international pour lesquelles un Etat 
est toujours lié à un territoire alors que nous arrivons à cette situation inédite 
d’Etats sans territoires (les pays submergés par la montée des eaux) et de 
problèmes translocaux c’est-à-dire non propres à un territoire. 
- Une crise du pouvoir de l’Etat. Cela sonne singulièrement en contexte 
français entre la conception maximaliste de l’Etat (la sécurité sociale comme 
un système de protection : état de droit et état social) et sa conception mini-
maliste (la seule sécurité politique et militaire) 
- Le rôle de l’expertise devant des risques technologiques inédits (cf. 
ci-dessus).
Face à cette situation d’un monde devenu instable, comment agir, s’orien-
ter et décider ? Nous sommes les contemporains d’un travail d’argumenta-
tion et d’interprétation qui a du mal à conclure concernant la portée et la 
consistance de la situation présente. Juger c’est le plus souvent placer un cas 
singulier sous une règle qui tient au fait qu’on connait mieux la règle que le 
cas (jugement déterminant dirait Kant, jugement d’experts). Mais en situa-
tion de crise on connait mieux le cas(qui en impose par son expressivité, sa 
complexité et son caractère sidérant) que la règle et on cherche à inventer une 
règle pour ce cas (jugement réfléchissant dira Kant et avec lui les puissances 
de l’imagination à l’œuvre dans la prospective, la recherche de l’imaginable). 
Notre difficulté présente est de décrire de façon ad hoc la situation ou ce qui 
fait dire qu’il y a crise. Il nous appartient de proposer une interprétation de 
notre situation historique dans de justes narrations. Mais qui a la capacité 
de raconter notre présent, d’en porter haut et fort le récit plutôt que de le 
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technocratiser ou de le procéduraliser, d’autant plus si nous vivons la fin des 
grands récits ? Il nous appartient également de pluraliser le travail d’inter-
prétation et nos narrations, enrichissant nos indicateurs qualitatifs et nous 
affranchissant des tableurs et des typologies quantitativistes qui s’emparent 
de notre présent (la croissance, les logiques du marché, les classements des 
triples AAA des agences de notations, le PIB ou l’IDH, etc.) pour emmurer 
l’avenir. Un des défis est aujourd’hui de revisiter cette culture de la prévision 
technoscientifique en la mettant en regard de l’anticipation inventive, qui res-
taure et reconnait la capacité d’initiative et d’innovation des acteurs. 
3. Imagination et décision
Si nous avons à apprendre à agir dans un monde incertain5, pour re-
prendre le titre du livre de Michel Callon, nous devons reconnaitre que cette 
incertitude est en même temps enserrée, voire enfermée dans la cage d’acier 
non de la loi mais de la norme. Il s’agit de celle que portent les techniques de 
régulations, de contrôles et d’administration de l’incertain par la force pré-
gnante des programmes, des standards et des protocoles. Tout cela inaugure 
une bureaucratisation croissante de la vie qui bride la créativité des acteurs, 
tue leurs capacités d’initiatives, les épuisent ou les dévitalisent. De fait, dans 
nos sociétés la question de la décision se trouve métamorphosée par quelques 
traits bien connus : le pluralisme de positions éthiques qui en appelle à la dis-
cussion au risque du relativisme ; la complexité des contextes sociotechniques 
qui en appellent à l’expert au risque de l’idéologique de l’expertise ; le poids 
grandissant de l’administration du monde vécu au risque de l’enfermement 
disciplinaire de la question des fins placée sous la domination qu’exigerait la 
maitrise des moyens. Nous sommes en ce sens les contemporains d’une crise 
de la raison pratique qui en appelle à repenser à nouveaux frais les relations 
entre imagination, éthique et décision.
Aristote caractérisait l’éthique par une réflexion non sur le futur en géné-
ral, mais sur les futurs contingents. Il y a de l’éthique, et de la politique, parce 
qu’en direction de ce qui est à venir, il y a une indétermination de l’issue, et un 
relatif manque de lisibilité quant aux conséquences futures. La sagesse pra-
tique mobilisée dans une décision est exigée parce qu’il y a du non savoir. Elle 
exige de ce fait un travail de discernement et de délibération pour chercher 
5  Callon, Lascoumes, Barthe (2001).
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à évaluer ses conséquences et donc à imaginer des possibles. Une opposition 
paraît alors frontale entre deux modèles de la décision : un modèle volonta-
riste et un modèle intellectualiste. Pour le premier, il y a décision parce qu’il 
y a indétermination. La décision est donc un prise de risque de la liberté qui, 
ne sachant pas ce que sera demain, comble par la force vive d’un engagement 
de la volonté et la fidélité à cette volonté, la faiblesse de ses connaissances. 
Dans cette perspective, décider c’est vouloir en ayant, en imagination, fait 
varier des scénarios possibles à vertu prospective, lesquels sont installés dans 
une mise en perspective, dans une visée. On s’interrogera alors sur ce que 
peut être cette sagesse pratique - voir aujourd’hui les travaux de M. Nuss-
baum, d’Amartya Sen - à l’heure de la civilisation technologique. En effet, un 
second modèle que l’on appellera intellectualiste domine nos sociétés. Pre-
nant le contrepied du précédent, il ambitionne de construire une « science de 
l’action ». Il tend, parce qu’il observe une certaine régularité dans les phéno-
mènes et une forme de constance, à construire la décision sur le modèle d’un 
calcul, envisageant l’à venir à partir de la modélisation algorithmique de ce 
qui s’est passé. Charles Dickens, dans son roman Temps difficiles (1854) dé-
nonçait déjà, à la suite de Thomas Carlyle, le caractère dangereusement abs-
trait d’une science économique vouant un culte aux statistiques au point de 
négliger la culture des besoins humains majeurs. Dans cette pièce enchantée, 
les questions sociales les plus compliquées étaient mises en chiffres, exacte-
ment totalisées et définitivement réglées – ou l’eussent été si seulement ce 
résultat avait pu être porté à la connaissance des intéressés. Comme si un 
observatoire pouvait être construit sans fenêtres… il n’avait pas besoin de 
jeter les yeux sur les fourmillantes myriades d’êtres humains qui l’entou-
raient, mais pouvait régler toutes leurs destinées sur une ardoise et effacer 
toutes leurs larmes avec un petit bout d’éponge sale6. En déconnectant la 
science de l’action de sa perspective éthique, cet économisme utilitariste sou-
met le comportement humain à un calcul ; on en trouve la version récente 
chez l’économiste anglais Gary Backer, Economist approach oh humain be-
havior, 1976. Ce dernier pose que tout comportement, fut-il très éloigné des 
préoccupations matérielles, est le résultat d’un calcul coûts-bénéfices que l’on 
peut expliquer et prévoir. Par exemple, on décrira un marché matrimonial 
en travaillant à quantifier les coûts ou les avantages engagés pour chaque 
mariage ou chaque divorce. Décider dans cette perspective ce serait déduire, 
c’est-à-dire tirer les conséquences d’un calcul des risques ou des probabili-
6  Dickens (1985), II partie, chapitre 15, p. 143.
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tés qu’un risque advienne, au sens où l’a développé la théorie des jeux. On 
tire alors l’anticipation du côté de la prévision, voire de la prédiction dans la 
prospective, supposant une forme de caractère isonormé du temps. Si nous 
sommes bien dans des sociétés qui tendent à généraliser cette conception in-
tellectualiste de la décision, laquelle met au jour d’utiles régularités et de légi-
times objectivations, il n’y a pas à choisir mais à articuler décider et déduire. 
Il s’agirait de se demander comment la décision peut-elle demeurer une puis-
sance d’innovation, de créativité pratique maintenant et ouvrant les possibles 
pratiques dans des contextes très contraints ou du moins très structurés ? 
Que devient l’anticipation entendue comme mise en perspective lorsqu’elle 
est disciplinée par la culture de la prospective ?
L’examen des liens entre imagination et décision qu’engage toute antici-
pation est classique. Il tient au fait que si nous avons à décider c’est en raison 
de la connaissance incertaine que nous avons du lien existant entre le temps 
de la décision et celui de ses conséquences plus ou moins lointaines. Dans 
le cadre de ce qu’Ulrich Beck nous a appris à appeler « société du risque » 
cette question est même devenue topique, passant de l’échelle individuelle à 
l’échelle collective. Avec la modernisation réflexive de la société industrielle7, 
la tradition n’est plus la garantie de ce qui doit être fait, car ce qui est à venir 
– en raison du statut du risque dans une civilisation technologique - est in-
déterminé, installé dans une discontinuité d’avec ce qui précède. La tradition 
pensait la prévention de risques connus ; la société du risque la précaution à 
l’égard de risques inconnus. Une société réflexive est post-traditionnelle. Il 
lui appartient d’envisager et d’anticiper des scénarios lui permettant de préci-
ser ce qu’elle cherche à faire être sur fond d’incertitude grandissante. Nous ne 
connaissons rien des conséquences qu’engage la généralisation de nos dispo-
sitifs techniques. C’est une société tout entière qui est engagée à faire collecti-
vement des choix quant à son devenir. Il s’agit par conséquent d’y apprendre 
à mettre en place des réflexions, des institutions et des méthodes accompa-
gnant des décisions collectives portant sur l’idée même du type d’homme et 
de monde humain qu’elle veut faire advenir, alors que, plus ou moins nos-
talgiquement, les réflexions sur la décision sont hantées, par le modèle du 
choix personnel. Pour cette société du risque, société industrielle ou postin-
dustrielle au développement continu – avec le défaut parfois d’y confondre le 
plan descriptif de l’innovation et avec le plan normatif du progrès – le déve-
loppement cherche à s’y piloter par une anticipation fortement rationalisée et 
7  Beck (2001), Préface, p. 26.
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instrumentée. L’anticipation s’y formalise par la planification, la prévision, la 
simulation et la prospection, développant une véritable culture de la prospec-
tive. Mais une question doit nous arrêter. Est-ce que le poids de la prospective 
planifiée ne tend pas à écraser la fonction exploratoire de l’anticipation dans 
la construction d’une perspective visée, désirée et désirable ? En effet, pour 
une société du risque, s’envisager dans l’avenir c’est se dévisager à partir de 
futurs possibles, au point de se laisser croire qu’il s’agit de s’installer dans de 
grandes structures au sein desquelles il n’y aurait, finalement, guère de choix. 
Nos sociétés éminemment réflexives ont appris à déployer l’extension de la 
rationalité mathématisante du monde des choses et de l’industrie vers celui 
du monde des hommes et de leurs activités, via la médiation des sciences so-
ciales et économiques et les sciences de gestion. Dans cet esprit, instruit des 
analyses de Max Weber, Jürgen Habermas a pu parler de « colonisation ad-
ministrative du monde vécu » ou de « bureaucratisation croissante du monde 
de la vie » à propos de cette civilisation de la planification. 
Mais la « société du risque » pose que dans une civilisation technologique 
comme la nôtre, les effets à très long terme de nos actions (nanotechnologie, 
biotechnologie, activité nucléaire) ont une telle ampleur et un tel retentisse-
ment qu’il nous est impossible d’en déterminer sans risques irréversibles, les 
conséquences bénéfiques ou désastreuses. Aux risques connus qui appelaient 
hier une attitude de prévention s’adjoignent des risques inconnus appelant 
une attitude de précaution. Plus radicale, l’éthique du futur présente dans le 
principe de précaution, dans l’impératif de responsabilité (Jonas), de futurs 
possibles ou futuribles (Gaston Berger ou Bertrand de Jouvenel) croit qu’on 
peut éviter un avenir catastrophique en anticipant les effets de la catastrophe. 
Pour Günter Anders, c’est ce qui distingue le catastrophisme de l’apocalypse. 
Mais ce serait ne pas assez être porté par la hantise pratique qu’il nous faut 
sauver le monde de son autodestruction morale et physique parce que nous 
vivons à l’âge des « télémeurtres » si nous assumons avec Anders, qu’Hiro-
shima est partout8. Dans une société du risque, il est une évidence de base 
qu’agir, c’est « agir dans un monde incertain » exigeant une redéfinition de 
la compréhension de notre responsabilité et des modalités selon lesquelles 
une décision, individuelle et collective, devrait être prise. Mais la conscience 
8  Refusant les catégories de possible et de libre-arbitre, Günther Anders écrivait dans 
La menace nucléaire. Considérations radicales sur l’âge atomique en 1981: Même si elle 
n’a jamais lieu, la possibilité de notre destruction définitive constitue la destruction défi-
nitive de nos possibilités. Cité par Dupuy (2008), p. 13.
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du risque interroge la réplique éthique qu’on peut y apporter. Celle qui est 
aujourd’hui dominante relève d’une approche en termes de quantification et 
de calcul des risques. Le principe de précaution parait être l’interprétation 
officielle de ce qu’est l’éthique de la responsabilité. Mais cette interprétation 
officielle entretient un rapport avec le futur qui doit être éthiquement discu-
té. N’y-a-t-il pas dans cette interprétation de la décision en termes de calculs 
de risques, une compréhension du futur selon laquelle au sein de ce dernier 
ne font que se prolonger des logiques ou des tendances déjà présentes ? Bref 
est-ce que le piège n’est pas en ces matières de croire que du futur, il n’y au-
rait rien à attendre en termes de surprises parce que nous serions dans une 
culture de l’emprise scientifique et technique qui imposerait aux individus 
et aux sociétés sa logique, comme un nouveau destin ? Est-ce que précisé-
ment une civilisation technologique, laquelle repose sur une économie qui 
permet le déploiement de techniques rendues possibles par les recherches 
scientifiques pour lesquelles tout serait déjà joué – finalement c’est aussi la 
thèse de Anders -, n’impose pas de repenser plus en profondeur les liens entre 
imagination éthique et anticipation, en complexifiant et en questionnant où 
sont les lieux de la décision, de la créativité pratique, de l’innovation institu-
tionnelle dans nos sociétés techniciennes ? 
Entre prévision et prospective, c’est un philosophe, Gaston Berger, qui a 
inventé le substantif prospective pour caractériser une attitude d’esprit sin-
gulière « qui permet de voir loin »9. Développée dès la fin des années 1960 
la prospective, d’abord présentée par Berger comme une « technique ration-
nelle » œuvrant à rendre l’action efficace pour l’homme, deviendra vite un 
« instrument de gouvernementalité » voire un « instrument d’action pu-
blique » producteur de normes, métamorphosant la régulation politique de 
ce qui est « à venir ». Pour Gaston Berger, la prospective est le lieu du choix 
et non de l’entérinement des faits. La prospective ne consiste pas à voir dans 
l’avenir une réalité déjà existante mais dissimulée que des méthodes scien-
tifiques appropriées permettraient de faire apparaître (la prévision et la pla-
nification) mais au contraire voit dans l’avenir le résultat délibéré (ou non) 
de nos actions, exigeant de réfléchir à chaque fois que des décisions sont à 
prendre. Mais alors l’anticipation prend-elle forme dans la perspective pros-
pective dont la prévision/planification serait la caricature ? Ici demeure en 
suspens la question du rôle que peut jouer l’imagination, si on entend cette 
dernière comme une faculté du possible pratique.
9  Berger (1967).
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Avec la planification (commissariat général au plan), prévision, prédic-
tion, et plus généralement la futurologie, nos sociétés s’organisent et s’or-
donnent et sont confrontées au sens qu’il conviendrait de donner à cet ordre. 
Elles font apparaître qu’il y a du structuré dans le temps à partir penser le 
monde commun comme stable, même à lui-même. Plans, scénarios, prévi-
sions, simulations édifient un type de monde. Ils orientent notre monde com-
mun vers un type de monde et de société mais laissent en suspens le fait de 
savoir s’il est souhaitable, voire désirable. Or comment résister au maintien 
du monde de l’action face à la domination du monde de l’œuvre ? Est-il pos-
sible de maintenir au sein de cette logique de la planification hostile à l’im-
prévisible qui fait pourtant un des traits de l’action (cf. Arendt) une logique 
de la création pratique qui ouvre des espaces de choix, d’orientation ? Si la 
liberté n’est pas à partir de rien mais en situation, la prospective doit-elle se 
comprendre comme la suppression du choix ou bien plutôt comme l’occasion 
du choix par l’anticipation en imagination et la multiplication des possibles 
au cœur de la contrainte instrumentée ? Alors que nous avons l’impression 
d’être dominés par un monde ultrarationalisé – du monde de la recherche à 
celui des entreprises qui parlent de leurs procédés dans le langage isonormé 
des procédures et normes dites précisément Iso - qui bride notre capacité 
d’initiative, il s’agit donc de penser l’initiative au cœur de l’organisation ra-
tionalisée. Nous avons à piloter sur le plan éthique et politique des dispositifs 
et l’organisation du monde commun ordonnés rationnellement. Ils ne sont 
pour nous un destin que dans la mesure où nous avons délaissé leur pilotage 
éthique et politique, alors qu’ils mobilisent nos capacités. Il s’agit de restau-
rer et d’exprimer notre responsabilité au niveau même de la prospective, 
c’est-à-dire de l’insérer dans toutes les zones d’incertitude, dans les nœuds 
d’indécision où des choix de caractère éthique peuvent être incorporés à la 
décision collective. […] Nous avons donc à … découvrir les formes nouvelles 
du choix offertes par une société de la prévision et de la décision rationnelle, 
au lieu de penser avec nostalgie à ces formes anciennes de liberté10. 
Une compréhension renouvelée de ce qu’est la décision dans notre situa-
tion de crise et la fécondité d’une raison pratique enrichie du travail explo-
ratoire de l’imagination se déploient donc sur plusieurs plans : a) sur le plan 
anthropologique, elles questionnent comment restaurer dans leurs capacités 
créatrices pratiques tous les acteurs scientifiques, techniciens ou ingénieurs 
qui deviennent les « fonctionnaires du développement » ; b) sur le plan 
10  Ricœur (1955), p. 304.
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éthique, elles ouvrent sur la nécessité de laisser résonner le retentissement 
moral de l’avenir anticipé en imagination non pas pour se plier à un nouveau 
destin mais pour étendre et redéfinir la sphère de la responsabilité (cf. Hans 
Jonas) ; c) enfin sur le plan juridique et politique il s’agit de travailler à repé-
rer où sont les lieux de la décision, d’apprendre à collectivement les assumer 
dans des formes de décisions collectives et y répondre en travaillant à déve-
lopper une forme de la « démocratie » sachant la crise écologique, la mobilité 
culturelle globale, le poids de l’expertise et les effets de la mondialisation de 
l’économie financière.
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The InTerdIscIplInary challenge

INTERCULTURAL CATEGORIES OF THOUGHT IN TIMES OF CRISIS. 
THE CHALLENGE OF INTER/MULTI-DISCIPLINARY RESEARCH
Flavia Stara
Within the new multicultural socio-urban contexts, many are the ques-
tions about the dynamics of relationships among people, with emphasis on 
moral and pragmatic key issues referring to education, well-fare and legal 
regulations. The biggest challenge for contemporary democracies is to find 
morally acceptable and politically viable strategies for the sustainability of 
social interactions. At present in Europe the assumptions that guided polities 
for decades are queried by clashes on the rights of migrants and cultural mi-
norities. On the global level, the foundations of the theory of human rights are 
shaking as they are more and more questioned by diverse cultural traditions. 
Principles, worldviews, moralities, languages claim their own space for truth, 
pointing to a contradiction between universalist and relativist tendencies. 
How is it possible to break the persisting deadlock of fear, anxiety and deep 
prejudices so as to engage in a pluralistic approach to human rights? How can 
human rights be turned into a value truly celebrated by all cultures if -more or 
less- they are only respected in western contexts?
When the appearance of “existential malaise” concerns no longer the indi-
vidual, but the structures of social interaction with plural demands, it would 
not be fruitful to pursue schematic investigations and seek separate profes-
sional resolutions. Pluralism can flourish if the search for it is not based upon 
the claim of an absolute truth. Neither is it possible to separate the social 
from the epistemic dimensions of truth claims.
More than fifty years ago, a famous American judge, Billings Learned 
Hand, advocated the study of humanities for the future direction of law. 
Hand′s assumptions focused on three points: the first is that the study of law 
is either part of or is strongly connected to the humanities. The second point 
is that the lawyer or legal scholar who is called upon to analyze legal questions 
cannot do so by merely looking within the confines of traditional legal materi-
als, since s/he needs assistance and edification from other sources. The third 
point is that the external sources of knowledge are to be found not only in the 
natural sciences or in the social sciences, but in subjects that are customarily 
called “the humanities.” The domain of legal analyses to some extent had to 
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be challenged. Never the less the sovereignty is still predominantly legalis-
tic so far as the human rights are concerned. It may be argued that human 
rights are conceptually legal: to have a right is to have a legal claim, whether 
that claim is grounded in natural or positive law. Indeed, human rights are 
effective only if embodied in legal systems, but the important demands about 
the processing of rights need to be examined more extensively. Pluralism is 
a normatively underpinned social pattern according to which the diversity of 
interests, opinions, values, ideas of individuals and groups is recognized as a 
constitutive element of socio-political order.
Some of the European countries are more and more, facing the problem of 
dealing with alien migrant (legal and illegal) populations. There is an urgency 
to reach solutions that can be considered fair and fitted both for the hosting 
countries and the immigrants. In this direction human and social sciences 
have been elaborating for the last twenty years a critical approach to rethink 
the relations among historical, cultural and national identities. This human-
istic counseling, defined as interculturality, hermeneutically deconstructs 
the fixity of the concept of diversity.1 On the methodological level it puts in 
place an interaction among different contents, methods, forms of knowledge, 
which can favor inter and multi-disciplinary conjectures to guide praxis on 
the said issues of contemporary relevance. It stresses on the action-tool of 
dialogue (meeting, confrontation, articulation of logics; dia-logoi) and on 
the contribution of different standpoints (topoi) in the key areas of law, ed-
ucation, religion, economics for the construction of different discourses and 
practices of social cooperation. Such acknowledgement of diverse method-
ologies of analysis of conflicting interests in today’s civil society, entails the 
recognition of an existential reality that cannot be exhausted by distinct par-
adigms of knowledge.
Despite the fact that intercultural research approach is shared by Human 
and Social Sciences, the same disciplines have not yet produced outcomes 
derived from an effective multidisciplinary collaboration. Therefore, since in-
tercultural interpellation puts at stake, on a conceptual and practical ground, 
the pluralistic cohabitation within social contexts, it is particularly significant 
for the humanities to assess resolutions with legal knowledge. Interculturali-
ty by stressing the process of interaction among different cultures, tackles the 
discomfort that affects all complex societies, in which global economic par-
1  For useful sources on interculturality, see: Wimmer (1990); Wimmer (2004); Mall 
(1995); Fornet-Betancourt (2000); Pinto Minerva (2002); Portes, Rumbaut (2001). 
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adigms apply to different ethnic roots which mingle and intertwine in large 
urban and metropolitan areas, as in local communities. Here conflicts may 
even become internal to a single cultural entity (because of contamination, 
hybridity, miscegenation), with clashes between immigrants of the first and 
second generations, leading to crucial consequences involving social service 
facilities (hospitals, courts, bureaucracy, etc.) as well as educational spaces. 
Therefore, in the setting of interculturality, a possible cooperation among 
Humanities, Social and Legal Sciences, should move from the level of logos 
toward the construction of praxis. It requires, indeed, an attitude of epis-
temological openness among theories and methods pointing out the impor-
tance of gaining insights and broadened perspectives on how problems, com-
monly concerning law, are conceptualized and solved by other disciplines ad 
vice versa, as well as by testing the dominant assumptions and resolutions of 
legal discipline with the consequences of other knowledge. The awareness to 
empower each individual with rights, implies searching, at all levels of com-
petence, for an ethic of words, of rules, of social means so to unsettle a bal-
ance mainly forced by economic mechanisms. Thus to contribute to a space 
in which each individual, be s/he a citizen, be s/he merely the holder of an 
international human right, is represented, recognized and protected in his/
her capacity to contribute his/her opinions and visions about common good. 
Taking into account this crucial issue of migrants’ adaptation to a basic 
west-centric understanding of the democratic ethos, our country- Italy- de-
signed two systems for addressing this problem. One is the functional sys-
tem that is based on social assistance resources and works to the satisfac-
tion of basic needs and the legal integration of foreign populations through 
inclusionary policies. The other one is for social interaction which aims at a 
communicative system entrusted to the educational dimensions, to enable 
the society to overcome the asymmetry between who is receiving and who is 
harbored. However, these two policy directions have not yet reached an effec-
tive operational synergy.
 The problem lies in the fact that the formal recognition of diversity and 
otherness is often associated with the preconception of superiority of the de-
veloped cultures and with consequent dynamics of incommensurability. It is 
equally true that, in many cases, these processes of fragmentation and em-
phasis of the differences are caused not only by aggressive processes of as-
similation or segregation but also by defensive encapsulations of resistance 
implemented by the same minorities to protect their traditions. 
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It is against this background of fragmented social reality that one can ap-
preciate the standpoints of three multi-disciplinary scholars on some signif-
icant social configurations in multicultural contexts, in reference to issues 
strictly connected with economic crisis and legal resolutions.
The first proposal comes from sociologist Nancy Fraser who discusses how 
the idea to remedy the unfair distribution of resources by using an econom-
ic-cultural recognition policy is rather illusory in multicultural societies2. The 
second suggestion is from philosopher Harry Frankfurt who commenting on 
the concept of inequality, observes that presently the problem is not “inequal-
ity” as such, but that some people have not “enough”: so, egalitarianism is 
beside the point.3 Lastly, the considerations of the theorist and political ac-
tivist Raul Fornèt Betancourt who points how the economic crisis could lead 
to a shared construction of a social and economic environment more favor-
able to develop a responsible and sustainable growth. The above mentioned 
perspectives, handled according to the intercultural paradigm, carry along 
interesting conceptual challenges for a multidisciplinary research approach.
Theorists of redistribution of wealth assess that injustice is primarily eco-
nomic, therefore any remedy could be found only in the economic restructur-
ing: since the affected communities are divided into classes the goal is to abol-
ish the differences because they are unjust. For those who advocate politics of 
cultural recognition, the matter is the social injustice, so the remedy lies in a 
social reorganization: since the affected communities are divided into groups, 
the purpose is the abolition of differences between arbitrary hierarchies. The 
non-recognition, in fact, is not an obstacle on the path of self-realization, but 
an institutionalized subordination and thus a violation of justice, id est, a dis-
crimination that society could not resolve and therefore institutionalized. In 
reference to this, Nancy Fraser suggests a two-dimensional idea of  Justice: the 
core is the notion of parity of participation, which has an objective condition 
(fair economic distribution) and an intersubjective one (cultural recognition). 
One can better understand the position of Fraser if one appreciates her use of 
the terms “class” and “status” to indicate subordination, by matching the first 
term with mal-distribution and the second term with non-recognition. The 
status subordination: gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation is rooted in insti-
tutionalized patterns of cultural values. The class subordination is already in 
the structural features of the economic system: capitalism produces poor. But 
2   Fraser (2003).
3  Frankfurt (2015). 
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the fact that there is no pure society in economic or cultural sense leads Fra-
ser to ask which characteristic has the priority. And Fraser is of the view that 
neither class subordination nor status subordination should be privileged, 
as they are not exclusive and “the status” involves a reference to the both. 
The issues must be addressed together trying to assess whether redistribution 
creates non-recognition and if recognition produces mal-distribution. 
The admission of the plurality of truth claims -that is implied by Fraser po-
sition- is essential for a multicultural society as it creates space for framework 
of rights, obligations and responsibilities, and it also serves as an “institution-
alized arena of discursive interaction”.4
The philosopher H.G. Frankfurt while recognizing that economic inequal-
ity is one of the most debated issues of our time, and although elimination 
of poverty is a desirable goal, says that the establishing economic equality 
is not in itself an important end. Indeed, according to the philosopher from 
Princeton, this can distract from the really important task, which is to en-
sure to everybody the basic measures and resources to live a dignified life. In 
this context, the elimination of inequalities ceases to be the primary focus of 
social policies, although it is true that those who have more resources enjoy 
significant competitive advantages over those who have less. However, the 
economic inequality is undesirable -as Frankfurt underlines-as it produces 
other kinds of unacceptable inequality, which undermine the role of trust in 
the institutional structures of a system of government. From an ethical point 
of view, it is not important that everyone has “the same” portion: it is import-
ant that everyone has “enough”, because if everyone had enough and was in 
a “condition of sufficiency” then we could have a comparatively sustainable 
socio-economic system. The theory of equality has spread and took deep root 
in the collective imagination, because dividing into “equal parts” is more as-
sociated with an application of justice than determining how much a person 
should have in order to have enough. Therefore, economic egalitarianism 
availed broader consensus toward the importance of investigating in depth 
the ethical issue of having enough: this made possible for economic theory 
of equality to become better articulated than sufficiency theory. Rather - as 
Frankfurt observes - it should be noted that the strength of egalitarianism is 
not original, but derived. The true essence of egalitarianism, as a matter of 
fact, emanates from the most basic requirements of respect and fairness. In a 
fundamental way what prescribes to guarantee the same rights to all human 
4  Fraser (1990), pp. 56-80.
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beings is the recognition of a moral duty to impartially respond to all human-
ity, not the supposed supreme importance of equality as a mandatory aim. 
Equality, consequently, is not in itself the main reference term to delineate 
a correct relationship among individuals and among them and the society 
in which they are members as citizens. The central value at the base of the 
inter-relationship should be the respect due to every individual of the whole 
of humanity. Respect, therefore, is the general principle of equality grounded 
on the moral premise of humanity, because every single being participates in 
a common nature. Respect for Frankfurt is the deductive criterion to trace all 
searches on moral basis. Therefore, the interdependence between respect and 
reason ought to constitute the orientation of political action for supporting 
intercultural societies, especially with regard to norms and the conceiving of 
norms as a practice to maintain human agency as a constitutive element of 
norms.
Coming to the third scholar namely Raul F. Betancourt, he notes that the 
“liberation” of the world from the centralism currently established by neo-
liberal globalization implies the demand for the right of any culture to de-
termine their own contexts - and specifically the economic ones - in light of 
their needs. His discourse insists that the cultural order does not dissociate 
from the economic sphere: indeed, every culture should be able to implement 
the economic system that is most appropriate to its particular situation. He 
is of the view that to “culturalize” the economy means allowing each country 
to identify its own development techniques, its resources and their manage-
ment. Even money is a cultural factor and so the problem lies in the way it can 
be used in the market processes. According to Betancourt “culturalize” means 
“pluralize” the processes of money, and therefore the economic processes. So 
the pluralistic or intercultural approach expresses itself in a concrete de-lo-
cation of the individual for a better social profit. 5 It is defined as a politically 
and economically challenging space, through the multi-culturalization of re-
sources, designing entrepreneurial strategies dictated by needs specifically 
detected to be privileged.
The connection between the cognitive and epistemological dimensions 
with the ethical dimension, in the particularity-universality ratio expressed 
by the intercultural perspective, can be seen in the fact that within the acti-
vated contribution of practices and knowledge (political philosophy, applied 
ethics, law, economics), the purpose is to enhance the appreciation of human 
5  Fornet-Betancourt (2004).
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values. The plausibility of an intercultural paradigm is directly linked to the 
criticism of uniforming theories and practices that, in the name of alleged 
artificial and exemplary universalism (Western democracy, the neoliberal 
market, globalization etc.) call into question the territorial specificities and 
the very sovereignty of cultures, engaged in a confrontation (and sometimes 
in a clash) with civilization models hegemonically set up in cultural spaces 
destined to marginalization and even to exclusion. 
In the light of these considerations it appears realistic that the theoretical 
and epistemological intercultural instance connects with a model of political 
praxis for a radical social hermeneutics that challenges any subject specific 
paradigm of knowledge and competence. Hence a multidisciplinary approach 
is needed for a comparative investigation of the complex geo-political space 
of European citizenship in order to identify historical conditions, economic 
interests, legal resolutions and religious tensions. The awareness and knowl-
edge acquired through this approach will facilitate to re-configure the reality 
of contemporary European scene and will lead to its critical appreciation, re-
sulting in an appropriate pragmatic and epistemic action.
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AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW?
SOME CURSORY REMARKS
Paolo Palchetti
1. In this brief work, I will attempt to answer to three main questions. 
They all focus on the role of interdisciplinarity for addressing international 
law problems. They can be formulated as follows: First, is there any need 
for interdisciplinarity in the study of international law? Second, what impor-
tance is currently attached to an interdisciplinary approach by international 
legal scholarship? Third and finally, what are the challenges posed by, and the 
risk inherent in, an interdisciplinary approach to the study of international 
law? As one can immediately realize, these are broad questions. I will limit 
myself to some introductory remarks. In doing so, I will also bring to the task 
my personal experience as a participant to the University of Macerata’s re-
search project on “Perceptions of (In)Security and Forms of Legal Protection 
in Times of Crisis”.
2. Is there any need for interdisciplinarity in the study of international 
law? As one can easily understand, there is no straightforward answer to this 
question. It is not a matter of “yes or no”. The answer depends on what one 
considers to be the proper object of study for international lawyers. To put it 
otherwise, it depends on what one considers to be the task of international 
legal science. If one adopts a strictly positivistic approach to international law 
(or to law in general), there seems to be little or no need for an interdisciplin-
ary approach. In a Kelsenian perspective, only positive law is law and only 
positive law is the focus of the legal science. Law must be determined on the 
basis of its own formal criteria of validity,1 without any need to refer to exter-
nal values. It must therefore be kept separate from political, moral, econom-
ical, sociological, or any other non-legal considerations.2 In this perspective, 
1  On the relationship between formalism and positivism, see Bobbio (1979), pp.167-169.
2  For a clear exposition of this method, see the judgment of the International Court of 
Justice in the South West Africa (Liberia v. South Africa) and (Ethiopia v. South Africa) 
cases: “Throughout this case it has been suggested, directly or indirectly, that humanitar-
ian considerations are sufficient in themselves to generate legal rights and obligations, 
and that the Court can and should proceed accordingly. The Court does not think so. It is 
a court of law, and can take account of moral principles only in so far as these are given a 
199
PAOLO PALCHETTI
200
lawyers do not need interdisciplinarity. Their role is simply to describe what 
the law is. As Lassa Oppenheim put it at the beginning of the XX century, “the 
first and chief task [of the science of international law] is the exposition of the 
existing rules of international law”.3 A different view is warranted if one in-
cludes among the tasks of the science of international law also a prescriptive 
dimension (“what the law should be”) as well as an explanatory dimension 
(“why the law prescribes a certain conduct” or “why rules are complied with 
or are broken”). If the focus is shifted from the rules, and the description of 
the rules, to the decision-making process, and the reasons behind that pro-
cess, the importance that can be attached to an interdisciplinary approach 
changes considerably. As observed by François Ost and Michel van de Ker-
chove, any attempt to explain inevitably entails the taking into consideration 
of non-normative and extra-legal elements.4 If the task of the international 
legal science is that of identifying the reasons behind certain legal phenome-
na, it becomes necessary to look beyond the boundaries of the legal discipline.
3. This brings me to the second question, which concerns the current trends 
in international legal scholarship about the methods and tasks of internation-
al law in general, and about the importance attached to interdisciplinarity, in 
particular. There is little doubt that legal positivism was the leading school of 
thought in international legal scholarship for the great part of the twentieth 
century.5 The study of international law was dominated by a rule-oriented 
approach. Corollaries of such an approach were the importance assigned to 
formal sources in international legal discourse and the distinction between 
existing law and policy considerations. The dominance of a rule-oriented ap-
proach is probably the main reason why, for a long time, international law 
scholars paid little attention to the potentialities of interdisciplinarity for the 
study of international legal phenomena. It may be interesting to note that, in 
sufficient expression in legal form. Law exists, it is said, to serve a social need; but precisely 
for that reason it can do so only through and within the limits of its own discipline. Oth-
erwise, it is not a legal service that would be rendered.” ICJ Reports 1966, at 34, para. 49.
3  Oppenheim (1908), pp. 313-356, (p. 314).
4  Ost, van de Kerchove (2002), p. 457 (“toute tentative d’explication intègre nécessai-
rement des donnés tant non normatives qu’extra-juridiques”). See also Corten (2009), pp. 
62-63 (“à la différence de l’approche formaliste, l’approche critique comprendra toujours 
une part d’interdisciplinarité, dans la mesure où l’analyse du système juridique en tant que 
tel sera complétée par la mise en œuvre d’une perspective de type sociologique”). 
5  On this, see the contributions in Kammerhofer, D’Aspremont (2014).
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the period after the Second World War, little attention was also paid to other 
non-strictly legal aspects of the discipline, such as the theory of international 
law and the history of international law. Here again, it could be argued that 
the predominance of a positivistic conception of international law might have 
induced the perception that the focus of international legal research had to 
remain on concrete applications of the law, while theoretical research lied 
outside the scope of the discipline.6 The trend towards specialization may also 
partly explain this phenomenon: with the expansion of the domains of inter-
national law, international lawyers appear to have progressively focused on 
the analysis of positive law and of practical problems, while largely abandon-
ing the theoretical reflection.7
4. It was only in the second half of the century, and most intensely in the 
last three decades, that legal positivism, with its rule-based conception of in-
ternational law, has been seriously challenged by other theoretical approach-
es. International law is nowadays characterized by methodological pluralism. 
A recent publication of the American Society of International Law identified 
8 different approaches: positivism, policy oriented jurisprudence (or New 
Haven approach), new international legal process, law and economics, crit-
ical approach, international law and international relations approach, femi-
nist approach, and third world approach.8 All these new approaches depart 
from a normative conception of international law. Some of them – such as the 
policy oriented jurisprudence or the new international legal process – essen-
tially focus on decision-making processes, aiming at examining the factors 
which influence decisions and at evaluating policy alternatives. They have 
their origin in American legal realism and attach importance on the effective-
ness of legal rules. Thus, they stress the difference between “decision” and 
“law” on the assumption that the focus on existing rules “does not properly 
reflect the reality of how law is made, applied and changed”.9 The object of 
6  See, with regard to French international law scholarship, Cot (2006), pp. 537-596, 
(p.539) (“La philosophie de droit a été laissée par les internationalistes aux philosophes. 
Le débat intellectuel se poursuit heureusement, mais dans un cadre bien précis”). 
7  As regards to the importance attached by international law scholars to the history of 
international law after the Second World War, see Koskenniemi (2004), pp. 61-66, (p. 61) 
(“the increasing specialization of international law directed attention away from history 
and general reflection of the profession’s past”).
8  See Ratner, Slaughter (2006).
9  Wiessner, Willard (2006), pp. 47-77, (p. 52).
PAOLO PALCHETTI
202
legal analysis becomes the determination of “how international legal rules are 
actually used by the makers of foreign policy”.10 Alongside these approaches 
that concentrate on the process of decision-making, other approaches place 
emphasis on what the law should be, rather than what the law is. Feminism, 
critical legal studies, international relations/international law, Third Word 
approaches are “distinctive ways of thinking about what international law is 
and should be; they involve the formulation of a particular set of concerns 
and the analytic tools with which to explore them”.11
5. These theoretical approaches bring with them new conceptions of the 
role and tasks of the international legal science. Under these approaches, the 
task is not limited to identifying and describing the law but includes exam-
ining the decision-making processes and formulating policy proposals. As a 
leading exponent of the international relations/international law approach 
put it, “my goals as a lawyer, scholar and teacher are…to better understand 
and communicate the functions, origins, and meanings of legal rules and in-
stitutions, and thereby to contribute, in even a small way, to improving glob-
al governance”.12 From a law and economics perspective, the function is “to 
assist international lawyers in perhaps their most important creative role – 
the design and operation of international institutions that permit states to 
overcome transactions costs and strategic problems and this to cooperate to 
realize joint gains”.13 The task of the international scholar being not anymore 
that of simply identifying what the law is, the answers to international law 
problems are sought by looking also to other, non-legal disciplines. Indeed, a 
common feature of these new theoretical approaches is that they are based on 
a high degree of interdisciplinarity, going beyond the realm of law to include 
methodologies and concepts developed in other areas of social science and 
humanities, from political science to sociology, from international relations 
to economics till linguistic. Thus, it has been said that, thanks to these new 
approaches, international law has experienced a marked turn to interdisci-
plinary research.14
10  O’Connell (2006), pp. 79-107, (p. 79).
11 Anghie, Chimni, (2006), pp.185-210, (p. 185).
12  Abbott (2006), pp. 127-157, (p.131).
13  Dunoff, Trachtmann (2006), pp. 211- 238, (p. 213).
14  Dunoff (2013), pp. 309-337, (p. 309).
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6. If the current international legal scholarship reveals the end of the dom-
inance of classical legal positivism and the emergence of a variety of theo-
retical approaches, it must be acknowledged, however, that the influence of 
these new approaches has been felt most in the United States, where they 
were born. In continental Europe, a rule-based approach to international law 
is still largely dominant. In this respect, national (or regional) legal cultures 
still appear to influence the way in which the study of international law is ap-
proached. This is an aspect which is sometimes neglected but which instead 
plays a significant role. As Stolleis put it, “although international law devel-
ops in a context of international communication, it remains entangled in the 
texture of national interests and habits of minds”.15 Italian international law 
scholarship – just to make one example – has been rather impermeable to 
the turn to critical self-reflection on the discipline which has characterized 
international legal scholarship at the world-wide level. Little can be found in 
terms of methodological debates or focused discussions on the new intellec-
tual trends. There is in fact a clear reluctance by Italian legal scholarship to 
abandon the terrain of the technical legal analysis for engaging in theoretical 
discussion on the methods and techniques of international law. This may also 
explain why Italian scholarship has so far shown little interests in engaging 
in interdisciplinary researches involving international law. To a different de-
gree, a marked preference for a rule-based approach still characterizes inter-
national legal scholarship in several other European States. In sum, we assist 
nowadays to a geographical divide in international legal scholarship. At the 
risk of stereotyping the differences, we can say that while American doctrine 
appears to be characterized by a certain rule-skepticism, European doctrine 
still maintains a positive attitude towards rules.16 The importance attached to 
interdisciplinarity is also a component of this divide. While American schol-
arship tends to challenges disciplinary boundaries, European scholarship ap-
pears to regard this kind of approaches as going too far and as loosing sight of 
the importance of a rigorous legal analysis.17 
7. This brings me to the third and last question: what are the dangers and 
challenges posed by an interdisciplinary approach to the study of internation-
15  Stolleis (2004), pp. 265-267, (p. 265).
16  See Verdirame (2007), pp.553-580, (p. 565). See also Cot (2009) fn 8, Jouannet 
(2006), pp. 292-335.
17  Verdirame (2007) fn. 16, p. 554.
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al law? This issue has been the object of a significant debate among interna-
tional lawyers. Nobody doubts about the importance of certain forms of inter-
disciplinarity. Modern thinking about international law has been influenced 
by successive waves of critical reflections on the discipline which have shed 
light on its nature by shifting the angle of observation through the recourse 
to analytical tools borrowed from other disciplines. In this respect, the “lin-
guistic turn”18 and the “historiographical turn”19 experienced by international 
law in the last decades are particularly notable. Positivism itself has evolved 
significantly over the time. Departing from certain tradition postulates, such 
as the idea of the neutrality and the objectivity of the law, modern positivism 
is characterized by a greater awareness of the indeterminacy of the law and an 
increasing attention towards the extra-legal context of the law. In a modern 
positivist approach, “the investigation of legal rules and institutions must not 
be carried out without a proper contextualization, both socio-politically and 
ideologically, in order to fully understand the dynamics which spurred their 
adoption or establishment”.20 This approach inevitably encourages a certain 
degree of interdisciplinary study of international legal phenomena. Yet, while 
there is nowadays a greater attention and openness toward an interdisciplin-
ary approach, several critical voices have been raised against the type of in-
terdisciplinarity which is advocated by many of the new methodological ap-
proaches to international law. Several authors have warned against the risks 
of the international legal discourse being colonized by approaches which put 
emphasis on the role of power in international relations. By focusing on the 
effectiveness of the law (“how is law effectively applied”) to the detriment of 
the normative dimension (“what is the law and how should States accordingly 
behave”), these approaches give priority to political science methodologies 
over legal forms. For these reasons, the interdisciplinarity they advocate has 
also been labelled as a “destructive” one, since it would have the effect of 
destabilizing the main tenets of international law as a legal discipline.21 The 
most well-known reaction against the risks inherent in this form of interdisci-
plinarity is Koskenniemi’s defense of a “culture of formalism”, which appears 
as a call for the preservation of the autonomy of the legal discourse.22 It is not 
18  See, in particular, Kennedy (1987) and Koskenniemi (2005).
19  Bandeira Galindo (2005), pp. 539–559.
20  Cassese (2011), p. 258.
21  See Sing (2013), pp. 236–261, (p. 247).
22  Koskenniemi (2002), pp. 502–509.
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here the place for examining in details all these positions. Their main point 
is clear. It is one I entirely agree with. The fact is that, without denying the 
relevance of interdisciplinarity, this cannot be conducted at the expense of 
a proper legal analysis. The strict methodology of law-ascertaining and the 
conceptual construction of legal notions should always be respected.23
8. By way of conclusions, let me move to the University of Macerata’s re-
search project. What are the lessons learned from this research project? One 
of the risks inherent in any interdisciplinary project is the colonization of one 
discipline at the expense of the other. This risk has been provocatively de-
scribed by Jan Klabbers in the following terms: “interdisciplinary scholarship 
is always, and inevitably, about subjection. Interdisciplinary scholarship is, 
more often than not, about imposing the vocabulary, methods, theories and 
idiosyncrasies of discipline A on the work of discipline B”.24 There is more 
than a grain of truth in this statement. Whenever researchers drawn from 
different disciplines engage in a common research, the most basic difficulty 
is that of defining a common vocabulary and there is always the temptation 
for researchers coming from one discipline to impose their vocabulary and 
methodologies on the others.
9. Klabbers has also noted that one of the difficulties of interdisciplin-
ary scholarship derives from the fact that, in most cases, one tends to have 
an oversimplified image of the other disciplines. As he put it, “all pictures 
of neighboring disciplines tend to be flat, one dimensional, monolithic: the 
lawyer aiming to cooperate with historians all too often assumes that history 
comes in only one version”25, forgetting that historians have their own battles 
over methodologies, theories and so on. In other words, the risk inherent in 
any interdisciplinary research project is that of an international lawyer turn-
ing historian, or even legal historian, without being aware of the variety of 
methodologies and approaches for making historical research.
23  See Nolte (2007), pp. 657-674, (p. 673-674) (“Der Kernbereich der Völkerrechts-
wissenschaft ist immer noch die rechtsdogmatische Analyse. Nachbarwissenschaften und 
öffentliche Debatte sind zusätzliche Erkenntnisquellen, weitere Foren und diese dienen 
nicht zuletzt zur Sensibilisierung für Probleme und Entwicklungen”).
24  Klabbers (2009), pp.119-125, (p. 120).
25  Klabbers (2009), p. 122.
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10. Apart from these risks, it is important to bear in mind that there are 
different ways by which a dialogue across the disciplines may be put in place. 
The Macerata project has engaged in a “soft” form of interdisciplinarity, by 
pulling together scholars from different disciplines who have addressed the 
same problem from different perspectives. It might well be that this form of 
dialogue across the disciplines should be qualified as a “multidisciplinary” 
dialogue rather than an interdisciplinary one.26 This form of cooperation cer-
tainly attenuates the risk of falling into the above mentioned traps, as the 
level of integration of the various disciplines in a common discourse is rather 
limited. Its significance, however, should not be underestimated. To engage 
in this dialogue requires from each participant to “translate” the language of 
his/her discipline in a language that can be accessible to all the other par-
ticipants, an exercise that, as has been noted, allow to “go beyond self-ref-
erentialism to self-reflectivity”.27. Most obviously, by being exposed to this 
dialogue, each participant has become aware of the different dimensions of 
the problems under discussion, thereby acquiring new inputs for the theo-
retical reflections within the boundaries of his/her own discipline. These, in 
my view, probably represent two of the most rewarding results of this kind 
of initiative.
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RIGHTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ISSUE FOR LEGAL STUDIES
Massimo Meccarelli
The study of fundamental rights currently requires new analytical approach-
es. The time of crisis has in fact attributed novel aspects to the problem. 
In the long history of rights1 – since the conception and development of 
the idea of legal protection for the human being as an individual, linked to 
the exercise of individual freedom – this model of legal protection has been 
developed by widening the recipient base, by enriching the catalogue of rights 
enacted in statutory law and by creating progressively more efficacious legal 
mechanisms and devices, thus reinforcing their level of unavailability.
One might observe that there is a tension to the progressiveness inher-
ent in the very concept of rights and therefore, today as in the past, despite 
the differences, the problem is essentially still the same: how to expand and 
strengthen these rights. A closer analysis of the impact of the crisis on the 
regimes of legal protection warns us, however, that we perhaps face a more 
complex problem: on the one hand, the trend of expansion of rights contin-
ues, but according to a dynamic of multiplication and fragmentation that 
compromises its effectiveness and changes its nature.2 On the other hand, 
the crisis has reduced access to rights (especially the social ones, but not only 
those if, for example, as it seems to us, immigration is also part of the crisis 
scenario we are talking about) as well as reduced the scope of impact of the 
rights. At the same time, the complex institutional system, consolidated over 
time to implement fundamental safeguards through rights, is still in force.
The problem of rights in times of crisis appears, therefore, in a new light; 
legal science has to acquire different points of view to solve it. This implies 
getting to the heart of the problem and re-discussing some founding ideas3. It 
is also necessary to verify the methods and knowledge involved in producing 
a legal discourse on the effectiveness of legal protection.
In this complex task, which implies a methodological and epistemological 
review, interdisciplinary dialogue takes a prominent place. It is on this partic-
1  Costa (2008), (2014).
2  See Meccarelli, Palchetti, Sotis (2014), pp. 10-22.
3  See further part 3 of this essay.
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ular aspect that this brief analysis will dwell. However, it is merely a tentative 
assessment of a problem that deserves deeper study.
In the following pages, in order to establish the importance of the interdis-
ciplinary challenge in legal studies, I will seek to highlight the inadequacy, in 
the present historical phase, of the model of legal protection by rights protec-
tion. I will then consider some methodological implications of dialogue in le-
gal sciences, and conclude by reflecting on the potential of knowledge shared 
between legal, human and social sciences.
1. The theoretical model of legal protection by rights protection and its inad-
equacy in times of crisis
If we aim to study the contents of legal protection in times of crises (what 
is protected or has to be protected), we will soon realize that, first, we have to 
deal with the problem of the way in which the legal protection is produced. 
The matter is to think about the premises, to consider the problems related to 
the processes of rights production and the structure of legal systems dedicat-
ed to rights protection, as well as the new questions that have arisen within 
new cultural contexts.
Providing individual rights is in fact just one of the ways in which legal 
protection has been produced4 over the centuries. It is the “modern” way to 
ensure legal protection. 
It has specific features: Rights are fixed primarily in a general and abstract 
form (usually by their enactment in statutory laws) in order to make them 
stable in view of the changing nature of political, social and economic issues. 
This approach to legal protection aims to identify and formalize the rights of 
the individual and to generalize and unify the subjective condition, thereby 
hoping to establish (abstractly) a plenitude of legal protection. 
Moreover, it should be underlined that individual rights are linked to the 
implementation of a principle, the principle of equality, which forms the im-
mediate pre-legal basis for rights. The equality principle, in fact, promotes a 
project5 for social and political reality. That is why rights perform a subsump-
tive capacity with respect to the social facts. It is a capacity to reduce the mul-
tiplicity of protection claims within the pre-established legal protection spaces. 
4  Costa (2014), pp. 27-80.
5  Fioravanti (2009), pp. 105-133.
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Nevertheless, the present phase in Europe shows deviations from this 
theoretical model. The trends that we have mentioned above undermine the 
subsumptive capacity of rights and they somehow oppose the program of 
implementation of the equality principle. 
This is why we need to understand how legal protection is improved in 
order to consider what is being protected (or should be protected) by the law; 
we need to check the means in order to deal with the contents.
Here, however, another problem emerges. The theoretical model of legal 
protection by rights protection is in crisis, but our analytical approach and 
our construction tools for the problem of legal protection are characterized by 
the assumption of that theoretical model. Therefore, we also have the prob-
lem of rethinking the methods and the basis of epistemic references for the 
legal sciences. At the same time, we have to consider the opportunity of an 
interdisciplinary approach. Without claiming to solve these great questions, 
we can try here to dwell briefly on the implications of this challenge.
2. A dialogue among the legal sciences
It is not an easy task to develop a true interaction of knowledge among le-
gal disciplines. First, we have to consider that, historically, the legal sciences 
defined their specific identities through emancipation from the problem of the 
cognitive diagnosis of the social. This is also part of the sphere of “the prem-
ises of the problem”, which must be included in today’s legal discourse; but 
it is this very competence in understanding the social that has, over the past 
two centuries, been gradually expelled from the scope of juridical thought it-
self. The cognitive diagnosis of the social has been entrusted to other sciences, 
particularly the social and human ones and, above all, to the action of politics.
Legal sciences have taken shape relying on the aggregative force of dog-
matics6. It has been a process of building a knowledge composed of concepts 
and categories, and hypostatizing the doctrinal configurations and therefore 
the normative forms of legal problems. The axiological foundation, such as 
the assumed social model, on which this path was built and which refers to 
the liberal values of the monistic State and of individual liberty, quickly be-
came an implicit7 element that did not need verification.
6  Cappellini (2010), pp. 155-162 and pp. 239-248; Hespanha (2012), pp. 410-451, 
(2013), pp. 223ff; Rückert (1988), (2011); Vano (2000); Haferkamp (2004); Henkel (2004).
7  By contrast we can observe that throughout the history of this legal regime, legal 
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With this formalistic model, legal disciplines grew up by way of differenti-
ation, specialization of methods, categories and themes, marking boundaries 
and separations. Achieving self-referentiality and obtaining thematic / meth-
odological self-sufficiency have also been ways to affirm the raison d’être of 
being and the autonomy of each legal discipline.
To take interdisciplinary approach seriously in legal studies means, there-
fore, breaking through not just methodological but also epistemological bar-
riers.
Moreover, we have to observe that the demand for an update of the meth-
odological approach also concerns legal disciplines that, like legal history, 
have in recent decades abandoned the formalistic approach to legal studies, 
aiming to act as a critical form of knowledge, able to relativize dogmatic cer-
tainties and produce a knowledge capable of revealing, precisely by way of the 
legal-historical perspective, certain mythologies and criticalities in contem-
porary legal discourse.8 The present phase raises new questions also in legal 
history, pressing it to update its relationship with the present.9
When legal history started to implement a critical approach, its voice in 
the interdisciplinary debate on the present acquired an eminently decon-
structive function. In the time of crisis, however, the search for new solutions 
for the changing framework invites legal history to participate with the other 
legal disciplines in a constructive task. It is not a matter of taking past models 
that may be useful to govern the present. This kind of constructive attitude – 
which in the past has been, in fact, quite congenial to legal dogmatics – is not 
appropriate10. It is much more about focusing, by way of the legal historical 
perspective, on the situational value, rather than on the anticipatory value of 
certain doctrines or legal solutions. The task is to make a history of the orig-
discourse on rights, in some cases, has become more sentitive to the social dimension; 
see for example Cazzetta (2007); Grossi (2000). However such a rapprochement, de-
spite some innovative approaches, was mainly based on the assumption of the formalistic 
self-delimitation. The program for equality has been able to keep “within its own scope” 
the legal discourse concerned with the social; it has created the opportunity to consider 
the social, but always assuming that the problem of legal protection could be resolved only 
through a subsumptive dynamic.
8  See among others Grossi (2005), (2006) pp. 3-74; Caroni (2005); Hespanha (2012) 
pp. 13-83; Stolleis (2012); Fonseca (2009).
9  See for example Nuzzo (2013); Costa (2013); Meccarelli (2013), (2015) pp. 249-250; 
Duve (2016); Augusti (2017).
10  See Caroni (2005), pp. 43-71; Grossi (1996), (2006), pp. 55-73; Somma (2002).
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inal limits of legal ideas and legal structures, rather than (as is more usual) a 
history of their emergence11. 
Coming back to our own problem: formalistic and dogmatic legal disci-
plines must give up their usual self-sufficiency and break the circle of self-ref-
erential closure; non-formalistic legal disciplines such as legal history have to 
consider their dialogic position by way of new reasons and aims. Moreover, 
we have to consider this interdisciplinary dialogue not as a mere space for 
exchanging information and different points of view: it should become a plat-
form for creating inter-connections.
How do we improve such a change in legal discourse? I think that that we 
should avoid looking for new general theories. It would seem more produc-
tive to follow a pragmatic approach, addressing specific topics and aiming, 
with interdisciplinary dialogue, to obtain original solutions. 
We can consider acting on four fronts in this regard. We can put the focus 
on thematic areas that, in order to be analysed, require the integration of 
knowledge in a communicative and epistemologically complex framework. 
We can address these issues considering the “how” before the “what” of the 
legal problem in order to open a gate to the “premises” of the problem. We 
have to question what function our own disciplinary knowledge may have in 
this context. Finally, we have to consider the limits of our own disciplinary 
standpoint and, at the same time, consider the reasons and possible outcomes 
of the incursions into other fields of legal knowledge.
This is not a matter of declaring the end of the different autonomous legal 
fields. On the contrary, the fact of rediscovering common fields of interaction 
could update the raison d’être of some disciplinary distinctions. Specialisms 
can survive and even become useful if they save and provide points of contact 
among different fields, making possible the sharing of ideas and research out-
comes. The interdisciplinary challenge means acquiring a dialogical attitude 
among the diverse areas of legal knowledge.
11  As I have already tried to observe (Meccarelli (2015) pp. 249-250), legal historical 
studies should be capable of analysing the constraints of the theoretical sustainability of 
concepts, a perspective mindful of the assumptions underlying the conceptualisation of 
ideas and attentive to the historical and theoretical conditions that justify their perfor-
mance. With such an approach, legal history will be able to interact on a constructive level, 
without sacrificing its specific perspective necessarily devoted to historicizing.
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3. A dialogue with philosophy and social sciences
Our problem acquires a more complex profile if we consider the relation-
ship between the legal sciences (in dialogue) and the human and social sci-
ences. We can look here at some examples, regarding rights and legal pro-
tection, to highlight the reasons and the potential of such dialogue among 
apparently distant sciences.
A possible common area of interest, for legal, human and social studies, 
is the conceptualisation of otherness: In this regard, we, as jurists, can find 
some enriching hermeneutical categories in the philosophical, sociological 
and anthropological debate12. Our conception of law links with the idea of a 
abstract individual as recipient of the law and with “equality” as the device 
for its concrete implementation. Moreover, we have to remember that this 
conception has its own debts to certain philosophical references13. 
Another rights-related topic, which is important for legal studies and is 
also considered in human and social studies, is the conception of human and 
social interactions: I am thinking about the forms of sociality and the re-
lational practices that make them possible. Philosophy and social sciences 
show many facets of the problem. Interculture, hospitality, fraternity and the 
analysis of identitarian social processes14 show possible dynamics of interac-
tion that does not still have proper correspondence with legal institutions. 
Furthermore, there is the fundamental issue of social cohesion: It is a mat-
ter of establishing a dialogue among these sciences in order to consider possi-
ble new configurations for the relationship between rights and social cohesion 
and more generally for the practices of conviviality as a field of occurrence 
of this relationship15. Fundamentally, the protection of rights arises precisely 
from a specific philosophical understanding of the problem of social cohesion, 
one that draws on the idea (in Hobbes and then in Rousseau) of a community 
of individuals who establish political authority with a monistic character and 
as a sovereign entity. A dialogue with philosophy and social sciences can en-
courage emancipation from such a modern configuration of the problem.
12  Among others Lévinas (1985); Todorov (1991); Habermas (2008); Waldenfels 
(2008); Sayad (2008); Viveiros De Castro (2015), (2011).
13  Hespanha (2012), pp. 307-358; Tarello (1976), pp. 133-190; Villey (2013), pp. 493ff.
14  See for example Stara (2014); Galli (1998), pp. 219-243; Derrida (2000); Mauro 
(2017); Baggio (2009); Latour (2005); Godicheau, Sánchez León (2015).
15  Sakrani (2016); Wimmer (2013); Vertovec (2009), (1999); Duve (2014); Mauro (2017).
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A last field of possible interaction concerns conceptions of normativity. 
Philosophy and social sciences can consider levels of normativity that are be-
fore or outside the legal dimension, such as levels of social regulation, that 
nevertheless appear relevant to an understanding of the problem “rights in 
times of crisis”. I am thinking about the field of disciplinary norms and bio-
politic that represent regulatory spaces, which have a strong impact on ac-
cess to universal rights such as human rights16. In am also thinking about the 
problem of cultural diversity and pluralism17, embedded in the relationship 
between law and ethics18, which could allow an updated discussion on multi-
normativity from a legal point of view19.
These are just a few examples. So far, I have talked about why interdisci-
plinary dialogue with human and social sciences should be appropriate, but I 
have not addressed the question of how. 
This is a much more complex issue, considering the epistemological di-
versity between these disciplines in dialogue. To understand the how of such 
dialogue probably requires a distinct analysis for each area of knowledge. 
Without attempting to fully explore this wide theme, we can observe here that 
it seems to be proper a pragmatic approach to the problem and that it may 
be helpful to improve dialogue by studying thematic areas, such as rights in 
times of crises, the complexity of which is beyond the understanding of each 
single specialist knowledge.
With these brief remarks, we can conclude that interdisciplinary research 
should not be a process of convergence in which the diverse forms of disci-
plinary knowledge have to lose their specificity and autonomy. The common 
field of action produced by this kind of dialogue does not, after all, absorb 
the whole field of action of each discipline; it constitutes rather an additional 
scope beyond the respective sites of gravitation of each discipline.
The challenging aspect of interdisciplinary dialogue, therefore, appears to be 
on another level. We can say that this additional scope has an added value: It 
tends to offer each disciplinary knowledge valuable opportunities for extension 
of its own base of epistemic references. It is probably this very de-disciplining 
16  Fonseca (2012), pp. 149-164.
17  De Sousa Santos (1997), pp. 11-32, (2003); Costa (2012), pp. 139-156; Mazzarese 
(2013); Neuenschwander Magalhães (2014).
18  Viola (1996), pp. 195–213, (2012), pp. 465-481.
19  For a perspective from legal history see Vec (2009), pp. 155-166; Duve (2016), pp. 12ff, 
«Rechtsgeschichte» (2017).
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experience20 that offers the heuristic margin that allows the legal, social and hu-
man sciences to produce new syntheses in the problematic, adscriptive time of 
the crisis. On this margin it is possible to advance with confidence.
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